Addressing PR feedback

This commit is contained in:
Parnell Springmeyer
2017-01-28 20:48:03 -08:00
parent 9de070e620
commit e92b8402b0
70 changed files with 320 additions and 510 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ with lib;
config = mkIf (cfg.confineSUIDApplications) {
security.apparmor.profiles = [ (pkgs.writeText "ping" ''
#include <tunables/global>
/var/permissions-wrappers/ping {
/run/wrappers/ping {
#include <abstractions/base>
#include <abstractions/consoles>
#include <abstractions/nameservice>
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ with lib;
${pkgs.attr.out}/lib/libattr.so* mr,
${pkgs.iputils}/bin/ping mixr,
/var/permissions-wrappers/ping.real r,
/run/wrappers/ping.real r,
#/etc/modules.conf r,
@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@ in
config = mkIf cfg.enable {
environment.systemPackages = [ sandbox ];
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid = [
{ program = sandbox.passthru.sandboxExecutableName;
source = "${sandbox}/bin/${sandbox.passthru.sandboxExecutableName}";
}
];
security.setuidPrograms = [ sandbox.passthru.sandboxExecutableName ];
};
}
+1 -10
View File
@@ -188,16 +188,7 @@ in
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.duo-unix ];
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid =
[
{ program = "login_duo";
source = "${pkgs.duo-unix.out}/bin/login_duo";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
];
security.setuidPrograms = [ "login_duo" ];
environment.etc = loginCfgFile ++ pamCfgFile;
/* If PAM *and* SSH are enabled, then don't do anything special.
+7 -26
View File
@@ -472,33 +472,14 @@ in
++ optionals config.security.pam.enableU2F [ pkgs.pam_u2f ]
++ optionals config.security.pam.enableEcryptfs [ pkgs.ecryptfs ];
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid =
[
{ program = "unix_chkpwd";
source = "${pkgs.pam}/sbin/unix_chkpwd.orig";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
security.setuidPrograms =
optionals config.security.pam.enableEcryptfs [ "mount.ecryptfs_private" "umount.ecryptfs_private" ];
] ++ (optional config.security.pam.enableEcryptfs
{ program = "umount.ecryptfs_private";
source = "${pkgs.ecryptfs.out}/bin/umount.ecryptfs_private";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
) ++ (optional config.security.pam.enableEcryptfs
{ program = "mount.ecryptfs_private";
source = "${pkgs.ecryptfs.out}/bin/mount.ecryptfs_private";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
);
security.wrappers.unix_chkpwd = {
source = "${pkgs.pam}/sbin/unix_chkpwd.orig";
owner = "root";
setuid = true;
};
environment.etc =
mapAttrsToList (n: v: makePAMService v) config.security.pam.services;
+1 -16
View File
@@ -33,22 +33,7 @@ in
config = mkIf (cfg.enable || anyUsbAuth) {
# Make sure pmount and pumount are setuid wrapped.
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid =
[
{ program = "pmount";
source = "${pkgs.pmount.out}/bin/pmount";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
{ program = "pumount";
source = "${pkgs.pmount.out}/bin/pumount";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
];
security.setuidPrograms = [ "pmount" "pumount" ];
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.pmount ];
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
inherit (config.security) run-permissionsWrapperDir permissionsWrapperDir;
isNotNull = v: if v != null then true else false;
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
setcapWrappers = import ./setcap-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
setuidWrappers = import ./setuid-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers
configureSetcapWrapper =
{ program
, capabilities
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
}: ''
cp ${setcapWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
# Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so
# the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on
# its file into the Ambient set.
#
# Only set the capabilities though if we're being told to
# do so.
${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
# Set the executable bit
chmod u+rx,g+x,o+x $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
'';
###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers
configureSetuidWrapper =
{ program
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setuid ? false
, setgid ? false
, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
}: ''
cp ${setuidWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" $permissionsWrapperDir/${program}
'';
in
{
###### interface
options = {
security.permissionsWrappers.setcap = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "ping";
source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping";
owner = "nobody";
group = "nogroup";
capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep";
}
];
description = ''
This option sets capabilities on a wrapper program that
propagates those capabilities down to the wrapped, real
program.
The `program` attribute is the name of the program to be
wrapped. If no `source` attribute is provided, specifying the
absolute path to the program, then the program will be
searched for in the path environment variable.
NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper program
to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT raised to
the Ambient set so that the real program cannot modify its own
capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for cases in which
the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at least leans on
the side security paranoid vs. too relaxed.
'';
};
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "sendmail";
source = "/nix/store/.../bin/sendmail";
owner = "nobody";
group = "postdrop";
setuid = false;
setgid = true;
permissions = "u+rx,g+x,o+x";
}
];
description = ''
This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid
wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the
default (setuid root, but not setgid root).
'';
};
security.permissionsWrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
default = "/var/permissions-wrappers";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the path to the permissions wrappers. It
should not be overriden.
'';
};
security.run-permissionsWrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
default = "/run/permissions-wrapper-dirs";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the run path to the permissions
wrappers. It should not be overriden.
'';
};
};
###### implementation
config = {
# Make sure our setcap-wrapper dir exports to the PATH env
# variable when initializing the shell
environment.extraInit = ''
# The permissions wrappers override other bin directories.
export PATH="${permissionsWrapperDir}:$PATH"
'';
system.activationScripts.wrapper-dir = ''
mkdir -p "${permissionsWrapperDir}"
'';
###### setcap activation script
system.activationScripts.permissions-wrappers =
lib.stringAfter [ "users" ]
''
# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
# programs to be wrapped.
PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
mkdir -p ${run-permissionsWrapperDir}
permissionsWrapperDir=$(mktemp --directory --tmpdir=${run-permissionsWrapperDir} permissions-wrappers.XXXXXXXXXX)
chmod a+rx $permissionsWrapperDir
${lib.concatMapStrings configureSetcapWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setcap)}
${lib.concatMapStrings configureSetuidWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setuid)}
if [ -L ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then
# Atomically replace the symlink
# See https://axialcorps.com/2013/07/03/atomically-replacing-files-and-directories/
old=$(readlink ${permissionsWrapperDir})
ln --symbolic --force --no-dereference $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp
mv --no-target-directory ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp ${permissionsWrapperDir}
rm --force --recursive $old
elif [ -d ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then
# Compatibility with old state, just remove the folder and symlink
rm -f ${permissionsWrapperDir}/*
# if it happens to be a tmpfs
${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${permissionsWrapperDir} || true
rm -d ${permissionsWrapperDir}
ln -d --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}
else
# For initial setup
ln --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}
fi
'';
};
}
+2 -16
View File
@@ -83,22 +83,8 @@ in
security.pam.services.polkit-1 = {};
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid =
[
{ program = "pkexec";
source = "${pkgs.polkit.out}/bin/pkexec";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
{ program = "polkit-agent-helper-1";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
source = "${pkgs.polkit.out}/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1";
}
];
security.setuidPrograms = [ "pkexec" ];
security.wrappers."polkit-agent-helper-1".source = "${pkgs.polkit.out}/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1";
system.activationScripts.polkit =
''
+1 -16
View File
@@ -81,22 +81,7 @@ in
${cfg.extraConfig}
'';
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid =
[
{ program = "sudo";
source = "${pkgs.sudo.out}/bin/sudo";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
{ program = "sudoedit";
source = "${pkgs.sudo.out}/bin/sudoedit";
owner = "root";
group = "root";
setuid = true;
}
];
security.setuidPrograms = [ "sudo" "sudoedit" ];
environment.systemPackages = [ sudo ];
+191
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
inherit (config.security) wrapperDir;
isNotNull = v: if v != null || v != "" then true else false;
cfg = config.security.wrappers;
setcapWrappers = import ./setcap-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
setuidWrappers = import ./setuid-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers
mkSetcapProgram =
{ program
, capabilities
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
...
}: ''
cp ${setcapWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper $wrapperDir/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 $wrapperDir/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} $wrapperDir/${program}
# Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so
# the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on
# its file into the Ambient set.
#
# Only set the capabilities though if we're being told to
# do so.
${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" $wrapperDir/${program}
# Set the executable bit
chmod u+rx,g+x,o+x $wrapperDir/${program}
'';
###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers
mkSetuidProgram =
{ program
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setuid ? false
, setgid ? false
, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
...
}: ''
cp ${setuidWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper $wrapperDir/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 $wrapperDir/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} $wrapperDir/${program}
chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" $wrapperDir/${program}
'';
in
{
###### interface
options = {
security.wrappers.setcap = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "ping";
source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping";
owner = "nobody";
group = "nogroup";
capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep";
}
];
description = ''
This option sets capabilities on a wrapper program that
propagates those capabilities down to the wrapped, real
program.
The <literal>program</literal> attribute is the name of the
program to be wrapped. If no <literal>source</literal>
attribute is provided, specifying the absolute path to the
program, then the program will be searched for in the path
environment variable.
NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper program
to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT raised to
the Ambient set so that the real program cannot modify its own
capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for cases in which
the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at least leans on
the side security paranoid vs. too relaxed.
'';
};
security.setuidPrograms = mkOption {
type = types.listOf types.str;
default = [];
example = ["passwd"];
description = ''
The Nix store cannot contain setuid/setgid programs directly.
For this reason, NixOS can automatically generate wrapper
programs that have the necessary privileges. This option
lists the names of programs in the system environment for
which setuid root wrappers should be created.
'';
};
security.wrappers = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.attrs;
default = {};
example = {
sendmail.source = "/nix/store/.../bin/sendmail";
};
description = ''
This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid
wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the
default (setuid root, but not setgid root).
'';
};
security.old-wrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
default = "/var/setuid-wrappers";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the path to the wrapper programs. It
should not be overriden.
'';
};
security.wrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
default = "/run/wrappers";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the path to the wrapper programs. It
should not be overriden.
'';
};
};
###### implementation
config = {
# Make sure our setcap-wrapper dir exports to the PATH env
# variable when initializing the shell
environment.extraInit = ''
# The permissions wrappers override other bin directories.
export PATH="${wrapperDir}:$PATH"
'';
###### setcap activation script
system.activationScripts.wrappers =
let
programs =
(map (x: { program = x; owner = "root"; group = "root"; setuid = true; })
config.security.setuidPrograms)
++ lib.mapAttrsToList
(n: v: (if v ? "program" then v else v // {program=n;}))
cfg.wrappers;
wrapperPrograms =
builtins.map
(s: if (s ? "setuid" && s.setuid == true) ||
(s ? "setguid" && s.setguid == true) ||
(s ? "permissions")
then mkSetuidProgram s
else if (s ? "capabilities")
then mkSetcapProgram s
else ""
) programs;
in lib.stringAfter [ "users" ]
''
# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
# programs to be wrapped.
WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
mkdir -p ${wrapperDir}
wrapperDir=$(mktemp --directory --tmpdir=${wrapperDir} wrappers.XXXXXXXXXX)
chmod a+rx $wrapperDir
${lib.concatStringsSep "\n" (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.wrappers)}
'';
};
}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
cfg = config.security.wrappers;
# Produce a shell-code splice intended to be stitched into one of
# the build or install phases within the derivation.
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ let
source=/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/${program}
fi
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETCAP=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${config.security.run-permissionsWrapperDir}\" \
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETCAP=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${config.security.run-wrapperDir}\" \
-lcap-ng -lcap ${./permissions-wrapper.c} -o $out/bin/${program}.wrapper -L ${pkgs.libcap.lib}/lib -L ${pkgs.libcap_ng}/lib \
-I ${pkgs.libcap.dev}/include -I ${pkgs.libcap_ng}/include -I ${pkgs.linuxHeaders}/include
'';
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
cfg = config.security.wrappers;
# Produce a shell-code splice intended to be stitched into one of
# the build or install phases within the derivation.
mkSetuidWrapper = { program, source ? null, ...}: ''
if ! source=${if source != null then source else "$(readlink -f $(PATH=$PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH type -tP ${program}))"}; then
# If we can't find the program, fall back to the
# system profile.
source=/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/${program}
if ! source=${if source != null then source else "$(readlink -f $(PATH=$WRAPPER_PATH type -tP ${program}))"}; then
# If we can't find the program, fall back to the
# system profile.
source=/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/${program}
fi
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETUID=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${config.security.run-permissionsWrapperDir}\" \
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETUID=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${config.security.run-wrapperDir}\" \
-lcap-ng -lcap ${./permissions-wrapper.c} -o $out/bin/${program}.wrapper -L ${pkgs.libcap.lib}/lib -L ${pkgs.libcap_ng}/lib \
-I ${pkgs.libcap.dev}/include -I ${pkgs.libcap_ng}/include -I ${pkgs.linuxHeaders}/include
'';