217 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
217 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
September 1991
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ESPIONAGE AWARENESS PROGRAMS
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By
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Freddie L. Capps, Jr.
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Special Agent
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FBI National DECA Coordinator
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Intelligence Division Assignment
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FBI Headquarters
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Washington, D.C.
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On a Saturday morning in January 1980, while on patrol,
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Cpl. Thomas E. Hutchins, a Maryland State trooper, noticed a car
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with diplomatic tags traveling slowly on a major highway. The
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trooper also observed that the driver of the car was constantly
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checking his rearview mirror as he drove. The actions of the
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driver, combined with the speed of the vehicle, the early hour,
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and the diplomatic tags, aroused his suspicions enough that he
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ran a check of the car's registration. It was registered to a
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Soviet, Ivan Ivanovich Odintsov. The trooper then asked himself
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what could a Soviet diplomat be doing at 6:00 a.m. on a cold
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Saturday morning? Now, more suspicious than ever, Corporal
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Hutchins continued to follow the diplomat's car.
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The diplomat, noticing the patrol vehicle, tried to evade
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the trooper. Then, he attempted several countersurveillance
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techniques to determine if he was still being followed. Losing
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his composure, the diplomat accelerated to more than 60 m.p.h.
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and ran a stop sign. This was when Corporal Hutchins decided to
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pull him over.
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As he approached the stopped vehicle, Corporal Hutchins
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noticed that the Soviet diplomat appeared frightened and
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nervous. When asked to identify himself, Odintsov stated he was
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a Soviet diplomat and produced a diplomatic passport and a
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District of Columbia driver's license. Also, with no prompting,
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he told the officer that he was going fishing.
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Corporal Hutchins, seeing no fishing gear in the car and
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knowing that there was no place to fish in the area, asked his
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dispatcher to contact the U.S. State Department to advise them
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of the stop and seek its guidance. A short time later, the
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dispatcher informed the trooper that no one was available at the
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State Department at that hour. Concerned about the proximity of
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the Soviet to Andrews Air Force Base and the Naval
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Communications Station, which were both less than 5 miles away,
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but running out of alternatives, he decided to issue the Soviet
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a warning citation and allowed him to depart. However, before
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the end of his patrol, the trooper did notify the Security
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Police at the airbase of the Soviet's presence in the area.
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Unknown to Corporal Hutchins, the Soviet was a known KGB
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intelligence officer. Later, in 1985, the FBI learned that
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Odintsov was one of the KGB officers responsible for handling
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John Walker, the most notable Soviet penetration of the U.S.
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Navy in this century. The fact that Walker was not identified
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on that Saturday morning, 5 years earlier, was just bad luck.
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MISSION
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Identifying agents and activities of foreign intelligence
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services in the United States is the most difficult task of
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counterintelligence. Without identification, plans cannot be
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developed to penetrate and neutralize an espionage operation.
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However, once the identification is made, even the most
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sophisticated network can be brought down.
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To be successful in its counterintelligence mission, the
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FBI depends on an informed, enlightened citizenry and local and
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State law enforcement to assist in the identification process.
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Public participation in the identification process has led to
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the identification of past KGB activities, and it still remains
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critical to current counterintelligence efforts.
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Unfortunately, however, the American public's perception of
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the Soviet threat has changed considerably in recent years. In
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June 1989, public opinion polls conducted in the United States
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indicated that 65% of Americans no longer consider the Soviet
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Union an immediate threat. (1) And, Stern Magazine reported
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that during the summer of 1989, 50% of West Germans polled
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believed they were more threatened by the United States than the
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Soviet Union. (2) Interesting facts, especially since both
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polls were taken before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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Now, incidents witnessed by American citizens that were
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previously viewed as suspicious or threatening are no longer
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seen in that light. In turn, citizens report fewer of these
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incidents.
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Today, the uninformed might conclude that an effective
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counterintelligence program is no longer necessary. Nothing
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could be further from the truth. As Nicholas Daniloff, former
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Moscow reporter for U.S. News and World Report and one-time
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prisoner of the KGB, stated in a recent newspaper article,
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"Despite the reforms...Soviet spying against the United States
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will continue with intensity for a long time to come." (3)
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What the American public fails to realize is that the
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Soviets continue to spend billions of dollars annually on
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espionage and intelligence collections activities in an attempt
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to close the gap with the West in microelectronics, computers,
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and sophisticated weapons systems. (4) In fact, heightened
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citizen awareness and cooperation is needed just as much now as
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it was in the past.
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THE DECA PROGRAM
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The FBI has developed a variety of techniques and programs
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to counter the activities of hostile foreign intelligence
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services in the United States. One of the most effective of
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these efforts is the Development of Espionage and
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Counterintelligence Awareness Program (DECA). DECA links the
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FBI's counterintelligence program to the security countermeasures
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employed by defense contractors. Under this program, FBI
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resources are focused on the spy's targets--U.S. employees with
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access to classified information--not on the intelligence
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officer or the diplomatic establishment.
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The DECA Program operates in all 56 FBI Field Offices. In
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each office, a DECA coordinator administers the program. The
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coordinator's primary responsibility is to visit firms that have
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been awarded classified contracts to update them on current
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foreign intelligence threats.
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Because of the dramatic increase in the threat posed by
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foreign intelligence services, the focus of the DECA Program has
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been expanded to now include American firms not engaged in
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classified government contracts and the public in general.
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Also, with the increase in exchange programs among Soviet and
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East European governments and U.S. Government agencies and local
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law enforcement agencies, DECA coordinators are now providing
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espionage briefings to other Federal agencies and local police
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departments.
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At the beginning of 1990, the FBI appointed a national DECA
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coordinator (NDC) to manage the program throughout the country.
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A short time later, a national DECA advisory committee was
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organized. This committee, composed of DECA coordinators from
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the larger FBI field offices, assists the NDC with the
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formulation and implementation of DECA goals, training, slides,
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videos, (5) and literature.
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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AWARENESS COUNCIL
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In August 1988, as another step designed to increase
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espionage awareness, the Industrial Security Awareness Council
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(ISAC) was formed. ISAC is a joint Government/private sector
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working group whose membership includes the Defense
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Investigative Service (DIS), the FBI, and 11 defense
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contractors. (6)
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ISAC's goal is to promote security awareness in the defense
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industry by focusing on the collective resources of industry and
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government. Its members share awareness resources, thereby
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reducing needless duplication of efforts that occur when
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companies operate alone, without coordination and cooperation.
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This concept has since been expanded by DIS and the FBI to other
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regions of the country and plans are in progress to make it a
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national organization.
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CONCLUSION
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The United States continues to have secrets that some
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foreign powers seek and are willing to steal. These secrets go
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beyond the strategic military and technological information that
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impact on national security. They also include sensitive
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economic information and proprietary technologies of America's
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private sector. These technologies may never be classified, but
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their loss could have a negative impact on those companies who
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developed them. A loss in the private sector, if significant
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enough to threaten a company's survival, could also endanger
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national security.
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The successes achieved by Soviet and other foreign
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intelligence services during the 1980s serve to reinforce the
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fact that counterintelligence is a strategic issue that requires
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a coordinated, effective national response. Because the world
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is so complex and is in a constant state of flux, the FBI must
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be able to articulate clearly this evolving intelligence threat
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and work with America's private sector to meet today's
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counterintelligence challenges successfully.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) David Remnick, The Washington Post, June 13, 1989, p.
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A 1.
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(2) Ibid.
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(3) Nicholas Daniloff, "Reforms In Soviet Union Only
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Increase Appetites For Secrets From The West," Los Angeles
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Times, August 9, 1989.
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(4) Hughes Aircraft Company, A Counterintelligence
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Awareness Primer, 1987, p. 5.
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(5) Hughes Aircraft Company and the FBI jointly produced a
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video entitled "Espionage 2000." This 30-minute video contains
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interviews of experts in the counterintelligence and security
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countermeasures fields discussing important awareness issues.
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It is available to any government agency or defense contractor
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for use in espionage awareness programs by contacting the FBI,
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the Defense Investigative Service, or the Hughes Aircraft
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Company.
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(6) The 11 defense contractors are Aerospace Corporation,
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Hughes Aircraft Company, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Lockheed
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Aeronautical Systems Company, Logicon, McDonnell Douglas
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Corporation, Northrop Corporation, Rockwell International
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Corporation, Science Applications International, Trident Data
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Corporation, and TRW.
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