827 lines
37 KiB
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827 lines
37 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Wed Apr 22, 1998 Volume 10 : Issue 25
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
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CONTENTS, #10.25 (Wed, Apr 22, 1998)
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File 1--Call for Papers - Special Issue of SP&E
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File 2--Congress May Soon Vote on Spawn of CDA Censorship Bills
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File 3--"Spam King" abdicates
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File 4--REVIEW: "Digital Fortress", Dan Brown
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File 5--Internet porn restriction moving ahead in Congress
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File 6--Re: "tagging color printers" (CuD 10.22)
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File 7--Re: File 1--proposal of technical solutions to spam problem
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File 8--for CuD
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File 9--Islands in the Clickstream. Densities. April 11, 1998
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File 10--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION ApPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 1998 07:58:57 -0700 (PDT)
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From: Gene Spafford <spaf@CS.PURDUE.EDU>
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Subject: File 1--Call for Papers - Special Issue of SP&E
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Call for Papers
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Special issue of "Software Practice & Experience"
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Experiences with Computer and Network Security
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July 1, 1998
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Later this year or early next year, there will be a special issue
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of the journal "Software Practice & Experience," with Gene
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Spafford as the guest editor; if there are enough articles, a
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second issue may also be published. This special issue will be
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devoted to experiences with computer and network security.
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The purpose of Software- Practice & Experience is to convey the
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results of practical experience (whether successful or not) that
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might benefit the computing community. The key criterion for a
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paper is that it make a contribution from which other persons
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engaged in software design and implementation might benefit.
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Originality, although important, is secondary, especially in cases
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where apparently well known techniques do not appear in the
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readily available literature.
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Papers describing both `systems' and `applications' software in
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any computing environment are acceptable. Typical topics include
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software design and implementation, case studies, studies
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describing the evolution of software systems, critical appraisals
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of systems, and the practical aspects of software engineering.
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Theoretical discussions can be included, but should illuminate the
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practical aspects of the work, or indicate directions that might
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lead to better practical systems.
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This special issue is specifically devoted to issues of computer
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and network security software. We are seeking high-quality
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articles relating to the above-mentioned themes. This includes
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papers on at least the following topics:
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* access control systems
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* auditing systems and analysis
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* misuse and instrusion detection systems
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* applications of cryptography
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* secure messaging systems
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* information protection systems
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* security of mobile code
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* security of browsers and related technology
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* security testing and assurance
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* firewall construction and testing
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* experiences with new security programming paradigms
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* development and experience with "hacking tools"
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* experiences with patching security flaws
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Papers may be of any length, ranging from a short note (perhaps a page) to
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a full treatment of a substantial software system (say 40 pages). To submit
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a paper to this special issue of the journal, please submit 3 paper copies
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of your paper, double-spaced, to:
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SP&E Special Issue Submissions
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c/o Prof. Eugene Spafford
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Department of Computer Sciences
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Purdue University
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West Lafayette, IN 47907-1398
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Articles should be submitted when ready, and preferably by July 1,
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1998 so as to allow sufficient time for peer review and any
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required edits and resubmission. Expected publication of the
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issue will be December 1998.
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If you are interested in being added to the list of potential
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reviewers for this issue, or if you have questions concerning
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submissions, contact Spaf at <spaf@cs.purdue.edu>
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 1998 17:44:12 -0500 (EST)
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From: owner-cyber-liberties@aclu.org
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Subject: File 2--Congress May Soon Vote on Spawn of CDA Censorship Bills
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CYBER-LIBERTIES UPDATE
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April 7, 1998
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7Congress May Soon Vote on Spawn of CDA Censorship Bills
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Congress May Soon Vote on Spawn of CDA Censorship Bills
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The Senate Commerce Committee recently approved two bills that may soon
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go to a floor vote that reconstruct the unconstitutional provisions of
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the 1996 Communications Decency Act and remove power from parents and
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local communities to decide how to help children use the Internet
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safely.
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The ACLU dubbed the bills "spawn of CDA," saying in a letter to the
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committee that the proposals fly in the face of the Supreme Court's
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landmark ruling in ACLU v. Reno and will restrict protected speech on
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the Internet.
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Ignoring these warnings, the Commerce Committee passed Senate Bill 1619,
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the Internet School Filtering Act, by a unanimous voice vote. The bill,
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sponsored by Sen. John McCain, R-AZ, requires all public libraries and
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schools that receive federal funds for Internet access to use blocking
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software.
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The second bill, S. 1482, was sponsored by Senator Dan Coats, R-IN.
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Dubbed "Son of CDA," its thrust is identical to the ill-fated
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Communications Decency
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Act, which was unanimously overturned last year by the United States
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Supreme Court in
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Reno v ACLU. The lone dissenter in that voice vote was Sen. Ron Wyden,
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D-OR, who criticized the "one-size-fits-all Washington approach" to
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regulating the Internet.
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Congress is obviously enjoying the free political ride these bills
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provide, with little thought for the taxpayers who will ultimately pay
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the price when the courts strike them down, said Ann Beeson, ACLU Staff
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Attorney.
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In an ACLU letter to the Senate Committee about the Internet Filtering
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Act, the group said, "blocking software restricts access to valuable,
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protected online speech about topics including safe sex, AIDS and even
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web sites posted by religious groups such as the Society of Friends and
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the Glide United Methodist Church."
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The ACLU is also working with 37 organizations that are members of the
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Internet Free Expression Alliance (IFEA) on efforts to dissuade Congress
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from passing the laws.
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The ACLU and IFEA members continue to emphasize that parents and
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teachers, not the government, should provide minors with guidance about
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accessing the Internet.
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The Coats bill, which attempts to narrow the CDA's restrictions to
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speech that is "harmful to minors," is also unconstitutional, the groups
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said, because such speech is "unquestionably protected by the
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Constitution when communicated among adults."
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The bill would impose criminal penalties on any sites with a commercial
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component that provide access to inappropriate material without
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requiring age verification. The definition of commercial distributor
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could include any site from amazon.com to individual home pages that
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have banner advertisements.
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The bill also "fails to make any distinction between material that may
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be harmful to a six-year-old but valuable for a 16-year-old, such as
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safer-sex information," the ACLU letter said.
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Some Congressional staff members believe the bills may go to a floor
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vote shortly after Congress spring recess.
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Take action against these bills by sending a message to Congress that
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you oppose these bills. You may send a fax in just a few moments by
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visiting the In Congress section of the ACLU Freedom Network web
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page, online at: <http://www.aclu.org/congress/IC031298.html>
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More information can also be found online at the Internet Free
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Expression Alliance home page, online at <http://www.ifea.net>
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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The Update is a bi-weekly e-zine on cyber-liberties cases and
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controversies at the state and federal level. Questions or comments can
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be sent to Cassidy Sehgal at csehgal@aclu.org. Past issues are archived
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at: <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates.html>
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To subscribe to the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, send a message to
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majordomo@aclu.org with "subscribe Cyber-Liberties" in the body of your
|
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message. To terminate your subscription, send a message to
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majordomo@aclu.org with "unsubscribe Cyber-Liberties" in the body.
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FOR GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACLU, WRITE TO info@aclu.org.
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SEE US ON THE WEB AT <http://www.aclu.org> AND AMERICA ONLINE KEYWORD:
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ACLU
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------------------------------
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From: "Leandro Asnaghi-Nicastro" <leandro@CAPNASTY.ORG>
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Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1998 22:36:30 +0000
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Subject: File 3--"Spam King" abdicates
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Thursday April 16 11:17 AM EDT
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"Spam King" abdicates
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PHILADELPHIA (Reuters) - "The Spam King," one of the most notorious
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junk e-mailers on the Internet, says he has abdicated his throne and
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promises never to sin again.
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But not everyone believes him.
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Sanford Wallace, 29-year-old president of Cyber Promotions Inc.,
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abruptly announced his decision to a legion of long-time adversaries
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who frequent a newsgroup dedicated to fighting bulk e-mail promotions.
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The term "spamming" was derived from a "Monty Python" sketch in which
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a waitress offers diners a choice of "spam, spam, spam, spam and
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spam."
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As the Internet's so-called Spam King, Wallace once boasted that his
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Philadelphia-based firm was sending out 25 million promotional e-mails
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daily on behalf of himself and his clients.
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But in his parting message, posted last weekend, he said he had not
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only abandoned the practice but would support anti-spam legislation.
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"I will never go back to spamming," he wrote. "I apologize for my past
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actions."
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He added that although there was money in spamming, profits were
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outweighed by risks.
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Some anti-spam activists welcomed the news as a sign that the battle
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had turned in their favor. But others remained suspicious, recalling
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that Wallace had once previously promised to desist and form a direct
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mailing standards organization.
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His latest change of heart followed a futile six-month attempt to get
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his operation back online after an angry service provider cut him off.
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He also had been saddled with expensive legal settlements, ending with
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a judgment against him last week over unsolicited faxes.
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Wallace could not be reached for comment. ^REUTERS@
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 16 Apr 1998 08:38:02 -0800
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From: "Rob Slade" <rslade@sprint.ca>
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Subject: File 4--REVIEW: "Digital Fortress", Dan Brown
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BKDGTLFT.RVW 980222
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"Digital Fortress", Dan Brown, 1998, 0-312-18087-X, U$24.95/C$33.95
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%A Dan Brown danbrown@digitalfortress.com
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%C 175 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10010
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%D 1998
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%G 0-312-18087-X
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%I St. Martin's Press
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%O U$24.95/C$33.95 212-674-5151 fax 800-288-2131 www.stmartins.com
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%P 384 p.
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%T "Digital Fortress"
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Dear Dan,
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Thanks for getting St. Martin's to send along the book. I enjoyed it
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a lot. Your characters are great, and the device of having the
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physical "street" action run in parallel with the cerebrations going
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on in Crypto was quite effective. It lost a little when the action in
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Crypto got physical, and at times the street activity skated a bit
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close to farce, but that's a fine line with thrillers anyway. You
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have a fine touch with dialogue, and the misunderstandings caused by
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specific messages was particularly realistic. (Although, if I may
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say, the people who staff your command center are a bit thick: I got
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it sixteen pages before they did.)
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However, I suspect that whoever suggested the review project to you
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didn't tell you the whole story. The books reviewed here are
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critiqued on the basis of technology, including the fiction. And on
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that score, well, there are a few things you might want to reconsider
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on your next effort.
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I will say that you have included a good presentation of ciphering,
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although you sometimes seem to get codes and ciphers confused.
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("Without wax" is a code, and therefore not subject to decryption.)
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You have also stressed the importance of key lengths, which, along
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with the algorithm used, is critical to determining the strength of
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encryption. Cryptographic key length is usually expressed in bits,
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but you often refer to keys with different lengths of characters. A
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character is usually measured as a byte, or eight bits.
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(Incidentally, ASCII characters were original defined as seven bits,
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so there are only 128, not 256.) Let me point out, though, that
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*adding* a single bit (not character) to a key length is generally
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considered to double the key space, essentially doubling the time
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necessary to crack a given key.
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Let's start with arithmetic. If your TRANSLTR superdecrypter is able
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to crack a 64 *character* key in ten minutes, a 65 character key will
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take about a day. A 66 character key will need about four months.
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However, in the book, a 10,000 bit key, which is equivalent to 1,250
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bytes and roughly twenty *times* as long as your 64 byte key, only
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takes an hour. A key length a hundred times as long as the 10,000
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bits takes only three hours.
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Sticking with calculations, I note that your command center, dominated
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by a 30' by 40' video wall, required the excavation of 250 metric tons
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of earth. If so, the room is less than eight feet from front to back,
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even if it was earth that was excavated and not rock, as one might
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expect at 214 feet down. In the same vein, TRANSLTR is housed in
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something no more than twenty three feet across and eight stories
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deep. But if we assume that the three million processors in it are no
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more advanced than, say, Pentiums, then the processors themselves are
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going to occupy a solid block of space ten feet thick and five stories
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high, even if the "spray-seal" doesn't add too much bulk. (I assume
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that by "VSLI" you mean VLSI, very large scale integration?) This
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disregards the space needed for memory, support chips, the boards
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themselves, cabling, interfaces, catwalks, and the oft-mentioned
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generators and cooling system, never mind enough air to support a
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fire.
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(While we are on the subject, we might as well mention chemistry: fire
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consumes oxygen, it doesn't usually release it.)
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A short detour via linguistics. Japanese ideographs are, as you say,
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based on Chinese ideographs. The similarity is not confined to the
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form of the symbols, though: enough of the meaning should come through
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in either language. (Of course, if you have the actual symbols, it
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should be clear which language is being used. The biggest problem
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would be in determining representation for the symbols. Unicode,
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anyone?)
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And, finally, to computers. Just to get these points out of the way,
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Grace Murray Hopper's moth was found in the Mark II, not the Mark I,
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and was not the first use of the term "bug" (although it may have been
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the origin of the use of "debugging"). PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is
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not an algorithm, although it is one of the most widely used
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implementations.
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First of all, you can't weld ceramic, and secondly, if you do weld the
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computer shut, you have rendered it instantly obsolete. Even Deep
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Blue got rebuilt between matches. Next, it makes no sense to say that
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the computer uses quantum states "rather than" binary for storage.
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Binary is, in a basic sense, a quantum state, and quantum physics
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could be used to build devices that store binary information. (All
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information can be stored in a binary system.) Also, I know about
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silicon, CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor), and gallium-
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arsenide but ... titanium-strontium? And, OK, I know titanium burns,
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but you have to get it pretty darn hot in order to do so.
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Yes, some languages are similar enough that it makes it easy for
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someone who has learned one to learn the other. However, it doesn't
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mean that you automatically know how to use a third. When programs
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are created, though, they are generally compiled into machine
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language. (Certainly programs in Pascal and C are.) That means it
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doesn't matter what languages you know: typing source commands into
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the keyboard isn't going to affect the running program. Some
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scripting languages use the source files, but Pascal and C don't
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qualify. But the difference between source and object code raises
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another point: the net would not automatically adopt an encryption
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standard without having the source code and a description of the
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algorithm to examine. The source code for PGP is available, and many
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people compile their program directly from the source, not trusting an
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already compiled version. Therefore, a "trap-doored" Digital Fortress
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would be detected almost immediately. (The publication of the
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Skipjack algorithm did result in the detection of a bug: ironically
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the bug would have let the public use non-escrowed keys with it,
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rendering the government's attempt to read messages much more
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difficult.) Your email tracer doesn't make any sense: if you can't
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find the guy, how can you find his site? Also, even if you could link
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back to him somehow, as I get everlastingly tired of repeating, you
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can't send programs in text messages (at least, not without it being
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blindingly obvious).
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More importantly, it doesn't matter how powerful your computer is, you
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can't decrypt a message with a key if you don't know the algorithm.
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Key length is important, but so is the algorithm used. A 56 bit
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(that's seven bytes, by the way) key can be very strong in one
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algorithm, and relatively weak in another. Also, the importance of
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public-key encryption does not lie simply in the strength of the
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algorithm. It is the "public" aspect that is so important.
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Correspondents who have not met can be completely sure of the
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authentication of the other without ever knowing identities. A
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fraudulent "North Dakota" would not be a problem to someone who really
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knew about encryption.
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Finally, there is my field, viruses. It makes no sense to create a
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virus for a one-of-a-kind computer, since viruses, as you eventually
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do point out, are meant to reproduce. Most of what you say about
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viruses makes no sense, including "mutation strings" and "rotating
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cleartext." Viruses do not infect data, or, if they do, they just
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corrupt it, rather than continuing to spread. I suppose you can
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"cross-breed [viruses] into oblivion," but it's easier to delete than
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overwrite them. And finally, what you have isn't a virus, and, no, it
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isn't a worm either. (Worms reproduce, too.) What you have is the
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classic, common or garden trojan horse. The bane of greedy net
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surfers everywhere.
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copyright Robert M. Slade, 1998 BKDGTLFT.RVW 980222
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 2 Apr 1998 14:20:54 -0800
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From: "(--Todd Lappin-->)" <telstar@wired.com>
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Subject: File 5--Internet porn restriction moving ahead in Congress
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Internet porn restriction moving ahead in Congress
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|
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WASHINGTON, April 2 (Reuters) - Legislation to restrict
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pornography on the Internet, backed by conservative lawmakers but
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opposed by civil libertarians, is picking up momentum,
|
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Congressional staff members said on Thursday.
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Last month, the Senate Commerce Committee approved a bill
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authored by Dan Coats, Republican of Indiana, that would require
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commercial Internet sites containing material deemed harmful to
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minors to prohibit access by children.
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Within a few weeks, a companion bill will be introduced in the
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U.S. House of Representatives by Republicans Mike Oxley of Ohio
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and Jim Greenwood of Pennsylvania, an Oxley staffer said.
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"Senator Coats has done a good job of building momentum," the
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staffer said.
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|
|
------------------------------
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From: "Frank Knobbe" <FKnobbe@BELLSOUTH.NET>
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Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1998 23:07:17 -0600
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Subject: File 6--Re: "tagging color printers" (CuD 10.22)
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|
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> Date--06 Apr 1998 15:29:44 -0400
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> From--Mark Atwood <mra@POBOX.COM>
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> Subject--File 3--US Govt wants to "tag" color printers
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|
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[...]
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> "In addition, Castle said, practical and realistic measures to tag
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> scanners and printers must be considered, in order to identify the
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> source of the counterfeit notes."
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>
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> In other words, he wants every color printer to embed some sort of
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> signature into its output, so that the "authorities" can determine
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> where it came from.
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>
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> I remember, back in high school civics, one of the bits of patriotic
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> propaganda that was dispenced to us, was that the USSR required all
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> photocopiers to embed a machine id and page number into its output,
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> so that the "authorites" could control their use as publishing
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> tools.
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>
|
|
> Now the USA wants to do the same thing.
|
|
|
|
[...]
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|
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Great! I'm so curious to see how they are gonna tackle this issue. Put
|
|
an ID on top of the page? Sure, go right ahead, I have to use my
|
|
scissors anyway to cut out the Lincoln's.
|
|
|
|
The only way this would work, would be to overlay the copy with a fine
|
|
barcode type output, where the lines stretch across the whole page.
|
|
Which means the ID changes when the fuser gets old'n'dirty. Plus,
|
|
imagine how many people would return that copier because "it's broke
|
|
and procudes crappy output".
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|
|
|
How about mandatory copier paper with a watermark? All you need to do
|
|
is equip the copier's paper cassette with a padlock.
|
|
|
|
Of course, alternatively you could try to improve security with newer
|
|
dollar bills that have additional security features such as holograms,
|
|
etc. but that would be too easy....
|
|
|
|
|
|
The world is going crazy, and it's not gonna get better...
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 1998 10:47:04 -0500
|
|
From: Neil Rickert <rickert@CS.NIU.EDU>
|
|
Subject: File 7--Re: File 1--proposal of technical solutions to spam problem
|
|
|
|
"Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com> writes:
|
|
|
|
>the software problem
|
|
|
|
> Currently the large mass of internet sites use a mail program called
|
|
> Sendmail developed chiefly by Eric Allman. Will all due respect to the
|
|
> author and maintainers, IMHO the program is an embodiment in awkward
|
|
> and monolithic legacy software. It features many extremely arcane
|
|
> syntax rules and inscrutable conventions.
|
|
|
|
Vladimir has misdiagnosed the problem. Granted, most systems use
|
|
sendmail, and granted, sendmail uses methods that many consider
|
|
arcane and inscrutable. But that is mostly a matter of internal
|
|
design, and has very little to do with spam.
|
|
|
|
If Vladimir wants to criticize, he should get to the heart of the
|
|
matter, which is the SMTP protocol. This protocol requires no sender
|
|
authentication (other than a simple syntax check), and could not
|
|
easily be extended to prevent spam.
|
|
|
|
The nucleus of the problem really goes back to the way the network
|
|
has evolved. In its early days most computing was done by multi-user
|
|
systems. Thus there was a core of trustworthy machines administered
|
|
by technically compentent professionals, most of whom had a sense of
|
|
ethics and public responsibility. Most of the network protocols were
|
|
designed under the assumption that the machines you would communicate
|
|
were trustworthy. However, we now have a network composed mostly of
|
|
individual machines, too often untrustworthy, and usually run by
|
|
novices and in some case by unethical novices (spammers, for
|
|
example).
|
|
|
|
There is little hope of resolving the spam situation unless we
|
|
recognize the nature of the problem. The best solution would be a
|
|
return to the idea of a central core of trustworthy machines. This
|
|
would still allow a network of mostly individual machines. But it
|
|
would require that each individual machine forward outgoing mail to a
|
|
core machine that is capable of identifying it. And each non-core
|
|
machine would only accept email from its own users or from a core
|
|
machine. And each core machine would only accept email from other
|
|
core machines or from machines it could identify and authenticate.
|
|
Then you would have to design new protocols which carried
|
|
authentication information in the message envelope.
|
|
|
|
Spam is only partly a technical problem. It is partly a social
|
|
problem. We could not re-establish a core of trustworthy machines
|
|
without setting up social conventions to accredit those machines, and
|
|
to identify which they are. And we could not find a technical
|
|
solution to network problems such as spam without some concept of
|
|
trustworthy machines.
|
|
|
|
> One of the deficiencies in sendmail is the inability to reject email
|
|
> based on header information alone.
|
|
|
|
The alternative would be like having a "big brother" or "post office
|
|
nanny" machine attached to your mailbox, which automatically shreds
|
|
mail if it does not begin with "Dear person" and end with "Yours
|
|
sincerely." We don't need such a machine. Automated rejection of
|
|
email on the basis of header information is *evil*. What is needed
|
|
is some sort of authentication information, including an estimation
|
|
of the degree of trust to be placed in the purported origin of the
|
|
message. This information should be transported in the envelope
|
|
(separate from the message content and headers), so that it can be
|
|
dynamically updated as the mail is tranferred between machines.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 1998 21:05:20 -0400
|
|
From: Jonathan Wallace <jw@bway.net>
|
|
Subject: File 8--for CuD
|
|
|
|
FEDERAL COURTS USE CENSORWARE; FREE SPEECH ADVOCATES OBJECT
|
|
|
|
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
|
|
|
|
Contact: Jonathan Wallace daytime: 212-513-7777 evening:
|
|
718-797-9808 email: jw@bway.net
|
|
|
|
|
|
New York, April 22, 1998--The Censorware Project
|
|
<http://www.spectacle.org/cwp>, an organization which battles the
|
|
use of blocking software by public institutions including schools
|
|
and libraries, announced today that it has learned that federal
|
|
courts are using the WebSENSE censorware product, at least in the
|
|
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth judicial circuits (covering twenty-two
|
|
states and Guam). WebSENSE <http://www.websense.com> was
|
|
installed by the Administrative Office of the Courts, apparently
|
|
without the knowledge or consent of the judges themselves.
|
|
|
|
"I am really disturbed that the federal court administrators have
|
|
installed censorware, especially in light of federal judge Leonie
|
|
Brinkema's recent decision in the Loudoun County, Virginia
|
|
case," said James Tyre, a First Amendment attorney who is a
|
|
founding member of the Censorware Project. "In that decision,
|
|
available at http://www.venable.com/ORACLE/opinion.htm, the judge
|
|
suggested that blocking a web site in a library is like pulling a
|
|
book from the shelves. It is particularly shocking that the
|
|
Administrative Office of the Courts thinks that federal judges
|
|
need to be protected against the Internet--and that our tax money
|
|
is being spent to buy censorware for this purpose. It would be
|
|
ironic indeed if Judge Brinkema is prevented by WebSENSE from
|
|
visiting the very sites at issue in the Loudoun County case,
|
|
blocked by X-Stop, a competitor of WebSENSE."
|
|
|
|
One site erroneously blocked by the WebSENSE product under its
|
|
"Hacking" category is http://www.digicrime.com -- a humorous site
|
|
created by security experts to educate the public about computer
|
|
crime. "WebSENSE apparently took the site for a real computer
|
|
crime site," Tyre said. "DigiCrime is not just one bad block out
|
|
of 200,000: it is one of 54 hand-picked sites by the makers of
|
|
WebSENSE itself included in the downloadable demo versions of
|
|
the product. Although The Censorware Project has not done a full
|
|
analysis of WebSENSE, one must seriously question its claims to
|
|
accuracy if it cannot even get its demo blocks right." WebSENSE
|
|
also reportedly blocks A Different Light Bookstore,
|
|
http://www.adlbooks.com/, specializing in gay or lesbian
|
|
literature. The company claims that the product blocks 200,000
|
|
sites.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 1998 16:07:31 -0500
|
|
From: Richard Thieme <rthieme@thiemeworks.com>
|
|
Subject: File 9--Islands in the Clickstream. Densities. April 11, 1998
|
|
|
|
Islands in the Clickstream:
|
|
Densities
|
|
|
|
|
|
Steven Hawking noted in a netcast from the White House that the next
|
|
generation of humans will live inside a common sense world of quantum
|
|
physics the way we have lived inside a Newtonian landscape. "Common sense"
|
|
is simply what we're taught to see, he said, which is why new truths always
|
|
appear at the edges of our thinking.
|
|
|
|
Or, as George Bernard Shaw put it, " All great truth begins as blasphemy."
|
|
|
|
|
|
Is it any wonder we are all beset by "cognitive dissonance" and see our
|
|
reality-frames flickering the way clairvoyants (excuse me, "remote
|
|
viewers") see images of distant sites? One moment we are living happily
|
|
inside Newtonian space, walking down a straight sidewalk toward a
|
|
right-angled corner when poof! with a puff of smoke, we experience
|
|
ourselves bent along a trajectory like light pulled by an immense
|
|
gravitational tug. Then we remember that how light bends IS gravity and
|
|
what we thought was a "pull" is simply the topography of energy wrinkling
|
|
and sliding into whorls of various densities.
|
|
|
|
In a museum the other day I watched a marble spiraling down a funnel of
|
|
smooth wood, circling toward the vortex. I thought of light travelling
|
|
along the curves and bumps of space-time ("the universe is shaped like a
|
|
potato," Einstein said, "finite but unbounded.") I thought of gravitational
|
|
lenses, created when galaxies that are closer to us magnify and distort
|
|
more distant galaxies.
|
|
|
|
Einstein predicted sixty years ago that a massive object would bend and
|
|
intensify light, generating multiple images or stretching an image into an
|
|
arc. When everything lines up just right, the distortion becomes a perfect
|
|
circle, like the galaxy pictured last week in Science News (Vol. 153, No.
|
|
114).
|
|
|
|
That's the long view. Turn the telescope around to see what's happening
|
|
right here in our own digital neighborhood.
|
|
|
|
Web sites are best characterized not by size but by density. A map of
|
|
cyberspace would look like millions of galaxies and a map of the traffic
|
|
between sites would look like a photo of electromagnetic energy across the
|
|
entire spectrum.
|
|
|
|
A browser is a knowledge engine that organizes information in flux so it
|
|
appears momentarily frozen. A site such as Yahoo that links links is a kind
|
|
of gravitational lens that boosts distant clusters into the foreground. If
|
|
we could see ourselves interacting in cyberspace, we too would look like
|
|
energy pouring through our monitors and moving at the speed of light toward
|
|
densities around which our interests coalesce. Our monitors like worm holes
|
|
let us bypass the long way around.
|
|
|
|
Organizational structures, including web sites, are dissipative structures
|
|
like whirlpools that retain their shape while exchanging energy and
|
|
information. Humans too are modular structures of energy and information
|
|
that interface over the Internet. That map of the energies of cyberspace is
|
|
really a map of our Mind.
|
|
|
|
Not quite common sense yet, is it? Words slip, slide, decay with
|
|
imprecision, T. S. Eliot said of his efforts to fix in poetic form the
|
|
world he discerned. In the world of printed text, the illusion that words
|
|
and meanings are fixed is magnified. The same words in pixels are obviously
|
|
transitory. Our media too function like gravitational lenses, magnifying
|
|
meanings intrinsic to their nature. The digital world builds a "common
|
|
sense reality" congruent with the quantum world, communicating by its very
|
|
nature that words, meanings, and all things slip, slide away.
|
|
|
|
We build this island for ourselves in the always sea and comfort ourselves
|
|
with the illusion that we are on dry land.
|
|
|
|
The trajectories of the energies of our lives - how they are organized,
|
|
aimed, and spent- are determined by our deepest intentionality. How we
|
|
intend to live our lives is how we wind up living them.
|
|
|
|
Cyberspace is a training ground for learning to live and move at the speed
|
|
of our minds, the speed of light, to inhabit a landscape that morphs or
|
|
changes shape according to our will, intention, and ultimate purpose.
|
|
|
|
The "sites" in our minds grow denser when our intentions coalesce like
|
|
millions of marbles rolling simultaneously toward a single vortex. Space,
|
|
time and causality may be woven into the very fabric of our minds, as Kant
|
|
said, but in a quantum landscape, causality is a very different animal. An
|
|
effect can precede its own cause.
|
|
|
|
Which is exactly how our minds operate.
|
|
|
|
Consciousness is always consciousness for or toward some end, always an
|
|
arrow aimed toward a potentiality or possibility. As a mental construct,
|
|
the image comes first. The effect precedes the cause and causes the effect
|
|
to come into being. That's why some think consciousness is the origin as
|
|
well as the goal of evolution.
|
|
|
|
A recent reflection on maps, filters, and belief systems ("Imaginary
|
|
Gardens - Filters. Filters of Filters.") brought from a reader an account
|
|
of the moment he realized how much the Mercator projection exaggerated the
|
|
size of the European community. He recalled the first time he looked at
|
|
Buckminster Fuller's Dymaxion map that looks at the world from the North
|
|
Pole rather than the equator. From that point of view, the world is seen as
|
|
a single unified landmass. The world has never looked the same to him since
|
|
|
|
|
|
Consciousness manifests itself in a visible medium like the Internet so we
|
|
can see it. We can never see the thing itself, because there is no thing
|
|
there. Nothing. But we can see some of the infinite ways it manifests
|
|
itself. Working and playing on the Internet is one way to practice
|
|
handling ourselves in a quantum world that is fluid, modular, and
|
|
interactive, a trans-planetary world, a trans-galactic world emerging on
|
|
the edge of the grid in which we have been living. That grid contained
|
|
reality in nice neat boxes. But the grid is flexing, morphing like an
|
|
animation even as we look at it, turning into another of its many
|
|
possibilities. Seen, of course - it's only common sense, isn't it?- from
|
|
just one of its infinitely many points of view.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Islands in the Clickstream is a weekly column written by
|
|
Richard Thieme exploring social and cultural dimensions
|
|
of computer technology. Comments are welcome.
|
|
|
|
Feel free to pass along columns for personal use, retaining this
|
|
signature file. If interested in (1) publishing columns
|
|
online or in print, (2) giving a free subscription as a gift, or
|
|
(3) distributing Islands to employees or over a network,
|
|
email for details.
|
|
|
|
To subscribe to Islands in the Clickstream, send email to
|
|
rthieme@thiemeworks.com with the words "subscribe islands" in the
|
|
body of the message. To unsubscribe, email with "unsubscribe
|
|
islands" in the body of the message.
|
|
|
|
Richard Thieme is a professional speaker, consultant, and writer
|
|
focused on the impact of computer technology on individuals and
|
|
organizations.
|
|
|
|
Islands in the Clickstream (c) Richard Thieme, 1998. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
ThiemeWorks on the Web: http://www.thiemeworks.com
|
|
|
|
ThiemeWorks P. O. Box 17737 Milwaukee WI 53217-0737 414.351.2321
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 10--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
|
available at no cost electronically.
|
|
|
|
CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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|
|
|
Or, to subscribe, send post with this in the "Subject:: line:
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|
|
SUBSCRIBE CU-DIGEST
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Send the message to: cu-digest-request@weber.ucsd.edu
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DO NOT SEND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MODERATORS.
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|
|
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6436), fax (815-753-6302)
|
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
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60115, USA.
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|
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To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CU-DIGEST
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Send it to CU-DIGEST-REQUEST@WEBER.UCSD.EDU
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(NOTE: The address you unsub must correspond to your From: line)
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #10.25
|
|
************************************
|
|
|