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1041 lines
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Bank of Wisdom, Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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**** ****
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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by
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Charles Bradlaugh
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THIS essay is issued in the hope that it may succeed in
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removing some of the many prejudices prevalent, not only against
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the actual holders of Atheistic opinions, but also against those
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wrongfully suspected of Atheism. Men who have been famous for depth
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of thought, for excellent wit, or great genius, have been
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recklessly assailed as Atheists by those who lack the high
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qualifications against which the malice of the calumniators was
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directed. Thus, not only have Voltaire and Paine been, without
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ground, accused of Atheism, but Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley
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himself, have, amongst others, been denounced by thoughtless or
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unscrupulous pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the
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accusation being that they manifested an inclination to push human
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thought a little in advance of the age in which they lived.
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It is too often the faslaon with persons of pious reputation
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to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring immorality,
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and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and
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who have adopted Atheistic views as a desperate defiance against a
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Deity justly offended by the badness of their lives. Such persons
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urge that amongst the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious
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training, immoral and proffigate companions, licentious living, and
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the like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his "Instructions on Christian
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Theology," goes so far as to declare that "nearly all the Atheists
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upon record have been men of extremely debauched and vile conduct."
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Such language from the Christian advocate is not surprising, but
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there are others who, while professing great desire for the spread
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of Freethought and having pretensions to rank amongst acute and
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liberal thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings
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cold, barren, and negative. Excepting to each of the above
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allegations, I maintain that thoughtful Atheism affords greater
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possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on, or
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possible to be founded on, Theism, and that the lives of true
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Atheists must be more virtuous -- because more human -- than those
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of the believers in Deity, the humanity of the devout believer
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often finding itself neutralized by a faith with which that
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humanity is necessarily in constant collision. The devotee piling
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the faggots at the 'auto da fe' of a heretic, and that heretic his
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son, might notwithstanding be a good father in every other respect
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(see Deut. xiii. 6-10). Heresy, in the eyes of the believer, is
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highest criminality, and outweighs all claims of family or
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affection.
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Atheism, properly understood, is no mere disbelief; is in no
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wise a cold, barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty,
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fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive
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assertion of action of highest humanity.
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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1
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned -- its
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defence unheard -- on the 'ex parte' slanders of some of the
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professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage is
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bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but whose valour
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becomes tempered with discretion when a free platform is afforded
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and discussion claimed; nor misjudged because it has been the
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custom to regard Atheism as so unpopular as to render its advocacy
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impolitic. The best policy against all prejudice is to firmly
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advocate the truth. The Atheist does not say "There is no God," but
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he says: "I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea of
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God; the word 'God' is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct
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affirmation. I do not deny God, because I cannot deny that of which
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I have no conception, and the conception of which by its affirmer,
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is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me. If, however,
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'God' is defined to mean an existence other than the existence of
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which I am a mode, then I deny 'God,' and affirm that it is
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impossible such 'God' can be. That is, I affirm one existence, and
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deny that there can be more than one." The Pantheist also affirms
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one existence, and denies that there can be more than one but the
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distinction between the Pantheist and the Atheist is, that the
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Pantheist affirms infinite attributes for existence, while the
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Atheist maintains that attributes are the characteristics of mode
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-- i.e., the diversities enabling the conditioning in thought.
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When the Theist affirms that his God is an existence other
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than, and separate from, the so-called material universe, and when
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he invests this separate, hypothetical existence with the several
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attributes of personality, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence,
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eternity, infinity, immutability, and perfect goodness, then the
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Atheist in reply says I deny the existence of such a being"; and he
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is entitled to say this because this Theistic definition is self-
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contradictory, as well as contradictory of every-day experience.
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If you speak to the Atheist of God as creator, he answers that
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the conception of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to
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construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence
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has been either increased or diminished, much less can we conceive
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an absolute origination of substance. We cannot conceive either, on
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the one hand, nothing becoming something, or on the other,
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something becoming nothing. The words "creation" and "destruction"
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have no value except as applied to phenomena. You may destroy a
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gold coin, but you have only destroyed the condition, you have not
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affected the substance. "Creation" and "destruction" denote change
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of phenomena; they do not denote origin or cessation of substance.
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The Theist who speaks of God creating the universe must either
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suppose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he produced
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it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the universe as
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evolution of Deity, because this would identify Universe and Deity,
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and be Pantheism rather than Theism. There would be no distinction
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of substance -- no creation. Nor can the Theist regard the universe
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as created out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him,
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necessarily eternal and infinite. Gods existence being eternal and
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infinite precludes the possibility of the conception of vacuum to
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be filled by the universe if created. No one can even think of any
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point in extent or duration and say: Here is the point of
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separation between the creator and the created. It is not possible
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for the Theist to imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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2
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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possible to conceive either an absolute commencement, or an
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absolute terminltion of existence; that is, it is impossible to
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conceive beginning, before which you have a period when the
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universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which the
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universe, having been, no longer exists. The Atheist affirms that
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he cognizes to-day effects; that these are, at the same time,
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causes and effects -- causes to the effects they precede, effects
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to the causes they follow. Cause is simply everything without which
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the effect would not result, and with which it must result. Cause
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is the means to an end, consummating itself in that end. Cause is
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the word we use to include all that determines change. The Theist
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who argues for creation must assert a point of time -- that is, of
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duration, when the created did not yet exist. At this point of time
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either something existed or nothing; but something must have
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existed, for out of nothing nothing can come. Something must have
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existed, because the point fixed upon is that of the duration of
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something. This something must have been either finite or infinite;
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if finite it could not have been God, and if the something were
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infinite, then creation was impossible: it is impossible to add to
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infinite existence.
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If you leave the question of creation, and deal, with the
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government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are by no
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means lessened. The existence of evil is then a terrible stumbling-
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block to the Theist. Pain, misery, crime, poverty confront the
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advocate of eternal goodness, and challenge with unanswerable
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potency his declaration of Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-
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powerful. A recent writer in the 'Spectator' admits that there is
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what it regards "as the most painful, as it is often the most
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incurable, form of Atheism -- the Atheism arising from a sort of
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horror of the idea of an Omnipotent Being permitting such a
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proportion of misery among the majority of his creatures." Evil is
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either caused by God or exists independently; but it cannot be
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caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it
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exist hostilely, as in that case he would not be all-powerful. If
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all-good he would desire to annihilate evil, and continued evil
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contradicts either God's desire, or God's ability, to prevent it.
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Evil must either have had a beginning or it must have been etemal;
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but, according to the Theist, it cannot be eternal, because God
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alone is etemal. Nor can it have had a beginning, for if it had it
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must either have originated in God, or outside God; but, according
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to the Theist, it cannot have: originated in God, for he is all-
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good, and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil
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have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist, God is
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infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond infinity.
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To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely
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different aspect. He declares that each evil is a result, but not
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a result from God nor Devil. He affirms that conduct founded on
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knowledge of the laws of existence may ameliorate each present form
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of evil, and, as our knowledge increases, prevent its future
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recurrence.
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Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check.
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to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder, lie, or
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steal without fear of any consequences. To try the actual value of
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this argument, it is not unfair to ask: Do Theists ever steal? If
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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3
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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yes, then in each such theft the belief in God and his power to
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punish has been insufficient as a preventive of the crime. Do
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Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the same remark has again force
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-- Theism , failing against the lesser as against the gearer crime.
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Those who use such an argument overlook that all men seek
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happiness, though in very, diverse fashions. ignorant and
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miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and
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commit crime in the endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by
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teaching mankind the real road to human happiness it is possible to
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keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error. Atheists would
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teach men to be moral now, not because God offers as an inducement
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reward by and by, but because in the virtuous act itself immediate
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good is ensured to the doer and the circle surrounding him. Atheism
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would perserve man from lying, stealing, murdering, not from fear
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of an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make this
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life itself a course of misery.
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While Theism, asserting God as the creator and govemor of the
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universe, hinders and checks man's efforts by declaring God's will
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to be the sole directing and controlling power, Atheism, by
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declaring all events to be in accordance with natural laws -- that
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is, happening in certain ascertainable sequences. -- stimulates man
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to discover the best conditions of life, and offers him the most
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powerful inducements to morality. While the Theist provides future
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happiness for a scoundrel repentent on his death-bed, Atheism
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affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does his best
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to live here so well as to have little cause for repenting
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hereafter.
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Theism declares that God dispenses health and infficts
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disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theists as
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visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meekness and
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content. Atheism declares that physiological knowledge may preserve
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us from disease by preventing us from infringing the law of health,
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and that sickness results not as the ordinance of offended Deity,
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but from ill-ventilated dwellings and workshops, bad and
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insufficient food, excessive toil, mental suffering, exposure to
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inclement weather, and the like -- all these finding root in
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poverty, the chief source of crime and disease; that prayers and
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piety afford no protection against fever, and that if the human
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being be kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be
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Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.
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It is very important, in order that injustice may not be done
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to the Theistic, argument, that we should have -- in lieu of a
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clear definition, which it seems useless to ask for -- the best
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possible clue to the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word
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"God." If it were not that the word is an arbitrary term,
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maintained for the purpose of influencing the ignorant, and the
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notions suggested by which are vague and entirely contingent upon
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individual fancies, such a clue could probably be most easily, and
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satistactorily obtained by tracing back the word "God," and
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ascertaining the sense in which it was used by the uneducated
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worshippers who have gone before us, and collating this with the
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more modem Theism, qualified as it is by the superior knowledge of
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to-day. Dupuis says: "Le mot Dieu parait destine a exprimer l'idde
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de la force universelle et eternellement active qui imprime le
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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4
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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mouvement a tout dans la Nature, suivant les lois d'une harmonie
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constante et admirable, qui se developpe dans les diverses formes
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que prend la matiere organisee, qui se mele a tout, anime tout, et
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qui semble etre une dans ses modifications infiniment variees, et
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n'appartenir qu'a elle-meme." "The word God appears intended to
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express the universal and etemally active force which endows all
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nature with motion according to the laws of a constant and
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admirable harmony; which develops itself in the diverse forms of
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organized matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all; which
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seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modifications,
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and inheres in itself alone."
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In the "Bon Sens" of Cure Meslier, it is asked: Qu'est-ce que
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Dieu? "and the answer is: "C'est un mot abstrait fait pour designer
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la force cachee de la nature; ou c'est un point mathematique qui
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n'a ni longueur, ni largeur, ni profondetir." "It is an abstract
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word coined to designate the hidden force of nature; or it is a
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mathematical point having neither length, breadth, nor depth."
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The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistic in
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its origin -- that is, it finds its root in the superstition and
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ignorance of a petty and barbarous people nearly destitute of
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literature, poor in language, and almost entirely wanting in high
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conceptions of humanity. It might, as Judaism is the foundation of
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Christianity, be fairly expected that the ancient Jewish records
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would aid us in our search after the meaning to be attached to the
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word "God." The most prominent words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord
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in English are @@ii)#-19@@ 'Ieue,' and @@t)',-*N@@ 'Aleim.' The
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first word Ieue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to
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"that which exists," and indeed embodies in itself the only
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possible trinity in unity i.e., past, present, and future. There is
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nothing in this Hebrew word to help us to any such definition as is
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required for the sustenance of modem Theism. The most we can make
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of it by any stretch of imagination is equivalent to the
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declaration "I am, I have been, I shall be." The word @@ii)#-19@@
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is hardly ever spoken by the religious Jews, who actually in
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reading substitute for it, Adonai, an entirely different word. Dr.
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Wall notices the close resemblance in sound between the word
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'lehowa' or leue, or Jehovah and Jove. In fact @@Zeig ora-r*Lo,@@
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Jupiter and leue-pater (God the father) present still closer
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resemblance in sound. Jove is also @@Zetic@@ or @@eeac@@ or
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@@Ae6g,@@ whence the word Deus and our Deity. The Greek mythology,
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far more ancient than that of the Hebrews, has probably found for
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Christianity many other and more important features of coincidence
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than that of a similarly sounding name. The word @@6)Eo'gl@@ traced
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back, affords us no help beyond that it identifies Deity with the
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universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought that the only
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Gods (@@eEOY-P@@) were the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven. The
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word @@C)SllbN@@, Aleim, assists us still less in defining the word
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God, for Parkhurst translates it as a plural noun signifying "the
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curser," deriving it from the verb @@i-75N@@ (Ale), to curse. Dr.
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Colenso has collected for us a store of traditional meanings for
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the @@IAO@@ of the Greek, and the @@1-111-71@@ of the Hebiew; but,
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though these are interesting to the student of mythology, they give
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no help to the Theistic demonstrator. Finding that philology aids
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us but little, we must endeavour to arrive at the meaning of the
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word "God" by another rule. It is utterly impossible to fix the
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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5
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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period of the rise of Theism amongst any particular people; but it
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is, notwithstanding, comparatively easy, if not to trace out the
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development of Theistic ideas, at any rate to point to their
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probable course of growth amongst all peoples.
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Keightley, in his "Origin of Mythology," says: "Supposing, for
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the sake of hypothesis, a race of men in a state of total or
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partial ignorance of Deity, their belief in many Gods may have thus
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commenced: They saw around them various changes brought about by
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human agency, and hence they knew the power of intelligence to
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produce effects. When they beheld other and greater effects, they
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ascribed them to some unseen being, similar but superior to man."
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They associated particular events with special unknown beings
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(Gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a peculiarity of
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power, or a sphere of action not common to other Gods. Thus, one
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was God of the sea, another God of war, another God of love,
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another ruled the thunder and lightning; and thus through the
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various then known elements of the universe, and the passions of
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human-kind.
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This mythology became modified with the com mencement of human
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knowledge. The ability to think has proved itself oppugnant to, and
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destructive of, the reckless desire to worship, characteristic of
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semi-barbarism. Science has razed altar after altar heretofore
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erected to the unknown Gods, and has pulled down Deity after Deity
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from the pedestals on which ignorance and superstition had erected
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them. The priest, who had formerly spoken as the oracle of God,
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lost his sway just in proportion as the scientific teacher
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succeeded in impressing mankind with a knowledge of the facts
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around them. The ignorant, who had hitherto listened unquestioning
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during centuries of abject submission to their spiritual
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precaptors, at last commenced to search and examine for themselves,
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and were guided by experience rather than by church doctrine. To-
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day advancing intellect challenges the reserve guard of the old
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armies of superstition, and compels a conflict in which human-kind
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must in the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the
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truth.
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From the word "God" the Theist derives no argument in his
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favour; it teaches nothing, defines nothing, demonstrates nothing,
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explains nothing. The Theist answers that this is no sufficient
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objection that there are many words which are in common use to
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which the same objection applies. Even if this were true, it does
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not answer the Atheist's objection. Alleging a difficulty on the
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one side is not a removal of the obstacle already pointed out on
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the other.
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The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable, but also
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infinitely intelligent, and says: "Matter is either essentially
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intelligent or essentially non-intelligent; if matter were
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essentially intelligent, no matter could be without intelligence;
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but matter cannot be essentially intelligent, because some matter
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is not intelligent, therefore matter is essentially non-
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intelligent; but there is intelligence, therefore there must be a
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cause for the intelligence, independent of matter -- this must be
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an intelligent being -- i.e., "God." The Atheist answers: I do not
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know what is meant, in the mouth of the Theist, by "matter."
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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6
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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"Matter," "nature," "substance," "existence," are words having the
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same signification in the Atheist's vocabulary. Lewes used "matter"
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as the symbol of all the known properties, statical and dynamical,
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passive and active; i.e., subjectively, as feeling and change of
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feeling, or objectively, as agent and action"; and Mill defined
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"nature" as "the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes
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which produce them, including not only all that happens, but all
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that is capable of happening." It is not certain that the Theist
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expresses any very clear idea to himself when he uses the words
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"matter" and "intelligence"; it is quite certain that he has not
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yet shown himself capable of communicating this idea, and that any
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effort he makes is couched in terms which are self-contradictory.
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Reason and understanding are sometimes treated as separate
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faculties, yet it is not unfair to presume that the Theist would
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include them both under the word intelligence. Perception is the
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foundation of the intellect. The perceptive ability differs in each
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animal; yet, in speaking of matter, the Theist uses the word
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"intelligence" as though the same meaning were to be understood in
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every case. The recollection of the perceptions is the exercise of
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a different ability from the perceptive ability, and occasionally
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varies disproportionately; thus, an individual may have great
|
|
perceptive abilities, and very little memory, or the reverse; yet
|
|
memory, as well as perception, is included in intelligence. So also
|
|
the comparing between two or more perceptions; the judging and the
|
|
reflecting; all these are subject to the same remarks, and all
|
|
these and other phases of the mind, are included in the word
|
|
intelligence. We answer then, that "God" (whatever that word may
|
|
mean) cannot be intelligent. He can never perceive; the act of
|
|
perception results in the obtaining a new idea, but if God be
|
|
omniscient, his ideas have been eternally the same. He has either
|
|
been always, and always will be, perceiving, or he has never
|
|
perceived at all. But God cannot have been always perceiving,
|
|
because, if he had, he would always have been obtaining fresh
|
|
knowledge, in which case he must at some time have had less
|
|
knowledge than now; that is, he would have been less perfect; that
|
|
is, he would not have been God. He can never recollect nor forget;
|
|
he can never compare, reflect, nor judge. There cannot be perfect
|
|
intelligence without understanding; but following Coleridge,
|
|
understanding is the faculty of judging according to sense." The
|
|
faculty of whom? Of some person, judging according to that person's
|
|
senses. But has "God" senses? Is there anything beyond "God" for
|
|
God to sensate? There cannot be perfect intelligence without
|
|
reason. By reason we mean that phase of the mind which avails
|
|
itself of past and present experience to predicate more or less
|
|
accurately of possible experience in the future. To God there can
|
|
be neither past nor future, therefore to him reason is impossible.
|
|
There cannot be perfect intelligence without will; but has God
|
|
will? If God wills, the will of the all-powerful must be
|
|
irresistible; the will of the infinite must exclude all other
|
|
wills.
|
|
|
|
God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are
|
|
identical. Every sensation is pleasurable or painful. But God, if
|
|
immutable, can neither be pleased nor pained. Every fresh sensation
|
|
involves a change in mental and perhaps in physical condition. God,
|
|
if immutable cannot change. Sensation is the source of all ideas,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
7
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
but it is only objects external to the mind which can be sensated.
|
|
If God be infinite there can be no objects external to him, and
|
|
therefore sensation must be to him impossible. Yet without
|
|
perception where is intelligence?
|
|
|
|
God cannot have memory nor reason -- memoiy is of the past,
|
|
reason for the future, but to God immutable there can be no past,
|
|
no future. The words past, present, and future imply change: they
|
|
assert progression of duration. If God be immutable, to him change
|
|
is impossible. Can you have intelligence destitute of perception,
|
|
memory, and reason? God cannot have the faculty of judgment --
|
|
judgment implies in the act of judging a conjoining or dis-joining
|
|
of two or more thoughts, but this involves change of mental
|
|
condition. To God the immutable, change is impossible. Can you have
|
|
intelligence, yet no perception, no memory, no reason, no judgment?
|
|
God cannot think. The law of the thinkible is, that the thing
|
|
thought must be separated from the thing which is not thought. To
|
|
think otherwise would be to think of nothing -- to have an
|
|
impression with no distinguishing mark would be to have no
|
|
impression. Yet this separation implies change, and to God,
|
|
immutable, change is impossible. In memory, the thing remembered is
|
|
distinguished from the thing temporarily or permanently forgotten.
|
|
Can God forget? Can you have intelligence without thought? If the
|
|
Theist replies to this, that he does not mean by infinite
|
|
intelligence, as an attribute of Deity, an affinity of the
|
|
intelligence found in a finite degree in humankind, then he is
|
|
bound to explain, clearly and distinctly, what other "intelligence"
|
|
he means; and until this be done the foregoing statements require
|
|
answer.
|
|
|
|
The Athdist does not regard "substance" as either essentially
|
|
intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of certain
|
|
conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright -- that is,
|
|
brightness is the characteristic of a certain condition of
|
|
existence. Alter the condition, and the characteristic of the
|
|
condition no longer exists. The only essential of substance is
|
|
existence. Alter, the wording of the Theest's objection: -- Matter
|
|
is either essentially bright, or essentially non-bright. If matter
|
|
were essentially bright, brightness should be the essence of all
|
|
matter; but matter cannot be essentially bright, because some
|
|
matter is not bright, therefore matter is essenteally non-bright;
|
|
but there is brightness therefore there must be a cause for this
|
|
brightness independent of matter -- that is, there must be an
|
|
essentially bright being -- i.e., God.
|
|
|
|
Another Theistic proposition is thus stated "Every effect must
|
|
have a cause; the first cause universal must be eternal: ergo, the
|
|
first cause universal must be God." This is equivalent to saying
|
|
that "God" is "first cause." But what is to be understood by cause?
|
|
Defined in the absolute the word has no real value. "Cause,"
|
|
therefore, cannot be eternal. What can be understood by "first
|
|
cause"? To us the two words convey no meaning greater than would be
|
|
conveyed by the phrase "round triangle." Cause and effect are
|
|
correlative terms -- each cause is the effect of some precedent;
|
|
each effect the cause of its consequent. It is impossible to
|
|
conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial cause. The
|
|
"beginning," as it is phrased, of the universe is not thought out
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
by the Theist, but conceded without thought. To adopt the language
|
|
of Montaigne: "Men make themselves believe that they believe." The
|
|
so-called belief in Creation is nothing more than the prostration
|
|
of the intellect on the threshold of the unknown. We can only
|
|
cognize the ever-succeeding phenomena of existence as a line in
|
|
continuous and eternal evolution. This line has to us no beginning;
|
|
we trace it back into the misty regions of the past but a little
|
|
way, and however far we may be able to journey there is still the
|
|
great beyond. Then what is meant by "universal cause"? Spinoza
|
|
gives the following definition of cause, as used in its absolute
|
|
signification: "By cause of itself I understand that, the essence
|
|
of which involves existence, or that, the nature of which can only
|
|
be considered as existent." That is, Spinoza treats "cause"
|
|
absolute and "existence" as two words having the same meaning. If
|
|
this mode of defining the word be contested, then it has no meaning
|
|
other than its relative signification of a means to an end. "Every
|
|
effect must have a cause." Every effect implies the plurality of
|
|
effects, and necessarily that each effect must be finite; but how
|
|
is it possible from finite effect to logically deduce a universal
|
|
-- i.e., infinite cause?
|
|
|
|
There are two modes of argument presented by Theists, and by
|
|
which, separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being
|
|
of a God. These are familiarly known as the arguments 'a Priori'
|
|
and 'a posterori'.
|
|
|
|
The 'a posteriori' argument has been popularized in England by
|
|
Paley, who has ably endeavoured to hide the weakness of his
|
|
demonstration under an abundance of irrelevant illustrations. The
|
|
reasoning of Paley is veiy deficient in the essential points where
|
|
it most needed strength. It is utterly impossible to prove by it
|
|
the eternity or infinity of Deity. As an argument founded on
|
|
analogy, the design argument, at the best, could only entitle its
|
|
propounder to infer the existence of a finite cause, or rather of
|
|
a multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten that the
|
|
illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the man, even if admitted
|
|
as instances of design, or rather of adaptation, are instances of
|
|
eyes, watches, and men, designed or adapted out of pre-existing
|
|
substance, by a being of the same kind of substance, and afford,
|
|
therefore, no demonstration in favour of a designer alleged to have
|
|
actually created substance out of nothing, and also alleged to have
|
|
created a substance entirely different from himself.
|
|
|
|
The illustrations of alleged adaptation or design in animal
|
|
life in its embryonic stages are thus dealt with by the late George
|
|
Henry Lewes: "What rational interpretation can be given to the
|
|
succession of phases each embryo is forced to pass through? None of
|
|
these phases has any adaptation to the future state of the animal;
|
|
they are in positive contradiction to it, or are simply
|
|
purposeless; many of them have no adaptation, even in its embryonic
|
|
state. What doe's the fact imply? There is not a single known
|
|
organism which is not developed out of simpler forms. Before it can
|
|
attain the complex structure which distinguishes it, there must be
|
|
an evolution of forms which distinguish the structures of organisms
|
|
lower in the series. On the hypothesis of a plan which prearranged
|
|
the organic world, nothing could be more unworthy of a supreme
|
|
intelligence than this inability to construct an organism at once,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
9
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
without making several tentative efforts, undoing to-day what was
|
|
so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries the same
|
|
tentatives and the same corrections in the same succession. Do not
|
|
let us blink this consideration. There is a traditional phrase
|
|
which is in vogue amongst Anthropomorphists -- a phrase which has
|
|
become a sort of argument -- 'the Great Architect.' But if we were
|
|
to admit the human point of view, a glance at the facts of
|
|
embryology must produce very uncomfortable reflexions. For what
|
|
shall we say to an architect who was unable -- or, being able, was
|
|
obstinotely unwilling -- to erect a palace, except by first his
|
|
materials in the shape of a but, then pulling them down and
|
|
rebuilding them as a cottage, then adding storey to storey, and
|
|
room to room, not with any reference to the ultimate purposes of a
|
|
palace, but wholly with reference to the way in which houses were
|
|
constructed in ancient times? Would there be a chorus of applause
|
|
from the Institute of Architects, and favourable notices in
|
|
newspapers of this profound wisdom? Yet this is the sort of
|
|
succession on which organisms are constructed. The fact has long
|
|
been familiar; how has it been reconciled with infinite wisdom?"
|
|
|
|
The 'a posteriori' argument can never demonstrate infinity for
|
|
Deity. Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most it could
|
|
afford would be a cause sufficient for that effect, such cause
|
|
being possibly finite in extent and duration. Professor Flint in
|
|
his late work in advocacy of Theism concedes that "we cannot deduce
|
|
the infinite from the finite." And as the argument does not
|
|
demonstrate God's infinity, neither can it, for the same reason,
|
|
make out his omniscience, as it is clearly impossible to logically
|
|
claim infinite wisdom for a God possibly only finite. God's
|
|
omnipotence remains unproved for the same reason, and because it is
|
|
clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he may not
|
|
be. Nor can the 'a posteriori' argument show God's absolute
|
|
freedom, for as it does nothing more than seek to prove a finite
|
|
God, it is quite consistent with the argumefit that God's existence
|
|
is limited and controlled in a thousand ways. Nor does this
|
|
argument show that God always existed; at the best, the proof is
|
|
only that some cause, enough for the effect, existed before it, but
|
|
there is no evidence that this cause differs from any other causes,
|
|
which are often as transient as the effect itself. And as it does
|
|
not demonstrate that God has always existed, neither does it
|
|
demonstrate that he will always exist or even that he now exists.
|
|
It is perfectly in accordance with the argument, and with the
|
|
analogy of cause and effect, that the effect may remain after the
|
|
cause has ceased to exist. Nor does the argument from design
|
|
demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with this argument that
|
|
a separate cause existed for each effect, or mark of design
|
|
discovered, or that several causes contributed to some or one of
|
|
such effects. So that if the argument be true, it might result in
|
|
a multitude of petty Deities, limited in knowledge, extent,
|
|
duration, and power; and still worse, each one of this multitude of
|
|
Gods may have had a cause which would also be finite in extent and
|
|
duration, and would require another, and so on, until the design
|
|
argument loses the reasoner amongst an innumerable crowd of
|
|
Deities, none of whom can have the attributes claimed for God.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
10
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
The design argument is defective as an argument from analogy,
|
|
because it seeks to prove a Creator God who designed, but does not
|
|
explain whether this God has been eternally designing, which would
|
|
be absurd or, if he at some time commenced to design, what then
|
|
induced him so to commence? It is illogical, for it seeks to prove
|
|
an immutable Deity, by demonstrating a mutation on the part of
|
|
Deity.
|
|
|
|
It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many
|
|
writers who have used from different stand-points the 'a
|
|
posteriori' form of argument in order to prove the existence of
|
|
Deity. The objections already stated apply to the whole class; and,
|
|
although probably each illustration used by the Theistic advocate
|
|
is capable of an elucidation entirely at variance with his
|
|
argument, the main features of objection are the same. The argument
|
|
'a posteriori' is a method of proof in which the premises are
|
|
composed of some position of existing facts, and the conclusion
|
|
asserts a position antecedent to those facts. The argument is from
|
|
given effects to their causes. It is one form of this argument
|
|
which asserts that a man has a moral nature, and from this seeks to
|
|
deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form has the
|
|
disadvantage that its premises are illusory. In alleging a moral
|
|
nature for man, the Theist overlooks the fact that the moral nature
|
|
of man differs somewhat in each individual, differs considerably in
|
|
each nation, and differs entirely in some peoples. It is dependent
|
|
on organization and education; these are influenced by climate,
|
|
food, and mode of life. If the argument from man's nature could
|
|
demonstrate anything, it would prove a murdering God for the
|
|
murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a dishonest God
|
|
for the thief, and so through the various phases of human
|
|
inclination. The 'a priori' arguments are methods of proof in which
|
|
the matter of the premises exists in the order of conception
|
|
antecedently to that of the conclusion. The argument is from cause
|
|
to effect. Amongst the prominent Theistic advocates relying upon
|
|
the 'a priori' argument in England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev.
|
|
Moses Lowman, and William Gillespie.
|
|
|
|
An important contribution to Theistic literature has been the
|
|
publication of the Baird lectures on Theism. The lectures are by
|
|
Professor Flint, who asks: "Have we sufficient evidence for
|
|
thinking that there is a self-existent, etemal being, infinite in
|
|
power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and goodness, the Maker
|
|
of heaven and earth?"
|
|
|
|
"Theism," he affirms, "is the doctrine that the universe owes
|
|
its existence, and continuance in existence, to the reason and will
|
|
of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise, and
|
|
good. It is the doctrine that nature has a Creator and Preserver,
|
|
the nations a Governor, men a heavenly Father and judge." But he
|
|
concedes that "Theism is very far from coextensive with religion.
|
|
Religion is spread over the whole earth; Theism only over a
|
|
comparatively small portion of it. There are but three Theistic
|
|
religions -- the Mosaic, the Christian, and the Muhammadan. They
|
|
are connected historically in the closest manner -- the idea of God
|
|
having been transmitted to the two latter, and not independently
|
|
originated by them. All other religions are Polytheistic or
|
|
Pantheistic, or both together. Among those who, have been educated
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
11
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
in any of these heathen religions, only a few minds of rare
|
|
penetration and power have been able to rise by their own exertions
|
|
to a consistent Theistic belief. The God of all those among us who
|
|
believe in God, even of those who reject Christianity, who reject
|
|
all revelation, is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. From these
|
|
ancient Jewish fathers the knowledge of him has historically
|
|
descended through an unbroken succession of generations to us. We
|
|
have inherited it from them. If it had not thus come down to us, if
|
|
we had not been born into a society pervaded by it, there is no
|
|
reason to suppose that we should have found it out for ourselves,
|
|
and still less that we should merely have required to open our eyes
|
|
in order to see it."
|
|
|
|
If "Theism is the doctrine that the universe owes its
|
|
existence to the reason and will of a self-existing Being who is
|
|
infinitely powerful, wise, and good," then it is a doctrine which
|
|
involves many difficulties and absurdities. It assumes that the
|
|
universe has not always existed. The new existence added when the
|
|
universe was originated was either an improvement or a
|
|
deterioration on what had always existed; or it was in all respects
|
|
precisely identical with what had therefore always existed. In the
|
|
first, if the new universe was an improvement, then the previously
|
|
self-existent being could not have been infinitely good. If the
|
|
universe was a deterioration, then the creator could have scarcely
|
|
been all-wise, or he could not have been all-powerful. If the
|
|
universe was in all respects precisely identical with the self-
|
|
existent being, then it must have been infinitely powerful, wise
|
|
and good, and must have been self-existent. Any of the alternatives
|
|
is fatal to Theism. Again, if the universe owes its existence to
|
|
God's reason and will, God must, prior to creation, have thought
|
|
upon the matter until he ultimately determined to create; but, if
|
|
the creation were wise and good, it would never have been delayed
|
|
while the infinitely wise and good reasoned about it, and, if the
|
|
creation were not wise and good, the infinitely wise and good would
|
|
never have commenced it. Either God willed without motive, or he
|
|
was influenced; if he reasoned, there was -- prior to the definite
|
|
willing -- a period of doubt or suspended judgment, all of which is
|
|
inconsistent with the attributes claimed for deity by Professor
|
|
Flint. It is hard to understand how whole nations can have been
|
|
left by their infinitely powerful, wise, and good governor -- how
|
|
many men can have been left by their infinitely powerful, wise, and
|
|
good father -- without any knowledge of himself. Yet this must be
|
|
so if, as Professor Flint conceives, Theism is spread over only a
|
|
comparatively small portion of the earth. The moral effect of
|
|
Christian and Muhammadan Theism on the nations influenced was well
|
|
shown in the recent Russo-Turkish War.
|
|
|
|
Every Theist must admit that, if a God exists, he could have
|
|
so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that doubt,
|
|
disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could not do
|
|
this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not be omniscient --
|
|
that is, he would not be God. Every Theist must also agree that, if
|
|
a God exists, he would wish all men to have such a clear
|
|
consciousness of his existence and attributes, that doubt,
|
|
disagreement, or disbelief on this subject would be impossible. And
|
|
this, if for no other reason, because that out of doubts and
|
|
disagreements on religion have too often resulted centuries of
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
12
|
|
|
|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
|
|
|
persecution, strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to
|
|
prevent. If God would not desire this, then he is not all good --
|
|
that is, he is not God. But as many men have doubts, as a large
|
|
majority of mankind have disagreements, and as some men have
|
|
disbeliefs as to God's existence and attributes, it must follow
|
|
that God does not exist, or that he is not all-wise, or that he is
|
|
not all-powerful, or that he is not all-good.
|
|
|
|
Many Theists rely on the intuitional argument. It is, perhaps,
|
|
best to allow the Baird Lecturer to reply to, these: "Man, say
|
|
some, knows God by immediate intuition; he needs no argument for
|
|
his existence, because he perceives Him directly -- face to face --
|
|
without any medium. It is easy to assert this, but obviously the
|
|
assertion is the merest dogmatism. Not one man in a thousand who
|
|
understands what he is affirming will dare to claim to have an
|
|
immediate vision of God, and nothing can be more likely than that
|
|
the man who makes such a claim is self-deluded." And Professor
|
|
Flint urges that "What seem intuitions are often really
|
|
inferenices, and not unfrequently errondous inferences; what seem
|
|
the immediate dictates of pure reason, or the direct and unclouded
|
|
perceptions of a special spiritual faculty, may be the conceits of
|
|
fancy, or the products of habits and association, or the reflexions
|
|
of strong feeling. A man must prove to himself, and he must prove
|
|
to others, that what he takes to be an intuition is an intuition.
|
|
Is that proof in this case likely to be easier or more conclusive
|
|
than the proof of the Divine existence? The so-called immediate
|
|
perception of God must be shown to be a perception and to be
|
|
immediate; it must be vindicated and verified; and how this is to
|
|
be especially if there be no other reasons for believing in God
|
|
than itself, it is difficult to conceive. The history of religion,
|
|
which is what ought to yield the clearest confirmation of the
|
|
alleged intuition, appears to be from beginning to end a
|
|
conspicuous contradiction of it. If all men have the spiritual
|
|
power of directly beholding their Creator -- have an immediate
|
|
vision of God -- how happens it that whole nations believe in the
|
|
most absurd and monstrous Gods? That millions of men are ignorant
|
|
whether there be one God or thousands?" And still more strongly he
|
|
adds: "The opinion that man has an intuition or immediate
|
|
perception of God is untenable; the opinion that he has an
|
|
immediate feeling of God is absurd."
|
|
|
|
Every child is born into the world an Atheist, and, if he
|
|
grows into a Theist, his Deity differs with the country in which
|
|
the believer may happen to be born, or the people amongst whom he
|
|
may happen to be educated. The belief is the result of education or
|
|
organization. This is practically conceded by Professor Flint,
|
|
where he speaks of the God-idea as transmitted from the Jews, and
|
|
says: "We have inherited it from them. If it had not come down to
|
|
us, if we had not been born into a society pervaded by it, there is
|
|
no reason to suppose that we should have found it out for
|
|
ourselves." And, further, he maintains that a child is born "into
|
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blank ignorance, and, if left entirely to itself, would, probably,
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never find out as much religious truth as the most ignorant of
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parents can teach it." Religious belief is powerful in proportion
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to the want of scientific knowledge on the part of the believer.
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The more ignorant the more credulous. In the mind of the Theist
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"God" is equivalent to the sphere of the unknown; by the use of the
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word he answers, without thought, problems which might otherwise
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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13
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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obtain scientific solution. The more ignorant the Theist, the more
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numerous his Gods. Belief in God is not a faith founded on reason.
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Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings are not only without
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utility, but of itself it has nothing to teach. Separated from
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Chrisitanity with its almost innumerable sects, from Muhainmadanism
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with its numerous divisions, and separated also from every other
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preached system, Theism is a Will-o'-the-Wisp, without reality.
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Apart from orthodoxy, Theism is the veriest dreamform, without
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substance or coherence.
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What does Christian Theism teach? That the first man, made
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perfect by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God, was
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nevertheless imperfect, and by his imperfection brought misery into
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the world, where the all-good God must have intended misery should
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never come; that this God made men to share this misery -- men
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whose fault was their being what he made them; that this God begets
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a son, who is nevertheless his unbegotten self, and that by belief
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in the birth of God's etemal son, and in the death of the undying
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who died as sacrifice to God's vengeance, men may escape the
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consequences of the first man's error. Christian Theism declares
|
|
that belief alone can save men, and yet recognizes the fact that
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man's belief results from teaching, by establishing missionary
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|
societies to spread the faith. Christian Theism teaches that God,
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though no respecter of persons, selected as his favourite one
|
|
nation in preference to all others; that man can do no good of
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|
himself or without God's aid, but yet that each man has a free
|
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will; that God is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven, and the
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|
majority to hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined
|
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from etemity that by far the largest number of human beings are to
|
|
be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism venture
|
|
to upbraid those who argue against such a faith.
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|
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Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must help
|
|
to spread its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases to
|
|
influence human conduct the better for human kind. This Plea for
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Atheism is put forth as a challenge to Theists to do battle for
|
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their cause, and in the hope that, the strugglers being sincere,
|
|
truth may give laurels to the victor and the vanquished; laurels to
|
|
the victor, in that he has upheld the truth; laurels which should
|
|
be even more welcome to the vanquished, whose defeat crowns him
|
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with a truth he knew not of before.
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APPENDIX
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A few years ago a Nonconformist minister invited me to debate
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the question, "Is Atheism the True Doctrine of the Universe?" and
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the following was in substance my opening statement of the
|
|
argument, which for some reason, although many letters passed, was
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never replied to by my reverend opponent.
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"By Atheism I mean the affirmation of one existence, of which
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existence I know only one mode; each mode being distinguished in
|
|
thought by its qualities. This affirmation is a positive, not a
|
|
negative, affirmation, and is properly describable as Atheism
|
|
because it does not include in it any possibility of Theos. It is,
|
|
being without God, distinctly an Atheistic affirmation. This
|
|
Atheism affirms that the Atheist knows only qualities, and only
|
|
knows these qualities as the characteristics of modes. By
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Bank of Wisdom
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Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
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14
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A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
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'existence' I mean the totality of phenomena and all that has been,
|
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is, or may be necessary for the happening of any and every
|
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phenomenon. By 'mode' I mean each cognized condition (phenomenon or
|
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aggregation of phenomena). By 'quality' I mean that characteristic,
|
|
or each of those characteristics, by which in thought I distinguish
|
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that which I think. The word 'universe' is with me an equivalent
|
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for 'existence.'
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Either Atheism or Theism must be the true doctrine of the
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Universe. I assume here that no other theory is thinkable. Theism
|
|
is either Pantheism, Polytheism, or Monotheism. There is, I submit,
|
|
no other conceivable category. Pantheism affirms one existence, but
|
|
declares that some qualities are infinite -- e.g., that existence
|
|
is intelligent. Atheism only affirms qualities for phenomena. We
|
|
know each phenomenon by its qualities; we know no qualities except
|
|
as qualities of some phenomenon. By infinite I mean illimitable.
|
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Phenomena are, of coursd, finite. By intelligent I mean able to
|
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think. Polytheism affirms several Theistic existences -- this
|
|
affirmation being nearly self-contradictory -- and so usually
|
|
affirms at least one non-theistic existence. Monotheism affirms at
|
|
least two existences: that is, the Theos and that which the Theos
|
|
has created and rules. Atheism denies alike the reasonableness of
|
|
Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism. Any affirmation of more than
|
|
one existence is on the force of the affirmation an absolute self-
|
|
contradiction, if infinity be pretended for either of the
|
|
existences affirmed. The word 'Theos' or 'God' has for me no
|
|
meaning. I am obliged, therefore, to try to collect its meaning as
|
|
expressed by Theists, who, however, do not seem to me to be either
|
|
clear or agreed as to the words by which their Theism may be best
|
|
expressed. For the purpose of this argument I take Monotheism to be
|
|
the doctrine 'that the universe owes its existence and continuance
|
|
in existence to the wisdom and will of a supreme, self-existent,
|
|
eternal, infinite, omnipotent, ormiscient, righteous, and
|
|
benevolent personal being, who is distinct from and independent of
|
|
what he has created.' By wisdom and will I mean that which I should
|
|
mean using the same words of any animal able to perceive, remember,
|
|
reflect, judge, and determine, and active in that ability or those
|
|
abilities. By supreme I mean highest in any relation of comparison.
|
|
By self-existent I mean that the conception of which, if it be
|
|
conceivable, does not involve the conception of antecedent or
|
|
consequent. By eternal and infinite I mean illimitable in duration
|
|
and extent. By 'omnipotent' I mean supreme in power over
|
|
everything. By omniscient, knowing everything. By 'righteous and
|
|
benevolent' I mean that which the best educated opinion would mean
|
|
when applying those words to human beings. This doctrine of
|
|
Monotheism appears to me to be flatly contradicted by the phenomena
|
|
we know. It is inconsistent with that observed uniformity of
|
|
happening usually described as law of nature. By law of nature I
|
|
mean observed order of event. The word 'nature' is another
|
|
equivalent for the worti universe or existence. By uniformity of
|
|
happening I mean that, given certain conditions, certain results
|
|
always ensue vary the conditions, the results vary. I do not attack
|
|
specially either the Polytheistic, Pantheistic, or Monotheistic
|
|
presentments of Theism. To me any pretence of Theism seems
|
|
impossible if Monism be conceded, and, therefore, at present, I
|
|
rest content in affir&uing one existence. If Monism be true, and
|
|
Atheism be Monism, then Atheism is necessarily the true theory of
|
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|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
15
|
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|
A PLEA FOR ATHETSM
|
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|
|
the universe. I submit that 'there cannot be more than one ultimate
|
|
explanation' of the universe. That any 'tracing back to two or
|
|
more' existences is illogical, and that as it is only by 'reaching
|
|
unity' that we can have a reasonable conclusion, it is necessary
|
|
'that every form of Dualism should be rejected as a theory of the
|
|
universe.' If every form of Dualism be rejected, Monism -- i.e.,
|
|
Atheism -- alone remains, and is therefore the true and only
|
|
doctrine of the universe."
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**** ****
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|
Speaking of the prevalence of what he describes as "a form of
|
|
agnosticism," the editor of the 'Spectator' writes: "We think we
|
|
see signs of a disposition to declare that the great problem is
|
|
insoluble, that whatever rules, be it a mind or only a force, he or
|
|
it does not intend the truth to be known, if there is a truth, and
|
|
to go on, both in action and speculation, as if the problem had no
|
|
existence. That is the condition of mind, we know, of many of the
|
|
cultivated who are not sceptics, nor doubters, nor inquirers, but
|
|
who think they are as certain of their point as they are that the
|
|
circle will not be squared. They are, they think, in the presence
|
|
of a recurring decimal, and they are not going to spend life in the
|
|
effort to resolve it. If no God exists, they will save their time;
|
|
and if he does exist, he must have set up the impenetrable wall. A
|
|
distinct belief of that kind, not a vague, pulpy impression, but a
|
|
formulated belief, exists, we know, in the most unsuspected places,
|
|
its holders not unfrequently professing Christianity, as at all
|
|
events the best of the illusions; and it has sunk very far down in
|
|
the ladder of society. We find it catch classes which have suddenly
|
|
become aware that there is a serious doubt afloat and have caught
|
|
something of its extent and force, till they fancy they have in the
|
|
doubt a revelation as certainly true as they once thought the old
|
|
certainty." Surely an active, honest Atheism is to be preferred to
|
|
the state of mind described in the latter part of the passage we
|
|
have just quoted.
|
|
**** ****
|
|
|
|
Reproducible Electronic Publishing can defeat censorship.
|
|
|
|
The Bank of Wisdom is a collection of the most thoughtful,
|
|
scholarly and factual books. These computer books are reprints of
|
|
suppressed books and will cover American and world history; the
|
|
Biographies and writings of famous persons, and especially of our
|
|
nations Founding Fathers. They will include philosophy and
|
|
religion. all these subjects, and more, will be made available to
|
|
the public in electronic form, easily copied and distributed, so
|
|
that America can again become what its Founders intended --
|
|
|
|
The Free Market-Place of Ideas.
|
|
|
|
The Bank of Wisdom is always looking for more of these old,
|
|
hidden, suppressed and forgotten books that contain needed facts
|
|
and information for today. If you have such books, magazines,
|
|
newspapers, pamphlets, etc. please send us a list that includes
|
|
Title, Author, publication date, condition and price desired, and
|
|
we will give them back to America.
|
|
|
|
**** ****
|
|
|
|
Bank of Wisdom
|
|
Box 926, Louisville, KY 40201
|
|
16
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