glibc: enable stackprotection hardening
Enables previously manually disabled stackprotector and stackguard randomization. From https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=511811: If glibc is built with the --enable-stackguard-randomization option, each application gets a random canary value (at runtime) from /dev/urandom. If --enable-stackguard-randomization is absent, applications get a static canary value of "0xff0a0000". This is very unfortunate, because the attacker may be able to bypass the stack protection mechanism, by placing those 4 bytes in the canary word, before the actual canary check is performed (for example in memcpy-based buffer overflows).
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation ({
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"--enable-add-ons"
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"--enable-obsolete-rpc"
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"--sysconfdir=/etc"
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"libc_cv_ssp=no"
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"--enable-stackguard-randomization"
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(if linuxHeaders != null
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then "--with-headers=${linuxHeaders}/include"
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else "--without-headers")
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