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102 KiB
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1795 lines
102 KiB
Plaintext
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ÚÁÁÁÁÁÁ¿
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´SphearÃ
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ÀÂÂÂÂÂÂÙ
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\_\ \__\ \ \ \_\ \ \__\
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\/ / / / / / /\ / /
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\ \/_\/ \/_\/ \/_\ \/__\ \/_\/
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\_\/ \/ \/ \/ \/_\ \/ \/ \/ \
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Digital Zine
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Phreaking
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Hacking
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Anarchy
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(And AnyThing Else P/H/A/C/C/V)
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Editor: Signal
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Co-Editor: Mustang
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Sphear can be reached at:
|
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[system@axposf.pa.dec.com]
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[sphear.digizine@lambada.oit.unc.edu]
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||
No Flame Mail or Hate Mail Please
|
||
|
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(If You Dont Like It.. Don't Read it);
|
||
[All Information Contained in This File Is]
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[ For Informational Purposes ONLY ]
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[In Other Words: If You Fuck Up, Its Your ]
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[Problem, not Ours. ]
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Issue #2
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[02.14.94]
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ÚÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ¿
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³Contents³
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ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄ
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³Articles³
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ÀÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÙ
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Voice Mail Boxes
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Writers Wanted
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RedBox Legality
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Clinton & Clipper
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2600 Congressional Testimony (1240Lines)
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ÚÁÁÁÁÁÁ¿
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´PhilezÃ
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ÀÂÂÂÂÂÂÙ
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CaveAsp.Zip
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CaveTmc.ZIp
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³Voice Mail Boxes³
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ÃÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ´
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³ by Raven ³
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Ok, This is a list of several popular Voice Mail systems, their default
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passwords, and maybe a little info about the actual system. Voice Mail
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is my second favorite way to contact people in the h/p community, next to
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e-mail.. This is more personal than e-mail, but is also just as anonymous,
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and just as safe..
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1. The Message Center (TMC):
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Hit '*' when you hear the greeting of the box, and you'll be prompted
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for your password, hit '*' again. You'll hear 'Welcome to The Message
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Center.' You're now in the main menu-thing,where you will continue
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to enter box numbers in hopes of finding a virgin box. When you hear
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the tmc bitch say something like 'Please leave your name and a short
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message for box number XXXXXXX..' then you've found a virgin box, hit
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'*' to enter the box, you should be greeted, and given step by step
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instructions on setting up your box for the first time <how lovely!>.
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If you happen to get prompted for your password instead of being given
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instructions, then try anothe box, if it happens again, then you're
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basically screwed, meaning the admin put a password on all the boxes,
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the only thing left for you to really do is social engineer it..
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Also, when you've hit 3 incorrect box numbers from the main, you'll
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probably hear 'Thank you, goodbye.' as it tries to hang up on you,
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to avoid this, simply press '*'...
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**Note**: Caveman wrote an excellent text file on TMC, that is a must
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for anyone interested, and who lacks experience.. He has
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also done a text on aspens <blegh>..
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2. Meridian Mail:
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To enter mail system when you hear the box's greeting, hit '*1'. Then
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enter the mail box number plus the pound key ('#'). The default
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passwords are the same as the mail box number, on meridians.
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There is a known way to dialout off of a meridian voice mail, but it
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is quite hard to do (you have to dial faster than redial on your phone,
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and you have to have the right codes..)
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3. Audix:
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Just like a Meridian, but to enter the system, hit '*7'.
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Simple, eh?
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4. Industrial:
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Enter the system using the pound key ('#'). Default passwords are
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the mailbox number or '0000'.
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5. Pactel:
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Use pound to enter the system. Default password '0000'.
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6. The Voice Mail System:
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Use pound to enter your box. Enter the box number. Default password
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is '1111'.
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That's it. This is not ment to be a detailed text on how to identify
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different systems, or whatnot.. This is to provide the basics of getting
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into the box. There are several other common VMB systems, but, I fealt
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that these were the most important. If you have any information on any
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of the following systems : PhoneMail, Yamaha(tri-log), then please contact
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me at [raven1@axposf.pa.dec.com]
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-Raven
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³ Writers Wanted ³
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ÃÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ´
|
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Sphear DigiZine, Is Looking for some good writers. Some
|
||
people who have technical knowledge, or people who acctually
|
||
hack or phreak. Any file donations would also be helpful.
|
||
Please mail [sphear.digizine@lambada.oit.unc.edu] with any
|
||
articles or UUEncoded Files. Sphear DigiZine is also an
|
||
editorial forum, in which people can express their views.
|
||
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³Redbox Legality³
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ÃÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ´
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³ by Signal ³
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These days, the question of possessing a 'RedBox' has become evermore
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debateable. Some people say that merely owning a device doesnot constitute
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||
fraud, and that it is analogous to owning a baseball bat or a kitchen knife.
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||
It exists but yet is not illegal to possess. And the law only comes into play
|
||
when these objects are used in an illegal manner, such as assault, and murder.
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||
Even the fact that a tone-dialer was modified would merely establish the point
|
||
that what i do with my tone-dialer is my business. In somecases where the
|
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Redbox is a homemade creation, the redbox would merely be a device that
|
||
created sounds. It could not be considered an illegal or even fraudulent device
|
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until it is applied in such a way. Although guns and other such dangerous
|
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weapons need to be registered, one can not imagine registering a tone
|
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-dialer or device that produces quarter-like tones. We must limit our minds to
|
||
such irrelevant questions such as whether or not owning a device, such as a
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tone-dialer, is legal. The is no doubt that owning a device to produce tones
|
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is not illegal, yet there are ignorant people out there that think owning such
|
||
a device is felony. If you thought about this logically you would see that
|
||
owning a redbox is not illegal, so long as the redbox is not
|
||
used in an illegal fashion. It would be perfectly legal to use
|
||
the redbox to kill a fly. But this brings up the question of
|
||
murder. 'The Killing of A Fly' and thus could be considered
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||
illegal.
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³Clinton & Clipper³
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ÀÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÙ
|
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|
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EFF Press Release Feb 4 '94 * DISTRIBUTE WIDELY *
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At two briefings, Feb. 4, 1994, the Clinton Administration and various
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agencies gave statements before a Congressional committee, and later
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representatives of civil liberties organizations, industry
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spokespersons and privacy advocates. The Electronic Frontier
|
||
Foundation's position, based on what we have seen and heard from the
|
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Administration today, is that the White House is set on a course that
|
||
pursues Cold War national security and law enforcement interests to
|
||
the detriment of individual privacy and civil liberties.
|
||
The news is grim. The Administration is:
|
||
* not backing down on Clipper
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||
* not backing down on key escrow
|
||
* not backing down on selection of escrow agents
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* already adamant on escrowed key access procedures
|
||
* not willing to eliminate ITAR restrictions
|
||
* hiding behind exaggerated threats of "drug dealers" and "terrorists"
|
||
The material released to the industry and advocacy version of the
|
||
briefing have been placed online at ftp.eff.org (long before their
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online availability from government access sites, one might add). See
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||
below for specific details.
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No information regarding the Congressional committee version of the
|
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briefing has been announced. EFF Director Jerry Berman, who attended
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||
the private sector meeting, reported the following:
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||
"The White House and other officials briefed industry on its Clipper
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chip and encryption review. While the review is not yet complete, they
|
||
have reached several policy conclusions. First, Clipper will be
|
||
proposed as a new Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) next
|
||
Wednesday. [Feb. 9] It will be "voluntary" for government agencies
|
||
and the private sector to use. They are actively asking other vendors
|
||
to jump in to make the market a Clipper market. Export licensing
|
||
processes will be speeded up but export restrictions will not be
|
||
lifted in the interests of national security. The reason was stated
|
||
bluntly at the briefing : to frustrate competition with clipper by
|
||
other powerful encryption schemes by making them difficult to market,
|
||
and to "prevent" strong encryption from leaving the country thus
|
||
supposedly making the job of law enforcement and intelligence more
|
||
difficult. Again in the interest of national security. Of course,
|
||
Clipper will be exportable but they would not comment on how other
|
||
governments will view this. Treasury and NIST will be the escrow
|
||
agents and Justice asserted that there was no necessity for
|
||
legislation to implement the escrow procedures.
|
||
"I asked if there would be a report to explain the rationale for
|
||
choosing these results - we have no explanation of the Administration's
|
||
thinking, or any brief in support of the results. They replied that
|
||
there would be no report because they have been unable to write one,
|
||
due to the complexity of the issue.
|
||
"One Administration spokesperson said this was the Bosnia of Telecomm-
|
||
unications. I asked, if this was so, how, in the absence of some
|
||
policy explanation, could we know if our policy here will be as
|
||
successful as our policy in Bosnia?"
|
||
The announcements, authorization procedures for release of escrowed keys,
|
||
and q-and-a documents from the private sector briefing are online at EFF.
|
||
They are:
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||
"Statement of the [White House] Press Secretary" [White House]
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file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/wh_press_secy.statement
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"Statement of the Vice President" [very short - WH]
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file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/gore_crypto.statement
|
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"Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements" [Dept. of Just.]
|
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file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/reno_key_escrow.statement
|
||
"Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption Key Components in
|
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Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to Title III/State Statutes/FISA"
|
||
[3 docs. in one file - DoJ]
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||
file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/doj_escrow_intercept.rules
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"Working Group on Data Security" [WH]
|
||
file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/interagency_workgroup.announce
|
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"Statement of Dr. Martha Harris Dep. Asst. Secy. of State for Polit.-Mil.
|
||
Affairs: Encryption - Export Control Reform" [Dept. of State]
|
||
file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/harris_export.statement
|
||
"Questions and Answers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption
|
||
Policy" [WH]
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||
file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/wh_crypto.q-a
|
||
These files are available via anonymous ftp, or via WWW at:
|
||
http://www.eff.org/ in the "EFF ftp site" menu off the front page.
|
||
Gopher access:
|
||
gopher://gopher.eff.org/
|
||
Look in "EFF Files"/"Papers and Testimony"/"Crypto"
|
||
All seven of these documents will be posted widely on the net
|
||
immediately following this notice.
|
||
Contacts:
|
||
Digital Privacy: Jerry Berman, Exec. Director <jberman@eff.org>
|
||
Daniel J. Weitzner, Sr. Staff Counsel <djw@eff.org>
|
||
Archives: Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist <mech@eff.org>
|
||
General EFF Information: info@eff.org
|
||
|
||
Congressional Testimony
|
||
-----------------------
|
||
|
||
At long last, 2600 has obtained a transcript of the hearings from
|
||
last June where two members of congress - Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
|
||
and Jack Fields (R-TX) - launched into a tirade against the evils
|
||
of computer hackers and generally demonstrated their ignorance
|
||
on the subject and their unwillingness to listen to anything that
|
||
didn't match their predetermined conclusions. Those conclusions are
|
||
basically that 2600 Magazine is a manual for criminals and that
|
||
hackers are a blight on civilization. At least, that was my
|
||
interpretation, which is admittedly biased since I was on the
|
||
receiving end of this double dose of dogma. I'd be most interested
|
||
in hearing yours as would the rest of us at 2600. While you may
|
||
think that members of Congress would also be interested, I would
|
||
have to say it doesn't seem too likely. I was asked down there to
|
||
address the issue of new technology, its implications, and the
|
||
social benefits and dangers. That is what I addressed in my twenty
|
||
pages of written testimony and my opening remarks. What happened
|
||
during the hearing was like something out of the Geraldo show, only
|
||
worse. This was the Congress of the United States. Look for the
|
||
soundbites, the simplistic solutions, the demonization of a
|
||
perceived enemy, and the eagerness to legislate away the problems
|
||
and avoid the complex issues. It's too bad it took them three
|
||
quarters of a year to get this transcript to us.
|
||
|
||
To be official, this is the full transcript of all spoken testimony
|
||
from the second panel on June 9, 1993. (If you want a copy of
|
||
my written testimony, email me at emmanuel@well.sf.ca.us.) This
|
||
is a literal transcript, meaning that any and all factual
|
||
or technical inaccuracies are reproduced without comment. The
|
||
panel you'll see being referred to that was on first was one on
|
||
the Clipper Chip, a subject these members of Congress were a bit
|
||
more enlightened on. To obtain your own copy of this hearing and
|
||
the other related ones, contact the U.S. Government Printing
|
||
Office (202-512-0000) and ask for Serial No. 103-53, known as
|
||
"Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
|
||
Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
|
||
Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session,
|
||
April 29 and June 9, 1993".
|
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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It was a very hot day in June....
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Mr. MARKEY. If you could close the door, please, we could move
|
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on to this very important panel. It consists of Mr. Donald Delaney,
|
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who is a senior investigator for the New York State Police. Mr.
|
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Delaney has instructed telecommunications fraud at the Federal Law
|
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Enforcement Training Center and has published chapters on computer
|
||
crime and telecommunications fraud. Dr. Peter Tippett is an expert
|
||
in computer viruses and is the director of security products for
|
||
Symantec Corporation in California. Mr. John J. Haugh is chairman
|
||
of Telecommunications Advisors Incorporated, a telecommunications
|
||
consulting firm in Portland, Oreg., specializing in network
|
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security issues. Dr. Haugh is the editor and principal author of
|
||
two volumes entitled "Toll Fraud" and "Telabuse" in a newsletter
|
||
entitled "Telecom and Network Security Review." Mr. Emmanuel
|
||
Goldstein is the editor-in-chief of "2600: The Hacker Quarterly."
|
||
Mr. Goldstein also hosts a weekly radio program in New York called
|
||
"Off The Hook." Mr. Michael Guidry is chairman and founder of the
|
||
Guidry Group, a security consulting firm specializing in
|
||
telecommunications issues. The Guidry Group works extensively with
|
||
the cellular industry in its fight against cellular fraud.
|
||
We will begin with you, Mr. Delaney, if we could. You each
|
||
have 5 minutes. We will be monitoring that. Please try to abide by
|
||
the limitation. Whenever you are ready, please begin.
|
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STATEMENTS OF DONALD P. DELANEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATOR, NEW YORK
|
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STATE POLICE; JOHN J. HAUGH, CHAIRMAN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORS;
|
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EMMANUEL GOLDSTEIN, PUBLISHER, 2600 MAGAZINE; PETER S. TIPPETT,
|
||
DIRECTOR, SECURITY AND ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS, SYMANTEC CORP.; AND
|
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MICHAEL A. GUIDRY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE GUIDRY GROUP
|
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Mr. DELANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to
|
||
testify today.
|
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As a senior investigator with the New York State Police, I
|
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have spent more than 3 years investigating computer crime and
|
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telecommunications fraud. I have executed more than 30 search
|
||
warrants and arrested more than 30 individuals responsible for the
|
||
entire spectrum of crime in this area.
|
||
I authored two chapters in the "Civil and Criminal
|
||
Investigating Handbook" published by McGraw Hill entitled
|
||
"Investigating Computer Crime and Investigating Telecommunications
|
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Fraud." Periodically I teach a 4-hour block instruction on
|
||
telecommunications fraud at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
|
||
Center in Georgia.
|
||
Although I have arrested some infamous teenagers, such as
|
||
Phiber Optic, ZOD, and Kong, in some cases the investigations were
|
||
actually conducted by the United States Secret Service. Because
|
||
Federal law designates a juvenile as one less than 18 years of age
|
||
and the Federal system has no means of prosecuting a juvenile,
|
||
malicious hackers, predominately between 13 and 17 years of age,
|
||
are either left unprosecuted or turned over to local law
|
||
enforcement. In some cases, local law enforcement were either
|
||
untrained or unwilling to investigate the high-tech crime.
|
||
In examining telecommunications security, one first realizes
|
||
that all telecommunications is controlled by computers. Computer
|
||
criminals abuse these systems not only for free service but for a
|
||
variety of crimes ranging from harassment to grand larceny and
|
||
illegal wiretapping. Corporate and Government espionage rely on the
|
||
user-friendly networks which connect universities, military
|
||
institutions, Government offices, corporate research and
|
||
development computers. Information theft is common from those
|
||
companies which hold our credit histories. Their lack of security
|
||
endanger each of us, but they are not held accountable.
|
||
One activity which has had a financial impact on everyone
|
||
present is the proliferation of call sell operations. Using a
|
||
variety of methods, such as rechipped cellular telephones,
|
||
compromised PBX remote access units, or a combination of cellular
|
||
phone and international conference lines, the entrepreneur deprives
|
||
the telephone companies of hundreds of millions of dollars each
|
||
year. These losses are passed on to each of us as higher rates.
|
||
The horrible PBX problem exists because a few dozen finger
|
||
hackers crack the codes and disseminate them to those who control
|
||
the pay phones. The major long distance carriers each have the
|
||
ability to monitor their 800 service lines for sudden peaks in use.
|
||
A concerted effort should be made by the long distance carriers to
|
||
identify the finger hackers, have the local telephone companies
|
||
monitor the necessary dialed number recorders, and provide local
|
||
law enforcement with timely affidavits. Those we have arrested for
|
||
finger hacking the PBX's have not gone back into this type of
|
||
activity or crime.
|
||
The New York State Police have four newly trained
|
||
investigators assigned to investigate telecommunications fraud in
|
||
New York City alone. One new program sponsored by AT&T is
|
||
responsible for having trained police officers from over 75
|
||
departments about this growing blight in New York State alone.
|
||
Publications, such as "2600," which teach subscribers how to
|
||
commit telecommunications crime are protected by the First
|
||
Amendment, but disseminating pornography to minors is illegal. In
|
||
that many of the phone freaks are juveniles, I believe legislation
|
||
banning the dissemination to juveniles of manuals on how to commit
|
||
crime would be appropriate.
|
||
From a law enforcement perspective, I applaud the proposed
|
||
Clipper chip encryption standard which affords individuals
|
||
protection of privacy yet enables law enforcement to conduct
|
||
necessary court-ordered wiretaps, and with respect to what was
|
||
being said in the previous conversation, last year there were over
|
||
900 court-ordered wiretaps in the United States responsible for the
|
||
seizure of tons of illicit drugs coming into this country, solving
|
||
homicides, rapes, kidnappings. If we went to an encryption standard
|
||
without the ability for law enforcement to do something about it,
|
||
we would have havoc in the United States -- my personal opinion.
|
||
In New York State an individual becomes an adult at 16 years
|
||
old and can be prosecuted as such, but if a crime being
|
||
investigated is a Federal violation he must be 18 years of age to
|
||
be prosecuted. Even in New York State juveniles can be adjudicated
|
||
and given relevant punishment, such as community service.
|
||
I believe that funding law enforcement education programs
|
||
regarding high-tech crime investigations, as exists at the Federal
|
||
Law Enforcement Training Center's Financial Frauds Institute, is
|
||
one of the best tools our Government has to protect its people with
|
||
regard to law enforcement.
|
||
Thank you.
|
||
Mr. WYDEN [presiding]. Thank you very much for a very helpful
|
||
presentation.
|
||
Let us go next to Mr. Haugh.
|
||
|
||
We welcome you. It is a pleasure to have an Oregonian,
|
||
particularly an Oregonian who has done so much in this field, with
|
||
the subcommittee today. I also want to thank Chairman Markey and
|
||
his excellent staff for all their efforts to make your attendance
|
||
possible today.
|
||
So, Mr. Haugh, we welcome you, and I know the chairman is
|
||
going to be back here in just a moment.
|
||
STATEMENT OF JOHN J. HAUGH
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. Thank you, Mr. Wyden.
|
||
We expended some 9,000 hours, 11 different people, researching
|
||
the problem of toll fraud, penetrating telecommunications systems,
|
||
and then stealing long distance, leading up to the publication of
|
||
our two-volume reference work in mid-1992. We have since spent
|
||
about 5,000 additional hours continuing to monitor the problem, and
|
||
we come to the table with a unique perspective because we are
|
||
vender, carrier, and user independent.
|
||
In the prior panel, the distinguished gentleman from AT&T, for
|
||
whom I have a lot of personal respect, made the comment that the
|
||
public justifiably is confident that the national wire network is
|
||
secure and that the problem is wireless. With all due respect, that
|
||
is a laudable goal, but as far as what is going on today, just
|
||
practical reality, that comment is simply incorrect, and if the
|
||
public truly is confident that the wired network is secure, that
|
||
confidence is grossly misplaced.
|
||
We believe 35,000 users will become victimized by toll fraud
|
||
this year, 1993. We believe the national problem totals somewhere
|
||
between $4 and $5 billion. It is a very serious national problem.
|
||
We commend the chairman and this committee for continuing to
|
||
attempt to draw public attention and focus on the problem.
|
||
The good news, as we see it, over the last 3 years is that the
|
||
severity of losses has decreased. There is better monitoring,
|
||
particularly on the part of the long distance carriers, there is
|
||
more awareness on the part of users who are being more careful
|
||
about monitoring and managing their own systems, as a result of
|
||
which the severity of loss is decreasing. That is the good news.
|
||
The bad news is that the frequency is greatly increasing, so
|
||
while severity is decreasing, frequency is increasing, and I will
|
||
give you some examples. In 1991 we studied the problem from 1988 to
|
||
1991 and concluded that the average toll fraud loss was $168,000.
|
||
We did a national survey from November of last year to March of
|
||
this year, and the average loss was $125,000, although it was
|
||
retrospective. Today we think the average loss is $30,000 to
|
||
$60,000, which shows a rather dramatic decline.
|
||
The problem is, as the long distance thieves, sometimes called
|
||
hackers, are rooted out of one system, one user system, they
|
||
immediately hop into another one. So severity is dropping, but
|
||
frequency is increasing. Everybody is victimized. You have heard
|
||
business users with some very dramatic and very sad tales. The
|
||
truth is that everybody is victimized; the users are victimized;
|
||
the long distance carriers are victimized; the cellular carriers
|
||
are victimized, the operator service providers; the co-cod folks,
|
||
the aggregators and resellers are victimized; the LEC's and RBOC's,
|
||
to a limited extent, are victimized; and the vendors are victimized
|
||
by being drawn into the problem.
|
||
Who is at fault? Everybody is at fault. The Government is at
|
||
fault. The FCC has taken a no-action, apathetic attitude toward
|
||
toll fraud. That Agency is undermanned, it is understaffed, it is
|
||
underfunded, it has difficult problems -- no question about that --
|
||
but things could and should be done by that Agency that have not
|
||
been done.
|
||
The long distance carriers ignored the problem for far too
|
||
long, pretended that they could not monitor when, in fact, the
|
||
technology was available. They have done an outstanding job over
|
||
the last 2 years of getting with it and engaging themselves fully,
|
||
and I would say the long distance carriers, at the moment, are
|
||
probably the best segment of anyone at being proactive to take care
|
||
of the problem.
|
||
Users too often ignored security, ignored their user manuals,
|
||
failed to monitor, failed to properly manage. There has been
|
||
improvement which has come with the public knowledge of the
|
||
problem. CPE venders, those folks who manufactured the systems that
|
||
are so easy to penetrate, have done an abysmally poor job of
|
||
engineering into the systems security features. They have ignored
|
||
security. Their manuals didn't deal with security. They are
|
||
starting to now. They are doing a far better job. More needs to be
|
||
done.
|
||
The FCC, in particular, needs to become active. This committee
|
||
needs to focus more attention on the problem, jawbone, keep the
|
||
heat on the industry, the LEC's and the RBOC's in particular. The
|
||
LEC's and the RBOC's have essentially ignored the problem. They are
|
||
outside the loop, they say, yet the LEC's and the RBOC's collected
|
||
over $21 billion last year in access fees for connecting their
|
||
users to the long distance networks. How much of that $21 billion
|
||
did the LEC's and the RBOC's reinvest in helping to protect their
|
||
users from becoming victimized and helping to combat user-targeted
|
||
toll fraud? No more than $10 million, one-fifth of 1 percent.
|
||
Many people in the industry feel the LEC's and the RBOC's are
|
||
the one large group that has yet to seriously come to the table.
|
||
Many in the industry -- and we happen to agree -- feel that 3 to 4
|
||
percent of those access fees should be reinvested in protecting
|
||
users from being targeted by the toll fraud criminals.
|
||
The FCC should become more active. The jawboning there is at
|
||
a minimal level. There was one show hearing last October, lots of
|
||
promises, no action, no regulation, no initiatives, no meetings. A
|
||
lot could be done. Under part 68, for example, the FCC, which is
|
||
supposed to give clearance to any equipment before it is connected
|
||
into the network, they could require security features embedded
|
||
within that equipment. They could prevent things like low-end PBX's
|
||
from being sold with three-digit barrier codes that anyone can
|
||
penetrate in 3 to 5 minutes.
|
||
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. THANK YOU, MR. HAUGH, VERY MUCH.
|
||
Mr. Goldstein, let's go to you next.
|
||
|
||
STATEMENT OF EMMANUEL GOLDSTEIN
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to this
|
||
committee for allowing me the opportunity to speak on behalf of
|
||
those who, for whatever reason, have no voice.
|
||
I am in the kind of unique position of being in contact with
|
||
those people known as computer hackers throughout the world, and I
|
||
think one of the misconceptions that I would like to clear up, that
|
||
I have been trying to clear up, is that hackers are analogous to
|
||
criminals. This is not the case. I have known hundreds of hackers
|
||
over the years, and a very, very small percentage of them are
|
||
interested in any way in committing any kind of a crime. I think
|
||
the common bond that we all have is curiosity, an intense form of
|
||
curiosity, something that in many cases exceeds the limitations
|
||
that many of us would like to put on curiosity. The thing is
|
||
though, you cannot really put a limitation on curiosity, and that
|
||
is something that I hope we will be able to understand.
|
||
I like to parallel the hacker culture with any kind of alien
|
||
culture because, as with any alien culture, we have difficulty
|
||
understanding its system of values, we have difficulty
|
||
understanding what it is that motivates these people, and I hope to
|
||
be able to demonstrate through my testimony that hackers are
|
||
friendly people, they are curious people, they are not out to rip
|
||
people off or to invade people's privacy; actually, they are out to
|
||
protect those things because they realize how valuable and how
|
||
precious they really are.
|
||
I like to draw analogies to where we are heading in the world
|
||
of high technology, and one of the analogies I have come up with is
|
||
to imagine yourself speeding down a highway, a highway that is
|
||
slowly becoming rather icy and slippery, and ask yourself the
|
||
question of whether or not you would prefer to be driving your own
|
||
car or to be somewhere inside a large bus, and I think that is kind
|
||
of the question we have to ask ourselves now. Do we want to be in
|
||
control of our own destiny as far as technology goes, or do we want
|
||
to put all of our faith in somebody that we don't even know and
|
||
maybe fall asleep for a little while ourselves and see where we
|
||
wind up? It is a different answer for every person, but I think we
|
||
need to be able to at least have the opportunity to choose which it
|
||
is that we want to do.
|
||
Currently, there is a great deal of suspicion, a great deal of
|
||
resignation, hostility, on behalf of not simply hackers but
|
||
everyday people on the street. They see technology as something
|
||
that they don't have any say in, and that is why I particularly am
|
||
happy that this committee is holding this hearing, because people,
|
||
for the most part, see things happening around them, and they
|
||
wonder how it got to that stage. They wonder how credit files were
|
||
opened on them; they wonder how their phone numbers are being
|
||
passed on through A&I and caller ID. Nobody ever went to these
|
||
people and said, "Do you want to do this? Do you want to change the
|
||
rules?"
|
||
The thing that hackers have learned is that any form of
|
||
technology can and will be abused, whether it be calling card
|
||
numbers or the Clipper chip. At some point, something will be
|
||
abused, and that is why it is important for people to have a sense
|
||
of what it is that they are dealing with and a say in the future.
|
||
I think it is also important to avoid inequities in access to
|
||
technology, to create a society of haves and have-nots, which I
|
||
feel we are very much in danger of doing to a greater extent than
|
||
we have ever done before. A particular example of this involves
|
||
telephone companies, pay phones to be specific. Those of us who can
|
||
make a telephone call from, say, New York to Washington, D.C., at
|
||
the cheapest possible rate from the comfort of our own homes will
|
||
pay about 12 cents for the first minute. However, if you don't have
|
||
a phone or if you don't have a home, you will be forced to pay
|
||
$2.20 for that same first minute.
|
||
What this has led to is the proliferation of what are known as
|
||
red boxes. I have a sample (indicating exhibit). Actually, this is
|
||
tremendously bigger than it needs to be. A red box can be about a
|
||
tenth of the size of this. But just to demonstrate the sound that
|
||
it takes for the phone company to believe that you have put a
|
||
quarter into the phone (brief tone is played), that is it, that is
|
||
a quarter.
|
||
Now we can say this is the problem, this huge demonic device
|
||
here is what is causing all the fraud, but it is not the case. This
|
||
tape recorder here (same brief tone is played) does the same thing.
|
||
So now we can say the tones are the problem, we can make tones
|
||
illegal, but that is going to be very hard to enforce.
|
||
I think what we need to look at is the technology itself: Why
|
||
are there gaping holes in them? and why are we creating a system
|
||
where people have to rip things off in order to get the same access
|
||
that other people can get for virtually nothing?
|
||
I think a parallel to that also exists in the case of cellular
|
||
phones. I have a device here (indicating exhibit) which I won't
|
||
demonstrate, because to do so would be to commit a Federal crime,
|
||
but by pressing a button here within the course of 5 seconds we
|
||
will be able to hear somebody's private, personal cellular phone
|
||
call.
|
||
Now the way of dealing with privacy with cellular phone calls
|
||
is to make a law saying that it is illegal to listen. That is the
|
||
logic we have been given so far. I think a better idea would be to
|
||
figure out a way to keep those cellular phone calls private and to
|
||
allow people to exercise whatever forms of privacy they need to
|
||
have on cellular phone calls.
|
||
So I think we need to have a better understanding both from
|
||
the legislative point of view and in the general public as far as
|
||
technology in itself, and I believe we are on the threshold of a
|
||
very positive, enlightened period, and I see that particularly with
|
||
things like the Internet which allow people access to millions of
|
||
other people throughout the world at very low cost. I think it is
|
||
the obligation of all of us to not stand in the way of this
|
||
technology, to allow it to go forward and develop on its own, and
|
||
to keep a watchful eye on how it develops but at the same time not
|
||
prevent it through overlegislation or overpricing.
|
||
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein.
|
||
Dr. Tippett.
|
||
|
||
STATEMENT OF PETER S. TIPPETT
|
||
Mr. TIPPET. Thank you.
|
||
I am Peter Tippett from Symantec Corporation, and today I am
|
||
also representing the National Computer Security Association and
|
||
the Computer Ethics Institute. Today is Computer Virus Awareness
|
||
Day, in case you are not aware, and we can thank Jack Fields,
|
||
Representative Fields, for sponsoring that day on behalf of the
|
||
Congress, and I thank you for that.
|
||
We had a congressional briefing this morning in which nine
|
||
representatives from industry, including telecommunications and
|
||
aerospace and the manufacturing industry, convened, and for the
|
||
first time were willing to talk about their computer virus problems
|
||
in public. I have got to tell you that it is an interesting
|
||
problem, this computer virus problem. It is a bit different from
|
||
telephone fraud. The virus problem is one which has probably among
|
||
the most misrepresentation and misunderstanding of these various
|
||
kinds of fraud that are going on, and I would like to highlight
|
||
that a little bit. But before I do, I would like to suggest what we
|
||
know to be the costs of computer viruses just in America.
|
||
The data I am representing comes from IBM and DataQuest, a
|
||
Dunn and Bradstreet company, it is the most conservative
|
||
interpretation you could make from this data. It suggests that a
|
||
company of only a thousand computers has a virus incident every
|
||
quarter, that a typical Fortune 500 company deals with viruses
|
||
every month, that the cost to a company with only a thousand
|
||
computers is about $170,000 a year right now and a quarter of a
|
||
million dollars next year. If we add these costs up, we know that
|
||
the cost to United States citizens of computer viruses just so far,
|
||
just since 1990, exceeds $1 billion.
|
||
When I go through these sorts of numbers, most of us say,
|
||
well, that hype again, because the way the press and the way we
|
||
have heard about computer viruses has been through hype oriented
|
||
teachings. So the purpose here is not to use hype and not to sort
|
||
of be alarmist and say the world is ending, because the world isn't
|
||
ending per se, but to suggest that there isn't a Fortune 500
|
||
company in the United States who hasn't had a computer virus
|
||
problem is absolutely true, and the sad truth about these viruses
|
||
is that the misconceptions are keeping us from doing the right
|
||
things to solve the problem, and the misconceptions stem from the
|
||
fact that companies that are hit by computer viruses, which is
|
||
every company, refused to talk about that until today.
|
||
There are a couple of other unique things and misconceptions
|
||
about computer viruses. One is that bulletin boards are the leading
|
||
source of computer viruses. Bulletin boards represent the infancy
|
||
of the superhighway, I think you could say, and there are a lot of
|
||
companies that make rules in their company that you are not allowed
|
||
to use bulletin boards because you might get a virus. In fact, it
|
||
is way in the low, single-digit percents. It may be as low as 1
|
||
percent of computer viruses that are introduced into companies come
|
||
through some route via a bulletin board.
|
||
We are told that some viruses are benign, and, in fact, most
|
||
people who write computer viruses think that their particular virus
|
||
is innocuous and not harmful. It turns out that most virus authors,
|
||
as we just heard from Mr. Goldstein, are, in fact, curious people
|
||
and not malicious people. They are young, and they are challenged,
|
||
and there is a huge game going on in the world. There is a group of
|
||
underground virus bulletin boards that we call virus exchange
|
||
bulletin boards in which people are challenged to write viruses.
|
||
The challenge works like this: If you are interested and
|
||
curious, you read the threads of communication on these bulletin
|
||
boards, and they say, you know, "If you want to download some
|
||
viruses, there's a thousand here on the bulletin board free for
|
||
your downloading," but you need points. Well, how do you get
|
||
points? Well, you upload some viruses. Well, where do you get some
|
||
viruses from? If you upload the most common viruses, they are not
|
||
worth many points, so you have to upload some really good, juicy
|
||
viruses. Well, the only way to get those is to write them, so you
|
||
write a virus and upload your virus, and then you gain acceptance
|
||
into the culture, and when you gain acceptance into the culture you
|
||
have just added to the problem.
|
||
It is interesting to know that the billion dollars that we
|
||
have spent since 1990 on computer viruses just in the United States
|
||
is due to viruses that were written in 1988 and 1987. Back then, we
|
||
only had one or two viruses a quarter, new, introduced into the
|
||
world. This year we have a thousand new computer viruses introduced
|
||
into our community, and it won't be for another 4 or 5 years before
|
||
these thousand viruses that are written now will become the major
|
||
viruses that hurt us in the future.
|
||
So virus authors don't believe they are doing anything wrong,
|
||
they don't believe that they are being harmful, and they don't
|
||
believe that what they do is dangerous, and, in fact, all viruses
|
||
are.
|
||
Computer crime laws don't have anything to do with computer
|
||
virus writers, so we heard testimony this morning from Scott
|
||
Charney of the Department of Justice who suggested that authorized
|
||
access is the biggest law you could use, and, in fact, most viruses
|
||
are brought into our organizations in authorized ways, because
|
||
users who are legitimate in the organizations accidentally bring
|
||
these things in, and then they infect our companies.
|
||
In summary, I think that we need to add a little bit of
|
||
specific wording in our computer crime legislation that relates
|
||
particularly to computer viruses and worms. We need, in particular,
|
||
to educate. We need to go after an ethics angle. We need to get to
|
||
the point where Americans think that writing viruses or doing these
|
||
other kinds of things that contaminate our computer superhighways
|
||
are akin to contaminating our expressways.
|
||
In the sixties we had a big "Keep America Beautiful" campaign,
|
||
and most Americans would find it unthinkable to throw their garbage
|
||
out the window of their car, but we don't think it unthinkable to
|
||
write rogue programs that will spread around our highway.
|
||
Thank you.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Dr. Tippett.
|
||
Mr. Guidry.
|
||
|
||
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. GUIDRY
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the
|
||
opportunity to appear before this subcommittee, and thank you,
|
||
subcommittee, for giving me this opportunity.
|
||
The Guidry Group is a Houston-based security consulting firm
|
||
specializing in telecommunication issues. We started working in
|
||
telecommunication issues in 1987 and started working specifically
|
||
with the cellular industry at that time. When we first started, we
|
||
were working with the individual carriers across the United States,
|
||
looking at the hot points where fraud was starting to occur, which
|
||
were major metropolitan cities of course.
|
||
In 1991, the Cellular Telephone Industry Association contacted
|
||
us and asked us to work directly with them in their fight against
|
||
cellular fraud. The industry itself has grown, as we all know,
|
||
quite rapidly. However, fraud in the industry has grown at an
|
||
unbelievable increase, actually faster than the industry itself,
|
||
and as a result of that fraud now is kind of like a balloon, a
|
||
water balloon; it appears in one area, and when we try to stamp it
|
||
out it appears in another area.
|
||
As a result, what has happened is, when fraud first started,
|
||
there was such a thing as subscription fraud, the same type of
|
||
fraud that occurred with the land line telecommunication industry.
|
||
That subscription fraud quickly changed. Now what has occurred is,
|
||
technology has really stepped in.
|
||
First, hackers, who are criminals or just curious people,
|
||
would take a telephone apart, a cellular phone apart, and change
|
||
the algorithm on the chip, reinsert the chip into the telephone,
|
||
and cause that telephone to tumble. Well, the industry put its best
|
||
foot forward and actually stopped, for the most part, the act of
|
||
tumbling in cellular telephones. But within the last 18 months
|
||
something really terrible has happened, and that is cloning.
|
||
Cloning is the copying of the MIN and and ESN number, and, for
|
||
clarification, the MIN is the Mobile Identification Number that is
|
||
assigned to you by the carrier, and the ESN number is the
|
||
Electronic Cellular Number that is given to the cellular telephone
|
||
from that particular manufacturer. As a result, now we have
|
||
perpetrators, or just curious people, finding ways to copy the MIN
|
||
and the ESN, thereby victimizing the cellular carrier as well as
|
||
the good user, paying subscriber. This occurs when the bill is
|
||
transmitted by the carrier to the subscriber and he says something
|
||
to the effect of, "I didn't realize that I had made $10,000 worth
|
||
of calls to the Dominican Republic," or to Asia or Nicaragua or
|
||
just any place like that.
|
||
Now what has happened is, those clone devices have been placed
|
||
in the hands of people that we call ET houses, I guess you would
|
||
say, and they are the new immigrants that come into the United
|
||
States for the most part that do not have telephone subscriptions
|
||
on the land line or on the carrier side from cellular, and now they
|
||
are charged as much as $25 for 15 minutes to place a call to their
|
||
home.
|
||
Unfortunately, though, the illicit behavior of criminals has
|
||
stepped into this network also. Now we have gang members, drug
|
||
dealers, and gambling, prostitution, vice, just all sorts of crime,
|
||
stepping forward to use this system where, by using the cloning,
|
||
they are avoiding law enforcement. Law enforcement has problems, of
|
||
course, trying to find out how to tap into those telephone systems
|
||
and record those individuals.
|
||
Very recently, cloning has even taken a second step, and that
|
||
is now something that we term the magic phone, and the magic phone
|
||
works like this: Instead of cloning just one particular number, it
|
||
clones a variety of numbers, as many as 14 or 66, thereby
|
||
distributing the fraud among several users, which makes it almost
|
||
virtually impossible for us to detect at an early stage.
|
||
In response to this, what has happened? A lot of legitimate
|
||
people have started to look at using the illegitimate cellular
|
||
services. They are promised that this is a satellite phone or just
|
||
a telephone that if they pay a $2,500 fee will avoid paying further
|
||
bills. So now it has really started to spread.
|
||
Some people in major metropolitan areas, such as the
|
||
Southwest, Northeast, and Southeast, have started running their own
|
||
mini-cellular companies by distributing these cloning phones to
|
||
possible clients and users, collecting the fee once a month to
|
||
reactivate the phone if it is actually denied access.
|
||
The cellular industry has really stepped up to the plate I
|
||
think the best they can right now in trying to combat this by
|
||
working with the switch manufacturers and other carriers, 150 of
|
||
them to date with the cellular telephone industry, as well as the
|
||
phone manufacturers, and a lot of companies have started looking at
|
||
software technology. However, these answers will not come to pass
|
||
very soon. What we must have is strong legislation.
|
||
We have been working for the last 18 months, specifically with
|
||
the Secret Service and a lot of local, State, and Federal law
|
||
enforcement agencies. The Service has arrested over 100 people
|
||
involved in cellular fraud. We feel very successful about that. We
|
||
also worked with local law enforcement in Los Angeles to form the
|
||
L.A. Blitz, and we arrested an additional 26 people and seized 66
|
||
illegal telephones and several computers that spread this cloning
|
||
device.
|
||
However, now we have a problem. U.S. Title 18, 1029, does not
|
||
necessarily state cellular or wireless. It is very important, and
|
||
I pray that this committee will look at revising 1029 and changing
|
||
it to include wireless and cellular. I think wireless
|
||
communications, of course, like most people, is the wave of the
|
||
future, and it is extremely important that we include that in the
|
||
legislation so that when people are apprehended they can be
|
||
prosecuted.
|
||
Thank you, sir.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Guidry, very much.
|
||
We will take questions now from the subcommittee members.
|
||
Let me begin, Mr. Delaney. I would like you and Mr. Goldstein
|
||
to engage in a conversation, if we could. This is Mr. Goldstein's
|
||
magazine, "The Hacker Quarterly: 2600," and for $4 we could go out
|
||
to Tower Records here in the District of Columbia and purchase
|
||
this. It has information in it that, from my perspective, is very
|
||
troubling in terms of people's cellular phone numbers and
|
||
information on how to crack through into people's private
|
||
information.
|
||
Now you have got some problems with "The Hacker Quarterly,"
|
||
Mr. Delaney.
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. And your problem is, among other things, that
|
||
teenagers can get access to this and go joy riding into people's
|
||
private records.
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. Yes, sir. In fact, they do.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Could you elaborate on what that problem is?
|
||
And then, Mr. Goldstein, I would like for you to deal with the
|
||
ethical implications of the problem as Mr. Delaney would outline
|
||
them.
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. Well, the problem is that teenagers do read the
|
||
"2600" magazine. I have witnessed teenagers being given free copies
|
||
of the magazine by the editor-in-chief. I have looked at a
|
||
historical perspective of the articles published in "2600" on how
|
||
to engage in different types of telecommunications fraud, and I
|
||
have arrested teenagers that have read that magazine.
|
||
The publisher, or the editor-in-chief, does so with impunity
|
||
under the cloak of protection of the First Amendment. However, as
|
||
I indicated earlier, in that the First Amendment has been abridged
|
||
for the protection of juveniles from pornography, I also feel that
|
||
it could be abridged for juveniles being protected from manuals on
|
||
how to commit crime -- children, especially teenagers, who are
|
||
hackers, and who, whether they be mischievous or intentionally
|
||
reckless, don't have the wherewithal that an adult does to
|
||
understand the impact of what he is doing when he gets involved in
|
||
this and ends up being arrested for it.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Goldstein, how do we deal with this problem?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. First of all, "2600" is not a manual for
|
||
computer crime. What we do is, we explain how computers work. Very
|
||
often knowledge can lead to people committing crimes, we don't deny
|
||
that, but I don't believe that is an excuse for withholding the
|
||
knowledge.
|
||
The article on cellular phones that was printed in that
|
||
particular issue pretty much goes into detail as to how people can
|
||
track a cellular phone call, how people can listen in, how exactly
|
||
the technology works. These are all things that people should know,
|
||
and perhaps if people had known this at the beginning they would
|
||
have seen the security problems that are now prevalent, and perhaps
|
||
something could have been done about it at that point.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Well, I don't know. You are being a little bit
|
||
disingenuous here, Mr. Goldstein. Here, on page 17 of your spring
|
||
edition of 1993, "How to build a pay TV descrambler." Now that is
|
||
illegal.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Not building. Building one is not illegal.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Oh, using one is illegal?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Exactly.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I see. So showing a teenager, or anyone, how to
|
||
build a pay TV descrambler is not illegal. But what would they do
|
||
then, use it as an example of their technological prowess that they
|
||
know how to build one? Would there not be a temptation to use it,
|
||
Mr. Goldstein?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is a two-way street, because we have been
|
||
derided by hackers for printing that information and showing the
|
||
cable companies exactly what the hackers are doing.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate it from that perspective, but let's
|
||
go over to the other one. If I am down in my basement building a
|
||
pay TV descrambler for a week, am I not going to be tempted to see
|
||
if it works, Mr. Goldstein? Or how is it that I then prove to
|
||
myself and my friends that I have actually got something here which
|
||
does work in the real world?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is quite possible you will be tempted to try
|
||
it out. We don't recommend people being fraudulent --
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. How do you know that it works, by the way?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Actually, I have been told by most people that
|
||
is an old version that most cable companies have gotten beyond.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. So this wouldn't work then?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It will work in some places, it won't work in
|
||
all places.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Oh, it would work? It would work in some places?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Most likely, yes. But the thing is, we don't
|
||
believe that because something could be used in a bad way, that is
|
||
a reason to stifle the knowledge that goes into it.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. That is the only way this could be used. Is there
|
||
a good way in which a pay TV descrambler could be used that is a
|
||
legal way?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Certainly, to understand how the technology
|
||
works in the first place, to design a way of defeating such devices
|
||
in the future or to build other electronic devices based on that
|
||
technology.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate that, but it doesn't seem to me that
|
||
most of the subscribers to "2600" magazine --
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is interesting that you are pointing to
|
||
that. That is our first foray into cable TV. We have never even
|
||
testified on the subject before.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate that.
|
||
Well, let's move on to some of your other forays here. What
|
||
you have got here, it seems to me, is a manual where you go down
|
||
Maple Street and you just kind of try the door on every home on
|
||
Maple Street. Then you hit 216 Maple Street, and the door is open.
|
||
What you then do is, you take that information, and you go down to
|
||
the corner grocery store, and you post it: "The door of 216 Maple
|
||
is open."
|
||
Now, of course, you are not telling anyone to steal, and you
|
||
are not telling anyone that they should go into 216 Maple. You are
|
||
assuming that everyone is going to be ethical who is going to use
|
||
this information, that the house at 216 Maple is open. But the
|
||
truth of the matter is, you have got no control at this point over
|
||
who uses that information. Isn't that true, Mr. Goldstein?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The difference is that a hacker will never
|
||
target an individual person as a house or a personal computer or
|
||
something like that. What a hacker is interested in is wide open,
|
||
huge data bases that contain information about people, such as TRW.
|
||
A better example, I feel, would be one that we tried to do 2
|
||
years ago where we pointed out that the Simplex Lock Corporation
|
||
had a very limited number of combinations on their hardware locks
|
||
that they were trying to push homeowners to put on their homes, and
|
||
we tried to alert everybody as to how insecure these are, how easy
|
||
it is to get into them, and people were not interested.
|
||
Hackers are constantly trying to show people how easy it is to
|
||
do certain things.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate what you are saying. From one
|
||
perspective, you are saying that hackers are good people out there,
|
||
almost like -- what are they called? -- the Angels that patrol the
|
||
subways of New York City.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Guardian Angels. I wouldn't say that though.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Yes, the Guardian Angels, just trying to protect
|
||
people.
|
||
But then Mr. Delaney here has the joy riders with the very
|
||
same information they have taken off the grocery store bulletin
|
||
board about the fact that 216 Maple is wide open, and he says we
|
||
have got to have some laws on the books here to protect against it.
|
||
So would you mind if we passed, Mr. Goldstein, trespassing
|
||
laws that if people did, in fact, go into 216 and did do something
|
||
wrong, that we would be able to punish them legally? Would you have
|
||
a problem with that?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I would be thrilled if computer trespassing
|
||
laws were enforced to the same degree as physical trespassing laws,
|
||
because then you would not have teenage kids having their doors
|
||
kicked in by Federal marshals and being threatened with $250,000
|
||
fines, having all their computer equipment taken and having guns
|
||
pointed at them. You would have a warning, which is what you get
|
||
for criminal trespass in the real world, and I think we need to
|
||
balance out the real world --
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. All right. So you are saying, on the one hand, you
|
||
have a problem that you feel that hackers are harassed by law
|
||
enforcement officials and are unduly punished. We will put that on
|
||
one side of the equation. But how about the other side? How about
|
||
where hackers are violating people's privacy? What should we do
|
||
there, Mr. Goldstein?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. When a hacker is violating a law, they should
|
||
be charged with violating a particular law, but that is not what I
|
||
see today. I see law enforcement not having a full grasp of the
|
||
technology. A good example of this was raids on people's houses a
|
||
couple of years ago where in virtually every instance a Secret
|
||
Service agent would say, "Your son is responsible for the AT&T
|
||
crash on Martin Luther King Day," something that AT&T said from the
|
||
beginning was not possible.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Again, Mr. Goldstein, I appreciate that. Let's go
|
||
to the other side of the problem, the joy rider or the criminal
|
||
that is using this information. What penalties would you suggest to
|
||
deal with the bad hacker? Are there bad hackers?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are a few bad hackers. I don't know any
|
||
myself, but I'm sure there are.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I assume if you knew any, you would make sure we
|
||
did something about them. But let's just assume there are bad
|
||
people subscribing. What do we do about the bad hacker?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, I just would like to clarify something.
|
||
We have heard here in testimony that there are gang members and
|
||
drug members who are using this technology. Now, are we going to
|
||
define them as hackers because they are using the technology?
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Yes. Well, if you want to give them another name,
|
||
fine. We will call them hackers and crackers, all right?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think we should call them criminals.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. So the crackers are bad hackers, all right? If you
|
||
want another word for them, that is fine, but you have got the
|
||
security of individuals decreasing with the sophistication of each
|
||
one of these technologies, and the crackers are out there. What do
|
||
we do with the crackers who buy your book?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I would not call them crackers. They are
|
||
criminals. If they are out there doing something for their own
|
||
benefit, selling information --
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Criminal hackers. What do we do with them?
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are existing laws. Stealing is still
|
||
stealing.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. OK. Fine.
|
||
Dr. Tippett.
|
||
Mr. TIPPETT. I think that the information age has brought on
|
||
an interesting dilemma that I alluded to earlier. The dilemma is
|
||
that the people who use computers don't have parents who used
|
||
computers, and therefore they didn't get the sandbox training on
|
||
proper etiquette. They didn't learn you are not supposed to spit in
|
||
other people's faces or contaminate the water that we drink, and we
|
||
have a whole generation now of 100 million in the United States
|
||
computer users, many of whom can think this through themselves,
|
||
but, as we know, there is a range of people in any group, and we
|
||
need to point out the obvious to some people. It may be the bottom
|
||
10 percent.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. What the problem is, of course, is that the
|
||
computer hacker of today doesn't have a computer hacker parent, so
|
||
parents aren't teaching their children how to use their computers
|
||
because parents don't know how to use computers. So what do we do?
|
||
Mr. TIPPETT. It is incumbent upon us to do the same kind of
|
||
thing we did in the sixties to explain that littering wasn't right.
|
||
It is incumbent upon us to take an educational stance and for
|
||
Congress to credit organizations, maybe through a tax credit or
|
||
through tax deductions, for taking those educational opportunities
|
||
and educating the world of people who didn't have sandbox training
|
||
what is good and what is bad about computing.
|
||
So at least the educational part needs to get started, because
|
||
I, for one, think that probably 90 percent of the kids -- most of
|
||
the kids who do most of the damage that we have all described up
|
||
here, in fact, don't really believe they are doing any damage and
|
||
don't have the concept of the broadness of the problem that they
|
||
are doing. The 10 percent of people who are criminal we could go
|
||
after potentially from the criminal aspect, but the rest we need to
|
||
get after from a plain, straight ahead educational aspect.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate that.
|
||
I will just say in conclusion -- and this is for your benefit,
|
||
Mr. Goldstein. When you pass laws, you don't pass laws for the good
|
||
people. What we assume is that there are a certain percent of
|
||
people -- 5 percent, 10 percent; you pick it -- who really don't
|
||
have a good relationship with society as a whole, and every law
|
||
that we pass, for the most part, deals with those people.
|
||
Now, as you can imagine, when we pass death penalty statutes,
|
||
we are not aiming it at your mother and my mother. It is highly
|
||
unlikely they are going to be committing a murder in this lifetime.
|
||
But we do think there is a certain percentage that will. It is a
|
||
pretty tough penalty to have, but we have to have some penalty that
|
||
fits the crime.
|
||
Similarly here, we assume that there is a certain percentage
|
||
of pathologically damaged people out there. The cerebral mechanism
|
||
doesn't quite work in parallel with the rest of society. We have to
|
||
pass laws to protect the rest of us against them. We will call them
|
||
criminal hackers. What do we do to deal with them is the question
|
||
that we are going to be confronted with in the course of our
|
||
hearings?
|
||
Let me recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fields.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
||
Just for my own edification, Mr. Goldstein, you appear to be
|
||
intelligent; you have your magazine, so obviously you are
|
||
entrepreneurial. For me personally, I would like to know, why don't
|
||
you channel the curiosity that you talk about into something that
|
||
is positive for society? And, I'm going to have to say to you, I
|
||
don't think it is positive when you invade someone else's privacy.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I agree.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Whether it is an individual or a corporation.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, I would like to ask a question in return
|
||
then. If I discover that a corporation is keeping a file on me and
|
||
I access that corporation's computer and find out or tell someone
|
||
else, whose privacy am I invading? Or is the corporation invading
|
||
my privacy?
|
||
You see, corporations are notorious for not volunteering such
|
||
information: "By the way, we are keeping files on most Americans
|
||
and keeping track of their eating habits and their sexual habits
|
||
and all kinds of other things." Occasionally, hackers stumble on to
|
||
information like that, and you are much more likely to get the
|
||
truth out of them because they don't have any interest to protect.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Are you saying with this book that is what you are
|
||
trying to promote? because when I look through this book, I find
|
||
the same thing that the chairman finds, some things that could
|
||
actually lead to criminal behavior, and when I see all of these
|
||
codes regarding cellular telephones, how you penetrate and listen
|
||
to someone's private conversation, I don't see where you are doing
|
||
anything for the person, the person who is actually doing the
|
||
hacking. I see that as an invasion of privacy.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. All right. I need to explain something then.
|
||
Those are not codes, those are frequencies. Those are frequencies
|
||
that anybody can listen to, and by printing those frequencies we
|
||
are demonstrating how easy it is for anybody to listen to them.
|
||
Now if I say that by tuning to 871 megahertz you can listen to
|
||
a cellular phone call, I don't think I am committing a crime, I
|
||
think I am explaining to somebody. What I have done at previous
|
||
conferences is hold up this scanner and press a button and show
|
||
people how easy it is to listen, and those people, when they get
|
||
into their cars later on in the day, they do not use their cellular
|
||
telephones to make private calls of a personal nature because they
|
||
have learned something, and that is what we are trying to do, we
|
||
are trying to show people how easy it is.
|
||
Now, yes, that information can be used in a bad way, but to
|
||
use that as an excuse not to give out the information at all is
|
||
even worse, and I think it is much more likely that things may be
|
||
fixed, the cellular industry may finally get its act together and
|
||
start protecting phone calls. The phone companies might make red
|
||
boxes harder to use or might make it easier for people to afford
|
||
phone calls, but we will never know if we don't make it public.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. I want to be honest with you, Mr. Goldstein. I
|
||
think it is frightening that someone like you thinks there is a
|
||
protected right in invading someone else's privacy.
|
||
Mr. Guidry, let me turn to you. How does a hacker get the
|
||
codes that you were talking about a moment ago -- if I understood
|
||
what you were saying correctly, the manual ID number, the other
|
||
cellular numbers that allow them to clone?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Well, unfortunately, "2600" would be a real good
|
||
bet to get those, and we have arrested people and found those
|
||
manuals in their possession.
|
||
The other way is quite simply just to what we call dumpster
|
||
dive, and that is to go to cellular carriers where they may destroy
|
||
trash. Unfortunately, some of it is shredded and put back together,
|
||
some of it is not shredded, and kids, criminals, go into those
|
||
dumpsters, withdraw that information, piece it together, and then
|
||
experiment with it. That information then is usually sold for
|
||
criminal activity to avoid prosecution.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. You are asking the subcommittee to include
|
||
wireless and cellular, and I think that is a good recommendation.
|
||
I think certainly that is one that we are going to take as good
|
||
counsel. But it appears that much of what you are talking about is
|
||
organized activity, and my question is, does the current punishment
|
||
scheme actually fit the crime, or should we also look at increasing
|
||
punishment for this type of crime?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. I would strongly suggest that we increase the
|
||
punishment for this sort of crime. It is unfortunate that some
|
||
hackers take that information and sell it for criminal activity,
|
||
and, as a result, if prosecution is not stiff enough, then it far
|
||
outweighs the crime.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. What is the punishment now for this type of
|
||
cellular fraud?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Right now, it can be as high as $100,000 and up to
|
||
20 years in the penitentiary.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Delaney, do you feel that that is adequate?
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. Under New York State law, which is what I deal
|
||
with, as opposed to the Federal law, we can charge a host of
|
||
felonies with regard to one illicit telephone call if you want to
|
||
be creative with the law. Sections 1029 and 1039 really cover just
|
||
about everything other than the cellular concern and the wireless
|
||
concern.
|
||
However, I think the thing that is not dealt with is the
|
||
person who is running the call sell operations. The call selling
|
||
operations are the biggest loss of revenue to the telephone
|
||
companies, cellular companies. Whether they are using PBX's or call
|
||
diverters or cellular phones, this is where all the fraud is coming
|
||
from, and there is only a handful of people who are originating
|
||
this crime.
|
||
We have targeted these people in New York City right now, and
|
||
the same thing is being done in Los Angeles and Florida, to
|
||
determine who these people are that use just the telephone to hack
|
||
out the codes on PBX's, use ESN readers made by the Curtis Company
|
||
to steal the ESN and MIN's out of the air and then to disseminate
|
||
this to the street phones and to the cellular phones that are in
|
||
cars and deprive the cellular industry of about $300 million a
|
||
year, and the rest of the telecommunications networks in the United
|
||
States probably of about $1 billion a year, due to the call sell
|
||
operations.
|
||
In one particular case that we watched, as a code was hacked
|
||
out on a PBX in a company in Massachusetts, the code was
|
||
disseminated to 250 street phones within the period of a week. By
|
||
the end of the month, a rather small bill of $40,000 was sent to
|
||
the company, small only because they were limited by the number of
|
||
telephone lines going through that company. Had it been a larger
|
||
company whose code had been cracked by the finger hacker, the bill
|
||
would have been in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, or over $1
|
||
million as typically some of the bills have been.
|
||
But this is a relatively small group of people creating a
|
||
tremendous problem in the United States, and a law specifically
|
||
dealing with a person who is operating as an entrepreneur, running
|
||
a call selling operation, I think would go far to ending one of the
|
||
biggest problems we have.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Let me ask so I understand, Mr. Delaney and Mr.
|
||
Guidry, because I am a little confused, or maybe I just didn't
|
||
understand the testimony, are these individual hackers acting
|
||
separately, or are these people operating within a network, within
|
||
an organization?
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. These finger hackers are the people that control
|
||
the network of people that operate telephone booths and cellular
|
||
phones for reselling telephone service. These finger hackers are
|
||
not computer hackers.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. When you say finger hackers, is this one person
|
||
operating independently, or is that finger hacker operating in
|
||
concert --
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. No. He has franchised. He has franchised out. He
|
||
actually sells the computer and the software and the cattail to do
|
||
this to other people, and then they start their own little group.
|
||
Now it is going internationally.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Explain to me, if the chairman would permit --
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Please.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Explain to me the franchise.
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. What happens is, let's pretend we are in Los
|
||
Angeles right now and I have the ability to clone a phone that is
|
||
using a computer, a cattail, we call it, that goes from the
|
||
computer, the back of the computer, into the telephone, and I have
|
||
the diskette that tells me how to change that program. I can at
|
||
some point sell the cloning. You can come to me, and I can clone
|
||
your phone.
|
||
However, that is one way for me to make money. The best way
|
||
for me to make money is to buy computers, additional diskettes, and
|
||
go to Radio Shack or some place and make additional cattails and
|
||
say, "I can either clone your phone for $1,500, or what you can do
|
||
for $5,000 is start your own company." So you say, "Well, wow,
|
||
that's pretty good, because how many times would I have to sell one
|
||
phone at from $500 to $1,500 to get my initial investment back?" As
|
||
a result now, you have groups, you have just youngsters as well as
|
||
organized crime stepping in.
|
||
The Guidry Group has worked in the Philippines on this, we
|
||
have worked in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina,
|
||
and next week I will be in London and in Rome. It is so bad, sir,
|
||
that now intelligence agencies in Rome have told me -- and that is
|
||
what I am going there for -- that organized crime seems to think
|
||
that telecommunications fraud is more lucrative, unfortunately,
|
||
than drugs, and it is darned sure more lucrative in the Los
|
||
Angeles, probably New York, and Miami areas, because right now
|
||
prosecution is not that strong. It is unfortunate that all of law
|
||
enforcement is not trained, nor could they be, to pick up on
|
||
someone standing on a corner using an illegitimate phone.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. How would a person know where to get their
|
||
telephone cloned?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Let me tell you what happens. Normally when we go
|
||
into a major metropolitan city, or we also check the computer
|
||
bulletin boards, a lot of times that information is there. Most of
|
||
the time, though, it is in magazines, like green sheets, which are
|
||
free advertisements saying, "Call anywhere in the world. Come to --"
|
||
a location, or, "Call this number." Also in Los Angeles, for some
|
||
reason, they seem to advertise a lot in sex magazines, and people
|
||
will simply buy a sex magazine and there will be a statement in
|
||
there, "Earn money the fast way. Start your own telecommunications
|
||
company." And then we will follow up on that tip and work with the
|
||
Secret Service to try to apprehend those people.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Haugh.
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. If I could just add a few comments, it would be
|
||
most unfortunate if this denigrates into a discussion of
|
||
adolescents who are curious and so-called finger hackers. The truth
|
||
of the matter is that the toll fraudsters are adults, they are
|
||
organized, they are smart, they are savvy, and the drug dealers in
|
||
particular are learning very quickly that it is far more lucrative,
|
||
far less dangerous, to go into the telecom crime business.
|
||
"Finger hacking" is a term, but the truth is, war dialers,
|
||
speed dialers, modems, automated equipment now will hack and crack
|
||
into systems and break the codes overnight. While the criminal
|
||
sleeps, his equipment penetrates those systems. He gets up in the
|
||
morning, and he has got a print sheet of new numbers that his
|
||
equipment penetrated overnight.
|
||
We have interviewed the criminals involved. These so-called
|
||
idle curiosity adolescents are being paid up to $10,000 a month for
|
||
new codes. I don't call that curiosity, I call that venality. We
|
||
are talking a $4 billion problem.
|
||
The chairman came up with the Maple Street example. I think
|
||
even better yet, Mr. Chairman, the truth is that 216 Maple had a
|
||
security device on the door and a code, and what Mr. Goldstein and
|
||
his ilk do is sell that code through selling subscriptions to these
|
||
periodicals. There is a big difference, in my opinion, between
|
||
saying, "216 Maple is open" -- that is bad enough -- than to say,
|
||
"You go to 216 Maple, and push 4156, and you can get in the door."
|
||
But we are talking about crime, we are talking about adults,
|
||
we are talking about organized crime, perhaps not in the Cosa
|
||
Nostra sense, but even the Cosa Nostra is wising up that they can
|
||
finance some of these operations, and in New York and Los Angeles,
|
||
in particular, the true Mafia is now beginning to finance some of
|
||
these telecom fraud operations.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Guidry, one last question. Is it the Secret
|
||
Service that is at the forefront of Federal activity?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, sir, it is.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Do they have the resources to adequately deal with
|
||
this problem?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. No, sir. The problem is growing so rapidly that
|
||
they are undermanned in this area but have asked for additional
|
||
manpower.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Is this a priority for the Secret Service?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, sir, it is.
|
||
Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has expired.
|
||
Again, it is a $4 to $5 billion problem.
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. That is what our research indicated.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. There were 35,000 victims last year alone.
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. Yes, sir, and this is only users, large users. Now
|
||
it can be businesses, nonprofits. There is a university on the East
|
||
Coast that just this last week got hit for $490,000, and the fraud
|
||
is continuing.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Ohio.
|
||
Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
|
||
Let me ask the witnesses: Other than making the penalties
|
||
tougher for this type of activity, what other recommendations, if
|
||
any, would any of you have that we could deal with, that our
|
||
subcommittee should look at, and the Judiciary Committee, I assume,
|
||
for what we might want to try to accomplish?
|
||
Mr. Haugh?
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. I happen to disagree with a couple of the witnesses
|
||
who have indicated tougher penalties. I mean it sounds great. You
|
||
know, that is the common instant reaction to anything, expand the
|
||
penalties. I happen to think 20 years is plenty enough for criminal
|
||
penetration of a telecom system, and there are a few housekeeping
|
||
things that could be done.
|
||
The problem isn't the adequacy of the law, the laws are pretty
|
||
adequate, and, as Mr. Delaney indicated, you have a violation
|
||
someplace, you have got a State law and a Federal law, both, and if
|
||
you are a smart prosecutor, there are about eight different ways
|
||
you can go after these criminals.
|
||
The truth is, we have got inadequate enforcement, inadequate
|
||
funding, inadequate pressure on the part of the Congress on the FCC
|
||
to make more proactive efforts and to put more heat on the industry
|
||
to coordinate.
|
||
The truth is that the carriers compete with each other
|
||
fiercely. They, with some limited exceptions, don't share
|
||
appropriate information with each other. The LEC's and the RBOC's
|
||
hide behind privacy; they hide behind other excuses not to
|
||
cooperate with law enforcement and with the rest of the industry as
|
||
effectively as they should.
|
||
So I think putting the heat on the industry, putting the heat
|
||
on the FCC, more adequately funding the FCC, more adequately
|
||
funding the Secret Service, and having hearings like this that
|
||
focus on the problem is the answer and not expanding the penalty
|
||
from 20 years to 25 years. Nobody gets 20 years anyway, so
|
||
expanding the 20 years is, to me, not the answer.
|
||
Mr. OXLEY. What is the average sentence for something like
|
||
that?
|
||
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. I think the average toll fraud criminal who
|
||
actually goes to jail -- and they are few and far between -- spends
|
||
3 to 6 months, and they are out.
|
||
Now recidivism levels are low, I agree with Mr. Delaney. Once
|
||
you catch them, they rarely go back to it. So it isn't a question
|
||
of putting them in jail forever, it is a question of putting them
|
||
in jail. The certainty of punishment level is very low.
|
||
We talked to a drug dealer in New York City who left the drug
|
||
business to go into toll fraud because he told me he can make
|
||
$900,000 a year -- nontaxable income, he called it -- and never
|
||
ever worry about going to jail.
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. In New York City, I have never seen anybody go to
|
||
jail on a first offense for anything short of armed robbery, let
|
||
alone telephone fraud. They typically get 200 hours of community
|
||
service, depending upon the judge.
|
||
These people that I am speaking about are not the computer
|
||
hackers that we were speaking about earlier, these are the people
|
||
that are the finger hackers that break into the PBX's around the
|
||
country. These are immigrants in the United States, they are
|
||
adults, they know how to operate a telephone. They sit there
|
||
generally -- almost every one that we have arrested so far uses a
|
||
Panasonic memory telephone, and they sit there night and day try
|
||
ing to hack out the PBX codes. They go through all the default
|
||
codes of the major manufacturers of PBX's. They know that much.
|
||
We don't have a single person in New York City, that I know
|
||
of, that is hacking PBX's with a computer. The long distance
|
||
carriers can see patterns of hacking into 800 lines, which are
|
||
typically the PBX's, and they can see that it is being done by
|
||
telephone, by finger hacking a telephone key pad, as opposed to a
|
||
computer.
|
||
The war dialing programs that Mr. Haugh referred to are
|
||
typically used by the computer hackers to get these codes, but they
|
||
create only a minuscule amount of the fraud that is ongoing in the
|
||
country. The great majority is generated by the finger hackers who
|
||
then disseminate those codes to the telephone booths and the call
|
||
selling operations that operate out of apartments in New York City.
|
||
In one apartment with five telephones in it that operates 16 hours
|
||
a day for 365 days a year selling telephone service at $10 for 20
|
||
minutes, you take in $985,000. It is a very profitable business.
|
||
One of the individuals we arrested that said he did this
|
||
because it was more profitable and less likely that he be caught
|
||
than in selling drugs was murdered several months after we arrested
|
||
him in the Colombian section of Queens because he was operating as
|
||
an independent. It is a very controlled situation in New York City,
|
||
and different ethnicities throughout New York City control the call
|
||
sell operations in their neighborhoods, and everyone in those
|
||
neighborhoods knows where they can go to make an illicit phone call
|
||
or to get a phone cloned, whether it is a reprogrammed phone or
|
||
rechipped.
|
||
Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Guidry, did you have a comment?
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Well, I think that we really do need to enforce
|
||
the laws and we need to make some statutory changes in title 18,
|
||
section 1029 to include cellular and wireless.
|
||
I have been in courtrooms where really savvy defense attorneys
|
||
say, "Well, it does not specifically indicate cellular or
|
||
wireless," and that raises some question in the jury's mind, and I
|
||
would just as soon that question not be there.
|
||
Mr. OXLEY. Thank you.
|
||
Mr. Chairman, I see we have got a vote, and I yield back the
|
||
balance of my time.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.
|
||
We are going to have each one of you make a very brief summary
|
||
statement to the committee if you could, and then we are going to
|
||
adjourn the hearing.
|
||
As you know, the Federal Communications Commission will be
|
||
testifying before this subcommittee next week. We have a great
|
||
concern that, although they held an all-day hearing on toll fraud
|
||
last October, while we thought they were going to move ahead in an
|
||
expeditious fashion, that, with a lot of good information, it has
|
||
all sat on the shelf since that time. We expected them to act on
|
||
that information to establish new rules protecting consumers and
|
||
pushing carriers to do a lot more than they have done thus far to
|
||
protect their networks. In light of recent court decisions holding
|
||
that consumers are always liable I think that action by the FCC is
|
||
long overdue, and at the FCC authorization hearing next week I
|
||
expect to explore this issue with the commissioners in depth, so
|
||
you can be sure of that, Mr. Haugh.
|
||
Let's give each of you a 1-minute summation. Again, we will go
|
||
in reverse order and begin with you, Mr. Guidry.
|
||
Mr. GUIDRY. Thank you, sir.
|
||
Telecommunications fraud, of course, is going internationally,
|
||
and as it goes internationally and starts to franchise and get more
|
||
organized, we are going to have to figure out a better way to
|
||
combat it. Industry itself right now is putting its best foot
|
||
forward. However, I would ask this committee to strongly look at
|
||
|
||
changing some of this legislation and to also increase law
|
||
enforcement's efforts through manpower.
|
||
Thank you very much, sir.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.
|
||
Mr. Haugh.
|
||
Mr. HAUGH. I agree with Mr. Guidry that there are some
|
||
housekeeping changes that need to be made, and the particular title
|
||
and section he referred to should definitely be amended to include
|
||
more clearly wireless.
|
||
The overall problem is an immense one; it is a very serious
|
||
one; it is a complicated one. Everybody is at fault. Finger
|
||
pointing has been carried to an extreme. Again, I think the long
|
||
distance carriers, the big three -- AT&T, MCI, and Sprint -- have
|
||
done a superb job of coming up to speed with monitoring. They are
|
||
starting to cooperate better. They have really come to the table.
|
||
The laggards are the LEC's and the RBOC's, the CPE
|
||
manufacturers, and the FCC. In fairness to the FCC, they are
|
||
understaffed, undermanned, underfunded. They can't even take care
|
||
of all their mandated responsibilities right now, let alone take on
|
||
new chores.
|
||
All that said, there is a great deal the FCC can do --
|
||
jawboning, regulations, pushing the LEC's and the RBOC's, in
|
||
particular, to get real, get serious -- and I would urge this
|
||
committee -- applaud your efforts and urge you to continue that.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.
|
||
Dr. Tippett.
|
||
Mr. TIPPETT. Thank you.
|
||
The computer virus issue is a little bit different than the
|
||
toll fraud issue. In fact, there are no significant laws that deal
|
||
with viruses, and, in fact, the fact that there are no laws gives
|
||
the people who write viruses license to write them. The typical
|
||
statement you read is, "It's not illegal, and I don't do anything
|
||
that is illegal." So in the computer virus arena we do need laws.
|
||
They don't need to be fancy; they don't need to be extensive. There
|
||
are some suggestions of approaches to virus legislation in my
|
||
written testimony.
|
||
We also need education, and I would encourage Congress to
|
||
underwrite some education efforts that the private sector could
|
||
perform in various ways, perhaps through tax incentives or tax
|
||
credits. The problem is growing and large. It exceeds $1 billion
|
||
already in the United States, and it is going to be a $2 billion
|
||
problem in 1994.
|
||
As bad as toll fraud seems, this virus issue is, oddly, more
|
||
pervasive and less interesting to a whole lot of people, and I
|
||
think it needs some higher attention.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.
|
||
Mr. Goldstein.
|
||
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you.
|
||
I would like to close by cautioning the subcommittee and all
|
||
of us not to mix up these two very distinct worlds we are talking
|
||
about, the world of the criminal and the world of the experimenter,
|
||
the person that is seeking to learn. To do so will be to create a
|
||
society where people are afraid to experiment and try variations on
|
||
a theme because they might be committing some kind of a crime, and
|
||
at the same time further legislation could have the effect of not
|
||
really doing much for drug dealers and gangsters, who are doing far
|
||
more serious crimes than making free phone calls, and it is not
|
||
likely to intimidate them very much.
|
||
I think the answer is for all of us to understand specifically
|
||
what the weaknesses in the technology are and to figure out ways to
|
||
keep it as strong and fortress-like as possible. I do think it is
|
||
possible with as much research as we can put into it.
|
||
Thank you.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein.
|
||
Mr. Delaney.
|
||
Mr. DELANEY. Last year, the Secret Service and the FBI
|
||
arrested people in New York City for conducting illegal wiretaps.
|
||
The ability to still do that by a hacker exists in the United
|
||
States. Concerned with privacy, I am very happy to see that
|
||
something like the Clipper chip is going to become available to
|
||
protect society. I do hope, though, that we will always have for
|
||
the necessary law enforcement investigation the ability to conduct
|
||
those wiretaps. Without it, I see chaos.
|
||
But with respect to the cellular losses, the industry is
|
||
coming along a very rapid rate with technology to save them money
|
||
in the future, because with encryption nobody will be able to steal
|
||
their signals either.
|
||
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Delaney.
|
||
I apologize. There is a roll call on the Floor, and I only
|
||
have 3 minutes to get over there to make it. You have all been very
|
||
helpful to us here today. It is a very tough balancing act, but we
|
||
are going to be moving aggressively in this area. And we are going
|
||
to need all of you to stay close to us so that we pass legislation
|
||
that makes sense.
|
||
This hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
|
||
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
||
|
||
Philez
|
||
------
|
||
|
||
CaveAsp.Zip
|
||
-----------
|
||
by Caveman
|
||
|
||
Description: Informational Texts on Aspen Mail Systems
|
||
|
||
begin 400 CAVEASP.ZIP
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||
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|
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|
||
Cavetmc.Zip
|
||
-----------
|
||
by Caveman
|
||
Description: Informational Text File on The Message Center VMB
|
||
systems.
|
||
|
||
begin 400 CAVETMC.ZIP
|
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end
|
||
|
||
|
||
End Of Sphear DigiZine Issue #2
|
||
-------------------------------
|
||
|
||
|