1263 lines
61 KiB
Plaintext
1263 lines
61 KiB
Plaintext
SELECTIONS FROM MOTHER ANARCHY NO.5
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OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1993
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NO SUBSCRIPTION PRICE
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NO COPYRIGHTS
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CONTACT ADDRESS: P.O.BOX 500 MOSCOW 107061 RUSSIA
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e-mail: cube@glas.apc.org
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*********************************************************
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THE LIES BEHIND THE LITTLE OCTOBER COUP D'ETAT
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The Little October Coup D'Etat may well prove to be a
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turning point of tremendous importance in Russian
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history, despite the seemingly apathetic reaction to the
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events that took place. We have yet to fully understand
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the events of the consequences they will have on the
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political future of the country. There are however many
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people who are researching the events that led up to the
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coup and are collecting eye witness testimony. Already a
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picture is being clearly painted of what really
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transpired immediately prior to and after Yeltsin signed
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his infamous decree no.1400 disbanding the parliament.
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The coup was in no way and unexpected move on the part of
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Yeltsin. It was rather the culmination of a long battle
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that he had had with the parliament. But this battle,
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contrary to how it was portrayed in the media, was not a
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battle between communist apparatchiki and a progressive
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democrat. It is important to point out that the
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parliament which was disbanded was a democratically
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elected organ, for all that's worth. It was a parliament
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whose majority were committed to reforming the Russian
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economy along capitalist lines. It was a parliament which
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was considered heroic as it supported Yeltsin and helped
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bring him to power during the August putsch, which was
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(supposedly) representative of the victory of the
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reformist path over the legacy of communism. It was
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hardly a "hardline" parliament. (If one was to read the
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communist press prior to the second coup, one could see
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exactly what they thought of Rutskoi and the parliament.)
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What then was the real problem between Yeltsin and the
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parliament?
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There are many differing opinions about what laid at the
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foundation of the problems between the parliament and
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Yeltsin. Obviously to some extent the parliament opposed
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the form of economic reforms that had taken place in
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Russia and were concerned about their results. The Gaidar
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Plan had many opponents, even amongst international
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economists who favoured Russia's transition to a market
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economy. But perhaps more importantly, the parliament
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served as a check against Yeltsin's personal power.
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Yeltsin had "ruled by decree" and the parliament was in a
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position to challenge him. Also many of Yeltsin's
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henchmen were being charged with corruption and his
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entire government was being discredited. Add to this the
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increasing unpopularity of the course of reform amongst
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the working people. Yeltsin had to wage war against the
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parliament and to blame them for the disastrous state of
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the Russian economy and he had to act quickly before the
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courts found his cronies guilty of corruption and before
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the economy further deteriorated.
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The coup was carefully planned by Yeltsin and the top men
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in his team. (Some ex-deputies have said that it was in
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fact his cronies that pushed for these tactics more than
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Yeltsin and that he was used as a populist figurehead. I
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don't know how much truth there is to these claims, but
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it is clear that others were deeply involved.) The
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parliament knew in advance that it would be disbanded;
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the signal was the return of Gaidar. Already immediately
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following Yeltsin's appearance on TV, the nature of
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Yeltsin's role as dictator became clear. The mass media
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was immediately subordinated to his rule. There was no
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mention of the fact that the parliament protested and
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announced Rutskoi president until 6PM the next day.
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The media did its best to portray the defenders of the
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White House as lunatics. It was just a stroke of luck
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that the only organized forces that appeared to protest
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the move were representatives of the so-called "red-brown
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alliance"; although many people joined up at their
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protest most people were just so alienated by them that
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they did nothing. This was just what the media needed to
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perpetuate the idea that the parliament was filled with
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communist and nationalist fanatics. They had hoped that
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public sentiment would be roused against them and that
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the whole issue would just blow over. When guns were
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being collected and distributed, they didn't mention it
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in the media until it had gotten to the point were
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everybody knew there was an armed force in the making.
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They were portrayed then as lunatics who wished to impose
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their dictatorship over the masses - who supposedly stood
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behind the transitionary dictatorship of Yeltsin.
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As a standoff became more and more inevitable, the
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Yeltsin team set to work creating conditions which would
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make it appear as if they were protecting the public from
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a dangerous group of armed insurgents. On the 27, 28,
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29th, there was an incredible police force encircling the
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White House. At any time they could have easily gone in
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and arrested the relatively few people who were camped
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out there. Publically they were claiming to be giving
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them a chance to put down their guns and go home while
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secretly they were planning on leading them into a trap.
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I personally had to deal with those pigs on those days -
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not because I was trying to get to the White House, but
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because I had to go home through the metro station
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nearest to the White House. I remember having to walk at
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least a kilometer in the snow out of my way, so well
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blocked was any and all approaches to the White House. I
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was charged at by special troops with full riot gear and
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machine guns, just for walking down the street. The
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atmosphere was so tense that I felt that they would open
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fire into the crowd at any moment. (Most of whom were
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just trying to find a way to get home after work.) This
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atmosphere is in strong contrast to that of the 2nd and
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3rd of October.
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October 4th was announced as the deadline for the
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defenders of the White House to give up their weapons. It
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is significant to add that Poltaranin (one of those
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cronies cleared of corruption charged immediately after
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the coup) clearly warned journalists to be careful on the
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3rd. On the 2nd and 3rd, just at the time when police
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presence should have been played up, they disappeared
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altogether from the area around the White House. What
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took place on Oct.2 and 3 was due to the fact that the
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police and the troops were under orders not to act, or at
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least to act minimally, and essentially to let the
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storming of the Mayor and Ostankino happen.
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With few exceptions, we have heard many different
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witnesses describe the events of Oct.3 as a provocation.
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Few people took place in the initial rally, and it was
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few who initiated the violence. The police took no
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concrete measures to seal off the area, which would have
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been amazingly simple to do as the demonstrators had to
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cross a bridge; to have cordoned off the bridge would
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have been to stop or reroute the demonstration. Indeed we
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have seen them tackle crowds much greater in size with
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incredible ease. The only thing they seemed to have done
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is to fire warning shots in the air, which served to
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create a charged atmosphere rather than scare people off.
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In fact, they ran away, and it is now thought that they
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ran not because they were afraid of the people (as the
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communist romantics would have it) but because they
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wanted the crowd to follow suit and to begin their run
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towards the White House. As most witnesses agree, the
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crowd was mostly made up of unarmed people - not the type
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that would scare the troops. When one stunned journalist
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asked why the were just standing around letting the
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demonstration build up and gain momentum, he was told
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"We've got other goals. We have other orders." This
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irregularity was so striking that even the conservative
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and pro-Yeltsin press had to question it. As the
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aforementioned journalist was to remark in the Moscow
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Tribune, "Could this have been a trap to encourage the
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violent elements on parliament's side to provide the
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justification the government needed to respond with the
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force it had sworn not to initiate?" [John Helmer,
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"Moscow Crisis: The First Spark", Moscow Tribune,
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Oct.5,1993]
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After listening to various testimonies, this seems like
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the obvious answer. It is clear for example that the
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storming of Ostankino was also allowed. Ostankino was on
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everybody's lips as a fair target as Yeltsin continued to
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control the media and use it for his campaign against the
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parliament. The pseudo-revolutionary dreams of storming
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Ostankino were being openly discussed five days before it
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became a reality. The OMON (special troops) were in place
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in the telecenter and the media celebrities were told to
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go home. The road to Ostankino was lined with military
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vehicles. Yet instead of offering any resistance to the
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volunteers sent from the White House, they actually
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cleared the road for them and let them pass at the
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intersection of Prospekt Mira and Ulitsa Koroleva. Then
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the volunteers hung around for more than an hour before
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things got rolling. Just like at the Mayor's, the first
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shots were fired by Yeltsin's troops, not by the
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demonstrators.
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Unfortunately there were many civilian casualities on the
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3rd and the 4th. (The exact figures are still unknown. On
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the first days after Bloody Monday, the Yeltsin
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government released ridiculously low and falsified
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figures in the media. There is some evidence that summary
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executions were carried out and that they unofficial
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deaths themselves number 100-200 people.) Many, many
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people were killed or wounded just because they were
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walking in the wrong place or were too close to the
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action. This is another strange question. How come the
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police can keep people from getting anywhere near to Red
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Square when some politician blows into town, but when
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they are shooting up a street and bullets are flying
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everywhere, they let people pass? Myself and two other
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friends were let out onto the scene while shooting was
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going on by the army. Later we had to run for our lives
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as Yeltsin's troops opened fire at us, in what was
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described in the media as a "sniper incident". Had we had
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been killed, we would have been more innocent victims of
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the cruel, heartless communist insurgents, more reason to
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hate and repress them.
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The fact of the matter is that Yeltsin had snipers
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situated near the scene and special agents in the crowd
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who were trying to provoke violence. I recall seeing a
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woman in the crowd take a revolver out of her trench coat
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and fire into the air. She then went and disappeared
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amongst the troops who were ocuppying the Mayor's. I was
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totally confused by it until I saw this incident in a
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larger context. At a meeting of witnesses, I found that I
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was not the only person who saw such a thing. Also, why
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is it that some people saw about 10 soldiers firing into
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the air in the Otradnoye section of Moscow the next day?
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There are two theories: one is that they were trying to
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illicit a response and weed out armed rebels, and the
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other is that they were trying to create a panic.
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Although the first seems much more plausible, there are
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reasons to give precedence to the second, seemingly odd
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scenario. First of all, the media carried out a fear
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campaign by warning that there were armed insurgents
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throughout the city. There were rumours that they were
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going to occupy Kiev St., etc.. The public was panicked
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as they were convinced that these "snipers" were firing
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into the public randomly and were about to wage war
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against the civilian population. And in fact there was
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much needless firing done upon the people. But, so far,
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from all the people I've spoken to, I've only heard two
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stories about communist snipers. These "snipers" were in
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both cases quickly killed by special troops. (In one of
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the cases an American woman was mistaken as a "sniper"
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and seriously wounded by Yeltsin's troops.) On the other
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hand, there were many prolonged incidents of "sniper
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fire", during which many people were killed and wounded,
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but in every case there was no trace of communist
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"snipers" - only Yeltsin's troops.
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I was caught in the most widely publicized sniper
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incident, and I can say that there probably were none
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there. We had witnessed tanks rolling onto the White
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House and went to find a telephone. We walked up Novy
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Arbat St. (see map). Just before we reached the
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intersection of Novy Arbat and the Garden Ring Rd., we
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encountered Yeltsin's troops who were trying to panic us.
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We turned right on the Garden Ring Rd. and were standing
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a few feet off the corner. Yeltsin's troops then began to
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fire into the crowd, which was a few hundred people. We
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ran into a courtyard, only to have to stop in the archway
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on the building because from the upper windows (or roof)
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of the building, they were shooting into the courtyard.
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The troops we had past on Novy Arbat were also shooting
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into this courtyard, right along with the other shots.
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They were not shooting up at the place where the shots
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were coming from, nor were the people in the building
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shooting at the troops. This was not a shoot out at all;
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instead it was just shooting at the crowd, most of whom
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were just looking on at the action foolishly. (And who
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were allowed to approach the area by Yeltsin's troops.)
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Some pro-Yeltsin people, upon learning that there were no
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snipers there, excused the troops, saying that they just
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acted nervously. But this is impossible. This was not
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something that happened real quickly; this particular
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"sniper incident" went on literally for hours. This
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should be compared to the incidents when there really
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were people on the rooves. They were swiftly killed. At
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the incident which I was at, they weren't even being shot
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at. How long do you think it should take someone to
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realize that the people are screaming and running and not
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firing weapons at you and that gunfire is coming from the
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house (especially when it's dark and you can see green
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and red streaks coming down). Should it take ten minutes?
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Twenty minutes? An hour before you realize it? Then, how
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long do you think it should take hundreds of troops,
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dozens of tanks, to subdue these supposed snipers? A few
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hours? Well, they were shooting until the next morning,
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and even 2 days later. Yes, you had single soldiers
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sitting in trees shooting at rooftops while they allowed
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pedestrians to walk by and do their shopping on Novy
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Arbat, where supposedly communist snipers were hiding
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out, but all the shops were open for business..
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The supposed sniper incidents not only don't make any
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sense as told by the government, but contradict all eye
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witness accounts. For example, supposedly there were
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communist snipers on the roof of the Mayor's office, but
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this was at the same time as it was taken back by
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Yeltsin's troops. One journalist from the Moscow Times,
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an American who got caught in the Mayor's on Oct.4, tells
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of how he made his way slowly up to the rooftop. At the
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end of the story, Yeltsin's troops, went up on the roof
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and, having been reassured the building was secured, he
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made his way down. Yet the Russia media talks of the
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"snipers" on the roof of this building. They also talk
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about the "snipers" on top of the Hotel Mir and the World
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Trade Center. Well, how the hell did they get there? Did
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they fly? The defenders of the White House would have had
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to storm these places, both heavily guarded even on
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normal days, to get onto the rooves. But they didn't do
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this. It was Yeltsin's people on these rooves. Witnesses
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from the World Trade Center (businessmen) have told how
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they were let in and let up onto the roof. Yet, in every
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news report here, these people were communist snipers
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firing into the innocent crowd. It seems to me that there
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is only one possible conclusion to draw: that Yeltsin's
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troops fired deliberately into crowds of spectators and
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then tried to blame everything on the communists to
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villianize them in the eyes of the public and to justify
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the political repressions that were then made against
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them.
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There are still many unanswered questions about what went
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on at the White House that day. For example, why was it
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that armed defenders of the White House were allowed to
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escape through a system of secret tunnels which lays
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under the White House? Were there summary executions made
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after Yeltsin's troops moved into the White House? (Some
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doctors who saw the bodies on the scene speak of
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professional style killings (bullets in the head) and
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scores upon scores of dead.) Did Yeltsin's troops fire on
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people who had surrendered? (They did continue to bombard
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the White House for hours after a white flag was raised.)
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What is clear is that, despite Yeltsin's calls for
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parliamentary elections, he is trying to legitimize his
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effective dictatorship. After the events of Bloody
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Monday, the censorship and political repression of the
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Stalinist era were back. Papers appeared with large white
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spots in them and editors learned that they would have to
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self-censor themselves if they are to exist. Martial law
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was introduced, and close to two hundred thousand people
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were harassed. In addition, racist policies were put into
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effect that called for the targeting of and deportation
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of people from the former Soviet republics and China,
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most notably people from the Caucasus. People were
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summarily stopped and arrested on the streets; some were
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sent to work camps (ostensibly to earn the money for
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their train tickets home) and others were just deported;
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most of these people were fleeing war-torn areas and some
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had already been granted refugee status. Yeltsin calls
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this "a war on crime". We know that this is just the tip
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of the iceberg in what will be a Russian chauvinist,
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nationalist regime.
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Soon, there will be elections. They are supposed to be
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democratic, but no doubt many political parties will be
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prevented from participating in them. But, this is
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democracy a la Yeltsin. Democracy with no real opposition
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allowed. Welcome back to 1934.
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Laure Akai
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*********************************************************
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WHAT FREEDOM, WHAT DEMOCRACY?!
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by Mikhail Tsovma
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MOSCOW, OCTOBER 5, NOON
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While the building of parliament in Moscow was on fire
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and changed it's colour from white to black, Russia
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drowned more and more into the depths of
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authoritarianism. Thousands of spectators gathered on
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October 4 around the White House to see the storm troops
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seizing the parliament. In the crowd however there's no
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unity since not only Yeltsinites but also the people who
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consider his actions criminal and anti-constitutional
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gather there. Even among those who speak in support of
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Yeltsin there are a lot of people who see no need to kill
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that many people to get rid of the "Communist
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parliament".
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During the last three days the media fed people with a
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mixture of preaches to sit home and to go defend the
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president. Information was scarce and very ideologically
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one-sided. Those who had a chance to watch Western TV
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broadcasts or listen to "Radio Liberty" were much more in
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touch with the events than those who stuck to the Russian
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media.
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On October 4 while the troops stormed the parliament the
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media changed its accent trying to manufacture public
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support for the actions of Yeltsin and his companions.
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The arrest of Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and Makashov was put
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into heavy rotation while the comments were made that
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these people were the only ones who started the
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bacchanalia of killings. Yeltsin didn't appear on TV this
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day.
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WHO WERE THE SNIPERS?
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One of the cornerstones of the media campaign on October
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4 were "the snipers", that is armed putchists who spread
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all over the city and whose numbers it was impossible to
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guess. One of the doctors who was evacuating the injured
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from the parliament was interviewed by Russian TV and
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said that there was a considerable number of people shot
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near the White House in the morning and during the day
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right in their hearts, necks and heads. This was
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presented by the media as the evidence of the crimes of
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the putschists. In fact it is, but it appears more
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grounded to say that these were the people killed by the
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KGB and special police troops loyal to the government.
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Though there were quite a lot of arms in the White House
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there were hardly any "snipers", that is people specially
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trained in shooting, among its defenders. It is more
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probable that those who were shot were shot by the
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snipers of KGB. (During the August 1991 coup there was
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much worries about whether these special KGB troops will
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take the side of Yeltsin or not.) Since none of these
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special troops declared their loyalty to the parliament,
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it's hardly so that the Communist "snipers" killed people
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in dozens around the parliament.
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It is also interesting to learn how it happened that
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considerable numbers of armed people leaked from the
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White House and spread around the city. The parliament
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was blocked from all sides and since its defenders didn't
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have tanks it was almost impossible for them to get
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out... until they were let out by the government. The
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story about "unprofessional actions of the police and the
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military" is an old one and it is usually used by the
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authorities to justify more repression and the use of
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more troops. This is what happened during the clash
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between communists and the police on the 1st of May this
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year. This is what happened on October 3 when the
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authorities let the opposition to "defeat" special police
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troops on the streets of Moscow. This is probably how
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they provoked more violence during the storm of the White
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House.
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DEMOCRACY IS THE POWER OF DEMOCRATS (ARMED)
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For the whole day October 4 central Gorky Street was
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blocked by barricades erected by the sympathizers of
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Yeltsin who searched people's bags looking for arms. None
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of these people had an ID saying that he has the right to
|
|
do it, they just said that they were "representing the
|
|
structure". In his appeal to the Muscovites in the
|
|
evening of October 3 vice-premier Yegor Gaidar urged the
|
|
people to come defend the building of the Moscow city
|
|
Soviet (currently - the mayor's office). On October 4
|
|
after the storm of the White House he was asked by a
|
|
journalist whether he thinks this appeal could have lead
|
|
to more bloodshed on the streets of Moscow. He said that
|
|
since the army and police troops are part of the society
|
|
they can no longer be just manipulated and that they will
|
|
act only if they see that there is enough public support
|
|
of their actions. That is why the public support of the
|
|
"democratic government" was crucial. He also said that
|
|
the government was ready to give out arms to those who
|
|
gathered around the mayor's office.
|
|
|
|
CENSORSHIP OF THE MEDIA
|
|
|
|
There are clear signs of the coming authoriatarian
|
|
regime. Even the programs of CNN transmitted through
|
|
Moscow and Russian TV channels get censored - in the
|
|
evening October 4 sound dissappeared during one of the
|
|
street interviews with a person who was speaking
|
|
unfavourably of president Yeltsin. The same happened on
|
|
several occasions to a TV journalist of Channel 1 while
|
|
she interviewed vice-premier of the government Sergei
|
|
Shakhrai.
|
|
On October 5 not all the papers managed to appear.
|
|
Censorship is implemented in all the major papers.
|
|
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta" appeared on Tuesday with 2 blind
|
|
spots, while "Moskovsky Komsomolets" (Moscow's largest
|
|
boulevard paper that was attacked on October 4) and
|
|
"Moskovskaya Pravda" didn't appear. In "Komsomolskaya
|
|
Pravda" censors look through all the materials including
|
|
advertisments. Seven communist and nationalist papers
|
|
were closed the day before.
|
|
|
|
|
|
MORE FREEDOM, MORE DEMOCRACY
|
|
|
|
On October 4 it was announced that the Ministry of
|
|
Justice (sic!) declared illegal a broad variety of "pro-
|
|
communist and nationalist organizations" that supported
|
|
the parliament including fascist Russian National Unity
|
|
and social-democratic Party of Labour. The list of
|
|
organizations was kind of weird since there was nothing
|
|
about the Civic Union (the association of entrepreneurs
|
|
and industrial managers) which supported paliament and
|
|
declared it's loyalty to Rutskoi, but Confederation of
|
|
Anarcho-syndicalists was in the list together with "pro-
|
|
communist and nationalist organizations" though it
|
|
declared that it supports neither Yeltsin, nor Rutskoi
|
|
and instead called upon people to stop work and create
|
|
popular organizations from below.
|
|
Presidential decree disbanded Moscow City and district
|
|
Soviets. Moscow Soviet deputees were arrested and beaten
|
|
at the police stations, some of them were released in the
|
|
morning, October 5.
|
|
Moscow is returning to its everyday life with metro
|
|
stations surrounding the White House opened and the
|
|
curfew introduced from 23.00 to 5.00 for an uncertain
|
|
period.
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************
|
|
|
|
AN ANARCHIST STATEMENT ON THE FIGHTING IN RUSSIA
|
|
|
|
We can understand the desires of many Russian people to
|
|
get off the economic course set by Yeltsin/Gaidar and the
|
|
world economic order. The results for the general
|
|
population have been disastrous. These problems cannot be
|
|
solved by "peaceful" politics means, as Yeltsin suggests.
|
|
The fact that he attempted a coup d'etat and dissolved
|
|
the parliament attests to that.
|
|
Most people however cannot bring themselves to fight
|
|
their condition. Everything has been painted black and
|
|
white for them. Either Yeltsin or Rutskoi. Plus which,
|
|
those who were the first to actively oppose the putsch
|
|
are by and large communists and fascists whom most people
|
|
wouldn't want to have anything to do with. But, howver
|
|
much they want to make all struggles seem like a choice
|
|
between two forces, that is not the case. There are other
|
|
potential forces out there, but unfortunately they have
|
|
yet to be organized. The force that needs to be created
|
|
is one of working class people and others who are tired
|
|
of being robbed by their bosses and the system but who
|
|
don't wish to revert to authoritarian means to attempt to
|
|
rectify their situation. This force, we feel, is
|
|
potentially a large segment of the population.
|
|
While volunteers and troops fight it out to see who will
|
|
lead the people, business goes on as usual at the large
|
|
multinationals which have invaded the country. Nobody is
|
|
fighting against them. both sides promise their rule will
|
|
be more beneficial for workers, yet in any case the
|
|
worker will be bound to his or her job, forced to work to
|
|
buy back the goods they produce, without much say as to
|
|
what will happen to the product of their labour.
|
|
Basically as powerless as ever. Even in the best of all
|
|
circumstances, all that one can hope for is an
|
|
improvement in their material standard of living within a
|
|
framework of misery. True this is important for most
|
|
people, but there are better options for an immediate
|
|
improvement of your material situation than fighting it
|
|
out in a power struggle.
|
|
A few steps away from the White House are chic Western
|
|
stores, fast food restaurants and commercial kiosks. If
|
|
you are hungry now, go help yourself. There's lots of
|
|
money to be found there as well. Let the world see what
|
|
the Russian working class has come to: a group of people
|
|
on the verge of starvation, completely shut out from the
|
|
consumer wonderland and the world of economic "progress"
|
|
that Yeltsin hails as the new Russia. Send a clear
|
|
message to McDonald's and Pizza Hut that they won't make
|
|
millions free and clear, that the workers want their
|
|
profits back! Let the mafiosi and the speculators know
|
|
that your power is greater than the fear and economic
|
|
power that they wield over you right now! DOWN WITH
|
|
BUSINESS! LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN SHOPPING!
|
|
At factories across the country, workers are urged to
|
|
continue work peacefully. These are the same workers who
|
|
don't earn enough money to live on, who might not get
|
|
paid at all, who for years worked and slaved to fund the
|
|
state and its bureaucracy. A change in management may or
|
|
(more likely) man not improve your condition. But think
|
|
if you were able to control your own labour- to manage
|
|
and control you own labour entirely. Enough of making
|
|
other people rich and wasting your life in the process!
|
|
Stop all work and get rid of your bosses! LONG LIVE THE
|
|
GENERAL STRIKE! WORKERS' CONTROL WITHOUT THE BOSSES!
|
|
|
|
ORGANIZE YOURSELF! WE ARE NOT POWERLESS!
|
|
|
|
MUJERES LIBRES
|
|
|
|
********************************************************
|
|
|
|
NO POLITICAL SOLUTIONS
|
|
|
|
The Russian people, it is said, are in a political
|
|
crisis. More correctly put, they are in a crisis of
|
|
politics. The present problems facing the country - from
|
|
social to economic- are all resultant of politics. By
|
|
this the reader should not understand that these problems
|
|
are resultant of bad politics, but of politics in
|
|
general.
|
|
|
|
Over and over again the Russian people are told that if
|
|
they elect the right politicians, reforms will be carried
|
|
out and their lives will be better. Whoever is in power
|
|
will blame other politicians, past or present, for
|
|
whatever problems there are in the country (unless of
|
|
course they can find an enemy or national minority to
|
|
blame); most opposition political groups suggest that you
|
|
help them into power to remedy the situation (either by
|
|
voting them in or making a revolution or coup d'etat).
|
|
This is the situation world round : politicians telling
|
|
the people that what will save them is only new
|
|
politicians.
|
|
|
|
There is increasing evidence that people in many
|
|
countries have lost faith in political leadership. Take
|
|
for example in America where there is a large awareness
|
|
that most politicians are corrupt and that no matter who
|
|
they vote for the government will work in the interests
|
|
of the rich. The people, by and large, don't vote. Of the
|
|
small majority who do vote, many do so because they
|
|
genuinely want to have a political voice but usually wind
|
|
up voting for the "lesser of two evils". Many also vote
|
|
out of a sense of duty. By and large nobody cares enough
|
|
to find out about all the issues or a given politician's
|
|
stand on this or that. They don't feel a connection with
|
|
these issues and feel that the government will do what it
|
|
wants anyway, so why bother. And this is fine with the
|
|
politicians. Only when they feel that they can mobilize
|
|
people around a specific issue to win a campaign will
|
|
they try to inform the voters. Then, of course once a
|
|
campaign is won, the issues change, promises are broken.
|
|
Many people then wait for their chance to vote someone
|
|
out, vote someone in... But many also loose faith in
|
|
politics in general.
|
|
|
|
The Russian people are mostly looking for political
|
|
solutions. For them there is enough of a difference
|
|
between the current political pretendents to tend towards
|
|
one side or another, if only in reaction towards the
|
|
policies of the other. Much of the present support of
|
|
Yeltsin is due strictly to the perception of his
|
|
opponents as hard-line communists (whether or not this is
|
|
what they really are). At the same time, many of those
|
|
who support the parliament now do not actually support
|
|
their policies, but see in them the only safeguard
|
|
against sped up economic "reforms" and the only
|
|
alternative to Yeltsin's dictatorship. Rutskoi was
|
|
denounced by communists many times for selling out to
|
|
Western capital; he and almost the entire parliament
|
|
supported Yeltsin's ascent to power and wanted to and
|
|
still want to carry out economic reforms (just not at the
|
|
same rate as Yeltsin wants). Yet most of the communists
|
|
are now supporting Rutskoi.
|
|
|
|
There are some groups that have called on new elections,
|
|
who want to get rid of both Rutskoi and Yeltsin. This too
|
|
is a political solution, but as they have not made the
|
|
possible alternatives clear to people, it's not a popular
|
|
one.
|
|
|
|
Seemingly the choice of government would make a
|
|
difference in the life of people here. There are however
|
|
many factors which superscede the people's will. These
|
|
range from foreign to extra-national intervention to the
|
|
designs of government. Yet, no matter what government is
|
|
in place, the people's ability to understand their will
|
|
and to exercise it freely will be hindered.
|
|
|
|
The legitimacy of government lies on the belief that
|
|
people cannot run their own lives and coordinate society
|
|
orderly. It lies in the belief that if people had the
|
|
chance to freely exercise their will, their greed and
|
|
violence would take over, and that they would hurt other
|
|
members of society to get what they want. It is aided by
|
|
the creation and perpetuation of increasingly more
|
|
complicated structures which make the running of society
|
|
seem to be so incredibly complicated that it can only be
|
|
done with a large bureaucratic apparatus in place and
|
|
that in no way can it be run by the people themselves.
|
|
|
|
The Stalinists claim that greed and violence has taken
|
|
over society, but this is because there isn't a strong
|
|
government to control it. Fear and law would stop this.
|
|
But wasn't Stalin the most effectively violent man of the
|
|
century? And what about the greed of the nomenclatura?
|
|
These things might have been seen, if it were not for the
|
|
belief in the government. These things could not be
|
|
prevented because the government protected itself with an
|
|
enormous army.
|
|
|
|
The Yeltsinists imply that the prospective nomenclatura
|
|
would rob the people's wealth and shoot people in the
|
|
street. But isn't it the greed of Yeltsin's supporters,
|
|
the speculators, foreign businesses and bosses who are
|
|
growing rich off keeping the value of the rouble low and
|
|
paying peanuts for labour and resources that is
|
|
responsible for the current mass poverty and resultant
|
|
upsurge in violent crime? People wouldn't tolerate this
|
|
except they believe the lies of the Russian government
|
|
that suffering through this unbearable nightmare is the
|
|
only way to a better nightmare and that if this doesn't
|
|
make any sense to you then that's only because you don't
|
|
understand how to run a country.
|
|
|
|
In any case, the government, the army and the police (its
|
|
henchmen) orchestrate a system where most people cannot
|
|
freely determine the value of their labour, where
|
|
industries can be legally owned by persons or bodies
|
|
other than the workers, rendering them unable to freely
|
|
dispose of the product of their labour - to use as they
|
|
need or to trade with other workers for goods they need
|
|
or would like but cannot themselves produce. Land cannot
|
|
be freely acquired. If some individual or group of
|
|
individuals got it into their stupid heads that they
|
|
would live better, for example, if they kept the profits
|
|
of their labour instead of contributing to the bosses'
|
|
country club fund or the state's nuclear arsenal, if
|
|
somebody, having no place to live built his or her own
|
|
house, if a starving person, realising that a person who
|
|
works 40 hours a week should be able to feed themselves
|
|
but sees they can't now decides to take over a piece of
|
|
land and farm it -then the powers that protect you and me
|
|
from such irrational and greedy actions being carried out
|
|
by the people step in and exercise control. But any of
|
|
these actions would be rational given the situation. What
|
|
isn't rational is working your butt off (for the good of
|
|
everyone), receiving a wage on which you can only afford
|
|
bread, potatoes and tea (never a home or anything else),
|
|
watching the "democrats" getting rich off the property
|
|
they sold to themselves, or from the money (skimmed from
|
|
your labour) that they invested in buying your labour so
|
|
that they can take what you make and re-sell it to you at
|
|
a profit for their efforts.
|
|
|
|
People, living under years of government, years of
|
|
promises of political solutions, have begun to think very
|
|
irrationally. They begin to believe outrageous claims and
|
|
support people and conditions they really don't want to
|
|
support because they have been convinced that there is no
|
|
other way. The Russian people are now going through a
|
|
phase of optimal public stupidity. One ex-Komsomol leader
|
|
claims to be God and people follow...people refuse to
|
|
believe that Stalinist purges happened, and if they did,
|
|
then only to the guilty...there is an unprecented belief
|
|
in the horoscope and faith healers...people forget that
|
|
Yeltsin was part of the nomenclatura...people stand in
|
|
line for hours to look in Western department
|
|
stores...workers who had their strike crushed by Yeltsin
|
|
blindly and fervently support him. The only remedy to
|
|
this will be when people begin to get interested in
|
|
taking back active control of the processes that rule
|
|
their lives and work with each other to make life
|
|
enjoyable rather than crossing their fingers and heading
|
|
off to the ballot box.
|
|
|
|
Sceptics of course argue that this alternative may not -
|
|
or definitely will not- lead to any great life. The
|
|
question is not whether or not this will lead to a
|
|
workers' paradise (although what could be worse than
|
|
waiting 40 years to get an apartment, working all the
|
|
time, being unable to feed yourself or your family,
|
|
hoping anxiously that there will be no civil war, that
|
|
the value of the rouble compared to the dollar won't
|
|
fall, watching government corruption hopelessly etc.
|
|
etc.?). The point is to start a tradition where people
|
|
will help themselves and each other (a tradition which to
|
|
some extent exists in many countries where people take
|
|
initiative to do something, without waiting for the
|
|
government to decide to set up the program, in other
|
|
words, where people respond to the immediate needs of the
|
|
community in a timely and logical manner).
|
|
|
|
The Russians in many ways have been conditioned out of
|
|
such responses as such initiative was threatening to the
|
|
totalitarian nature of the Soviet government. Still they
|
|
are capable of organising things for themselves, as has
|
|
been evident in times of extreme crisis, such as during
|
|
the last coup when they organised shelter, free food,
|
|
distribution of gas masks, etc. for the diffence of the
|
|
White House, all on their own initiative.
|
|
|
|
I would suggest, that as an alternative to political
|
|
Russian roulette, that people would be better off meeting
|
|
with each other, trying to create alternative
|
|
institutions which can be influential paradigms for the
|
|
future. The pseudo-left are trying to get together a
|
|
"kinder, gentler, platform" as they have some chance of
|
|
winning some power in this somewhat pluralistic
|
|
government. They, in general, support the idea of
|
|
government and bureaucratic rule. They offer no
|
|
alternative to it whatsover. It is ridiculous to think
|
|
that any politician will come up with a program that will
|
|
call for less government and more freedom. (If any have
|
|
that is because business is the substitute government.)
|
|
Right now there is no political solution for the Russian
|
|
people. The international business community has its eyes
|
|
on Russia as the market which will save it from crisis.
|
|
Large investments have already been made. There is
|
|
probably only one forseeable course for the Russian
|
|
economy; this course may bring them a VCR in every home
|
|
eventually, in the very best of circumstances, but, as
|
|
the market demands, it will be at the cost of a constant
|
|
underclass, and a steady rate of unemployment. This is
|
|
not the solution that people want, but it is the only one
|
|
that they will get.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(MOTHER ANARCHY NO.5, cont.)
|
|
|
|
OBVIOUSLY A PROVOCATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
|
|
by Mikhail Tsovma
|
|
|
|
Two days after the succesful storm of the parliament in Moscow
|
|
gunshots are still to be heard around Moscow and this "obvious
|
|
fact" of the existence of Communist fighters and "snipers"
|
|
pushes people to embrace the martial law, the curfew and police
|
|
and military troops loyal to president Yeltsin as the saviors
|
|
of peace and calmness of Muscovites. This situation, of course,
|
|
is exactly what Yeltsin was looking for when he started his
|
|
coup d'etat on September 21st and there are clear signs that he
|
|
or at least somebody from his team were the people who worked
|
|
hard to reach this result.
|
|
Communist fighters and "snipers" somehow leaked through the
|
|
lines of police and troops surrounding the White House on the
|
|
day that the troops started the storm of the parliament and
|
|
caused many deaths among the government troops and civilians,
|
|
the media reports. Gunfire is heard in various districts of
|
|
Moscow, but it is quite likely that, like in Moscow's northern
|
|
suburb of Otradnoye (in the evening of October 5), policemen
|
|
are just firing machine guns into the air. What is it if not an
|
|
outright provocation designed to make people believe they need
|
|
more law and order.
|
|
Even the Moscow-based English-language periodical Moscow
|
|
Tribune which seems to undoubtedly believe in the stories about
|
|
Communist snipers published several materials revealing how the
|
|
forces of law and order were too reluctant when dealing with
|
|
the rioters on Sunday, October 3 during the clashes on
|
|
Oktyabrskaya and Smolenskaya Square. "we've got other goals. We
|
|
have other orders", - a police officer is reported to say when
|
|
asked why the police, at least 120 strong, had acted slowly and
|
|
done so little to stop 40 rioters, when the clashes were just
|
|
beginning. (John Helmer, Moscow Crisis: The First Spark, Moscow
|
|
Tribune, Oct.5.)
|
|
Sometime after when the riot was gathering its strength
|
|
Muscovites witnessed demonstrators forcing police to retreat,
|
|
attacking them with their own equipment and fighting their way
|
|
over the Moscow river and across the Ring Road to parliament.
|
|
(Reuters, Oct.3, 14:54.) The police troops that were blocking
|
|
the bridge across the Moscow River were rather poorly equiped
|
|
(helmets, shields and rubber batons only) and stood in the line
|
|
one-man thick only. It's worth mentioning that during less
|
|
dramatic oppositional demonstrations in Moscow police forces
|
|
were much broader represented and were acting much more
|
|
fearlessly, managing to stop the demonstrators where and when
|
|
needed. An hour and a half after the beginning of the
|
|
demonstration (time that is usually more than enough for the
|
|
police to predict the movement of the demonstrators and block
|
|
the streets where needed) police troops once again were
|
|
defeated on Smolenskaya Square not far from the White House.
|
|
These victories inspired the opposition to storm the TV centre
|
|
later in the evening, which somehow appeared to be unprotected.
|
|
Soon after the beginning of the storm Yeltsin declared a state
|
|
of emergency in Moscow, the government declared that it has
|
|
been forced to use force "to end the actions of political
|
|
adventurists an IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVERT MASS
|
|
BLOODSHED". (Reuters, Oct.3, 17:51 and 19:04). At 19:56 Moscow
|
|
mayor Yuri Luzhkov blamed "bandits" for the deaths of two
|
|
policemen and two interior ministry soldiers and the media
|
|
reported that troops loyal to president were brought to Moscow.
|
|
|
|
WHO WERE THE SNIPERS?
|
|
|
|
One of the cornerstones of the media campaign on October 4
|
|
were "the snipers", that is armed putchists who spread all
|
|
over the city and whose numbers it was impossible to guess.
|
|
One of the doctors who was evacuating the injured from the
|
|
parliament was interviewed by Russian TV and said that
|
|
there was a considerable number of people shot near the White
|
|
House in the morning and during the day right in their
|
|
hearts, necks and heads. This was presented by the media
|
|
as the evidence of the crimes of the putschists. In fact it
|
|
is, but it appears more grounded to say that these were
|
|
the people killed by the KGB and special police troops loyal
|
|
to the government. Though there were quite a lot of arms in
|
|
the White House there were hardly any "snipers", that is people
|
|
specially trained in shooting, among its defenders. It is
|
|
more probable that those who were shot were shot by the
|
|
snipers of KGB. (During the August 1991 coup there were much
|
|
worries about whether these special KGB troops will take the
|
|
side of Yeltsin or not.) Since none of these special troops
|
|
declared their loyalty to the parliament, it's hardly so that
|
|
the Communist "snipers" killed people in dozens around the
|
|
parliament.
|
|
Witnesses that were among the spectators of the storm of the
|
|
White House on Oct.4 report that there were government snipers
|
|
who were shooting "in all directions" (Moscow Tribune, Oct.5)
|
|
and particularly civilians. October 6 issue of Izvestiya,
|
|
Russia's biggest newspaper, features a story "Troops Near The
|
|
White House Shot Everything That Moves" describing how the
|
|
soldiers started shooting at the windows and roofs of buildings
|
|
around the parliament if they saw anybody moving there. This
|
|
went on for about two days and none of the specially trained
|
|
anti-terrorist detachments of KGB were involved in the fight
|
|
against the mythical snipers.
|
|
During the "sniper incident" on Novy Arbat (the only one
|
|
described in the media as far as I know) soldiers from APCs
|
|
shot in various directions, including the house on the
|
|
embankment of the Moscow River near the parliament where dozens
|
|
of people and TV crews gathered to see the fight. After the
|
|
people on Novy Arbat tried to escape into one of the courtyards
|
|
they were met by gunshots from the neighboring streets and the
|
|
windows of the houses that composed the courtyard - the area
|
|
was totally in the control of the police troops and there were
|
|
no "Communist fighters" there.
|
|
|
|
It is also interesting to learn how it happened that
|
|
considerable numbers of armed people leaked from the White
|
|
House and spread around the city. The parliament was blocked
|
|
from all sides and since its defenders didn't have tanks it
|
|
was almost impossible for them to get out... until they
|
|
were let out by the government. The story about
|
|
"unprofessional actions of the police and the military" is an
|
|
old one and it is usually used by the authorities to
|
|
justify more repression and the use of more troops. This is
|
|
what happened during the clash between communists and the
|
|
police on the 1st of May this year. This is what happened
|
|
on October 3 when the authorities let the opposition
|
|
"defeat" special police troops on the streets of Moscow.
|
|
This is probably how they provoked more violence during the
|
|
storm of the White House.
|
|
Currently the media reports dozens of cases when journalists
|
|
were arrested by the forces of law and order, severely beaten
|
|
up, held in Lefortovo KGB prison (together with the leaders of
|
|
parliament and dozens of civilians, including children), their
|
|
films exposed. (Izvestiya, October 6.) I doubt that any of the
|
|
policemen or military will be punished for these actions - they
|
|
feel that this is their time and that they can do whatever they
|
|
want without being punished or anything like that. This is what
|
|
they were doing for years, but what's going on now is just
|
|
outrageous.
|
|
And it's not just the police and the military since every other
|
|
high-rank "democrat" is trying to make revenge on his
|
|
opponents. Yeltsin had his fun destroying the paliament,
|
|
Moscow's mayor Luzhkov gladly witnessed (and sanctioned, I'm
|
|
sure) arrests and beatings of Moscow City Soviet deputees that
|
|
bothered him a lot about the legal grounds of his multiple
|
|
political and business activities. Heads of local
|
|
administrations are disbanding troublesome Soviets in their
|
|
regions. In the situation where there are virtually no
|
|
political organizations that really represent the interests of
|
|
different social groups, Soviets were almost the only
|
|
opposition to the governmental course (though the one that can
|
|
be called the real opposition), but with them being disbanded,
|
|
oppositional organizations and papers closed, and martial law
|
|
and censorship introduced, the road for Yeltsin's triumphant
|
|
elections is clean. Long live the real freedom of choice, the
|
|
choice between the Big Brother and yourself!
|
|
|
|
POSTSCRIPT
|
|
|
|
Vecherniya Moskva, Moscow evening paper on October 6, reported
|
|
that none of president's decrees implemented censorship and
|
|
that the censorship that existed was dictated by the needs of
|
|
the moment and that they won't work anymore. Nezavisimaya
|
|
Gazeta, one of the pro-democratic, pro-Yeltsin papers appeared
|
|
on that day with about half a page of blank space plus some
|
|
published information lacking the starting sentences. The
|
|
editor-in-chief of the hysterically pro-governmental Moskovsky
|
|
Komsomolets said on TV that blank spaces in some of the papers
|
|
is he fault of the editors. He also went as far as to declare
|
|
that there will be no blank spaces in his paper because they
|
|
publish the truth and nothing else but the truth and the truth
|
|
can't be censored. Do you love me, Moskovsky Komsomolets? Yes,
|
|
I love you, Big Brother!
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
|
|
DECREE
|
|
|
|
Couple of minutes ago a decided to appoint myself as the Third
|
|
Concurrent President of Russia. I proclaim that the First and
|
|
the Second Concurrent Presidents are just plain pretenders. I
|
|
command all Russian authorities to obey my orders and disregard
|
|
all decrees of the pretenders.
|
|
|
|
Who elected me? Well, who elected Yeltsyn to disband the
|
|
parliament? Who elected Yeltsyn to disobey constitutional
|
|
court? Who elected Rutskoy to replace Yeltsyn? Already
|
|
dissolved parliament did it?
|
|
|
|
The laws of Russian politics today are: "I do what I want." "I
|
|
am what I claim myself to be."
|
|
|
|
So, I order the Commander of St.Petersburg garrison to provide
|
|
me with an armored vehicle by the time of my arrival to the
|
|
Finland Railway Station of St.Petersburg (a la Vladimir
|
|
Illich), and the Commander of Moscow garrison to supply a tank
|
|
when I arrive to the White House (a la Boris Nikolaevich).
|
|
|
|
It is well known that since 1917 the main precondition for
|
|
taking power in Russia is making a speech from the top of an
|
|
armored vehicle. The topics of such speech are quite standard
|
|
as well: "Jest' takaja partia!" - "There is such a party !"
|
|
<that's ready to take power> and "Otechestvo v opasnosti!" -
|
|
"Fatherland is in danger".
|
|
|
|
I'm ready to participate in the presidential elections in
|
|
December, but only on one condition: radio and TV will be
|
|
subordinated to my government completely, my opponents will get
|
|
radio-TV time of 15 minutes per month, all other time will be
|
|
devoted to my political campain - then we will see who is going
|
|
to win very easily.
|
|
|
|
In addition, I agree to take power in other CIS countries with
|
|
more then one President and government or without any
|
|
governments at all.
|
|
|
|
I would consider applications of those netters who want to
|
|
become the ministers in my government. No experience required
|
|
(as always in Russia).
|
|
|
|
Grisha, the President of All Russias.
|
|
|
|
(Downloaded from GlasNet soon after Yeltsin's famous decree of
|
|
Sept.21.)
|
|
|
|
**************************************************************
|
|
|
|
THE VOLUNTEER MEDICAL BRIGADE
|
|
|
|
A perfect example of constructive self-organization is the
|
|
Maximilian Voloshin Volunteer Medical Brigade which was formed
|
|
on Oct.1, 1993 in anticipation of the events in Moscow of
|
|
Oct.3-4. Different left democrats and socialists (including
|
|
anarchists) got together and formed the brigade, the purpose of
|
|
which was to help the wounded as much as possible until they
|
|
could be treated by doctors. The team worked from Oct.2-4,
|
|
helping dozens of wounded- primarily people who were somehow
|
|
caught in the crossfire. Money and medicine was donated by
|
|
citizens who appreciated the fact that somebody was trying to
|
|
do something to alleviate the situation.
|
|
|
|
The brigade faced several problems. First of all, they had not
|
|
adequately prepared themselves for situations such as they
|
|
faced at Ostankino where there were scores of wounded. They had
|
|
to position themselves far enough from the battle to be safe
|
|
and this made it difficult for them at times to attend to the
|
|
wounded. But they were not alone; the entire medical community
|
|
in fact was unprepared for dealing with so many serious
|
|
injuries (mainly gunshot wounds) all at once. So the fact that
|
|
they were there to help out was extremely important. Another
|
|
problem the brigade faced was interference from Yeltsin's
|
|
troops. On the fourth, the brigade was not allowed through to
|
|
the White House to help the wounded. As one member, Petya
|
|
Ryabov writes, "Despite our flag with a red cross on it and our
|
|
medical supplies, the military did not allow us through; they
|
|
didn't even allow doctors through. Instead they subjected us to
|
|
a humiliating search and even took a gas mask away from one of
|
|
us. As if it were a weapon and not a self-protection devise."
|
|
|
|
Despite the problems the brigade had, it was deeply appreciated
|
|
by those it helped. Hopefully a few people learned the value of
|
|
acting on one's own initiative.
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
***
|
|
|
|
ETHNIC CLEANSING A LA RUSSE
|
|
By Laure Akai
|
|
|
|
Of all the repression which has taken place after the September
|
|
coup, by far the most outrageous has been the racist measures
|
|
taken by the government to cleanse the capital on a racial
|
|
basis. Immediately following the blasting of the White House on
|
|
October 4, special troops and regular police began a round up
|
|
of all "illegal aliens" in the city. Thousands were deported
|
|
and many more thousands fled, terrified for their safety.
|
|
|
|
The legal basis used for this mass operation was the "propiska"
|
|
or permit system, a relic of the Stalinist past which required
|
|
citizens of the former Soviet Union to have a permit to live in
|
|
Moscow (or any other region) stamped in their passport.
|
|
Normally this could only be obtained by birthright, a special
|
|
invitation to study or work, or through marriage. For years
|
|
there was a market of fake marriages to get around the system.
|
|
Without a propiska, finding work or a place to live in Moscow
|
|
was virtually impossible. But in the last few years, as visa
|
|
regulations were relaxed and as apartments began to appear
|
|
freely on the market for rent, more amd more people simply
|
|
ignored these rules and came to live in Moscow. Most of these
|
|
people are ethnically Russian, but also a large number of
|
|
others have settled here, including many Armenian and Georgian
|
|
refugees, many traders from Central Asia and China, and a great
|
|
deal of Americans and Europeans.
|
|
|
|
The operation to crack down on illegal residents, which
|
|
resulted in over 5,000 deportations within the first two weeks
|
|
alone was targeted almost exclusively on dark-skinned peoples
|
|
of the Soviet Union. There was no effort at all to conceal the
|
|
fact that the prime targets in this operation were people first
|
|
and foremost from the Caucasus, and from Central Asia. Searches
|
|
and identity checks were conducted on dark skinned people as
|
|
"whites" were left alone.
|
|
|
|
This harassment of people of colour has been going on for some
|
|
time in Moscow, and indeed has always existed to a certain
|
|
extent in the Soviet Union Every day people of colour are
|
|
stopped and harassed, often having to pay regular bribes to the
|
|
police to avoid arrest. Now the government, using the pretext
|
|
of the propiska system, have institutionalized this racism.
|
|
|
|
Most Russians blame people of colour, more specifically
|
|
"Caucasians", for the astronomical crime rate in the city.
|
|
Government officials, police and even the TV news claim that
|
|
"80% of all the crime committed in Moscow is commited by
|
|
Caucasians". If this figure is based on arrest records, it is
|
|
because of the fact that these people are much more likely to
|
|
be arrested than white skinned people. The police and the
|
|
government claim that they are "fighting crime", but in a city
|
|
where the Russian mafia carries on their business in the open,
|
|
where law enforcement officials are famous for taking bribes,
|
|
where police peddle guns and where theft and corruption takes
|
|
place in the government, this is a laughable exuse.
|
|
|
|
The general population has been by and large supportive of
|
|
these deportations. Most Russians, newly impoverished, insecure
|
|
about the future, etc., are seeking people whom they can blame
|
|
and take out their frustrations on. Before the coup, the police
|
|
had called on people to inform on their neighbours if they
|
|
expected them of being illegal aliens. Hundreds of people
|
|
called on the first day of the appeal. Now 40,000 citizens have
|
|
volunteered to help patrol the streets, keeping an eye out for
|
|
crime and "suspicious individuals".
|
|
|
|
During the operation numerous human rights abuses were
|
|
reported. Most typically people were grabbed and sent to
|
|
detention centres, without being able to contact friends,
|
|
relatives, their embassy, and often without a chance to argue
|
|
their position. There have been reports of people having their
|
|
posessions and documents stolen and of one man having his
|
|
papers bearing his refugee status torn up. Some people were
|
|
sent to special "work camps" to earn the money for their "trip
|
|
home". Those who have been arrested and deported include people
|
|
who were passing through Moscow or who had legal status. One
|
|
businessman was arrested at a hotel as he tried to register and
|
|
65 Chinese students were held and may still be deported.
|
|
Embassies and businesses have reported harassment of their
|
|
employees.
|
|
Sometimes the scenes have been truly ugly. At one Moscow food
|
|
market, Russian merchants reportedly helped police turn over
|
|
the fruit stands, beat and arrest traders from Azerbaijan. The
|
|
remaining vendors, now devoid of much competition, have raised
|
|
the prices on their own vegetables.
|
|
|
|
Although human rights groups have petitioned the government and
|
|
foreign embassies have lodged their protests, the government is
|
|
totally non-plused. And why shouldn't they be when around them
|
|
the major powers of the world carry on similar campaigns with
|
|
impugnity? Latching on the main theme of the 90's, Russia wants
|
|
to bleach out its population, and shut up its borders for those
|
|
without money, or those with dark skin. The rest are welcome.
|
|
|
|
People are encouraged to write letters of protest to the
|
|
Russian government and to picket consular offices in their
|
|
cities. For more information write to the Moscow Institute for
|
|
the Study of Racism, Fascism and Nationalism.
|
|
(cube@glas.apc.org)
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
|
|
WHY IT WAS THAT YELTSIN HAD A VICTORY
|
|
|
|
by Sonya K.
|
|
|
|
On the CNN they said everytime that all the Russian people love
|
|
Yeltsin and they want his reforms. This is not exactly so.
|
|
There are some people who benefit of the reforms, but they are
|
|
small portion of people. Then there are others who still like
|
|
Yeltsin because they remember him as a populist and they don't
|
|
have such bad time economically. But during the last putsch, it
|
|
was divided amongst the people. Many people felt sympathy with
|
|
the parliament but they were afraid of the Barkashovtsy
|
|
(fascists) and extreme communists who also supported the
|
|
parliament. Yeltsin made a big propaganda against these people
|
|
and said that there will be Stalinism again if the parliament
|
|
will win and that it was their fault that the economy is so
|
|
bad. He made some people take his side only because they think
|
|
he is better than parliament people.
|
|
|
|
So people were afraid to act against Yeltsin because they are
|
|
afraid of these communists and because they are afraid to take
|
|
any side in a political conflict. People took a side of Yeltsin
|
|
two years ago and now many of these people feel betrayed by
|
|
him. The market reforms did not bring no economic prosperity to
|
|
Russia, but made the people very poor. Only they lived worse
|
|
during the Great Patriotic War and War Communism times. But in
|
|
those times they could understand why they were starving. Now,
|
|
there is no reason because the shops are full with food. In the
|
|
beginning they told people that you must wait for the economy
|
|
to fix itself and then you will live as in America. People want
|
|
to believe this so they waited and they tolerated everything.
|
|
Now already many years have passed since beginning of
|
|
perestroika and only the mafia and Mayor Luzhkov live well.
|
|
Many people understand now that Yeltsin is liar and that his
|
|
reforms are just way to rob people again.
|
|
|
|
What could people do? They did nothing, but now they have
|
|
Yeltsin in complete control of the country and he is looking
|
|
like a dictator. There is something in Russian mentality that
|
|
likes dictator, because it represents stability. Some people
|
|
are tired of crisis of power so they choose dictator. But
|
|
others see that dictator is bad thing and they are sad that
|
|
Yeltsin shot the White House. People think that he should have
|
|
negotiated with parliament and let the people have an election
|
|
soon so they could decide what to do. Now people see that Tsar
|
|
Boris does not want to have a fair elections, but he wants to
|
|
guarantee his power. He promised that there will be
|
|
presidential election also, but it won't be. People distrust
|
|
him because he lies and because his friends are very rich and
|
|
corrupt nomenclatura men who steal money from the city and from
|
|
the people. They don't believe his promises any more.
|
|
|
|
The problem for people is that they believe that they need the
|
|
strong government to save Russia. They see that people have
|
|
become morally sick and that all the young people care about is
|
|
the money. The are making crime and this makes harder for
|
|
everybody. The people don't trust the other people any longer.
|
|
They are fighting with each other. This is one reason why they
|
|
cannot work together and make a real opposition. Another reason
|
|
is that people spend all time worrying about money and where
|
|
can you buy bread for cheap. The rest the people try to forget
|
|
about real life and they watch Mexican soap operas about rich
|
|
and beautiful people and they think their problems are not so
|
|
bad. They try not think about the politics. They think only
|
|
that goverment should be strong. If they participate in
|
|
politics, it is only that they choose one side or another, and
|
|
usually this choice is not intelligent one, but is based on who
|
|
makes the best promises and who is the person that already is
|
|
not discredited in the media. This is not the good way.
|
|
|
|
Also now very popular are the nationalist and the fascist
|
|
ideas. Russian nation feels insulted because it is not the
|
|
great power anymore and because they are not the masters. They
|
|
lived very well before, especially in the Moscow which got
|
|
special priveledges. Now they feel a resentment against many
|
|
people, especially against the countries who spit on the
|
|
Russians. They feel like their people are persecuted minority
|
|
in Estonia because they can't be citizens if they don't speak
|
|
Estonian. It makes no sense for people to speak Estonian,
|
|
people think, in old imperialist thinking. This thinking is
|
|
still alive, but even more. They are jealous that people live
|
|
better in this country. The idea to invade these places and
|
|
make Russian Empire again is very popular. It is special
|
|
conditions which make the people turn into Nazis, like in
|
|
Germany before the World War 2. There are many conditions the
|
|
same, if you think about this.
|
|
|
|
This reason is one reason why people were happy when Yeltsin
|
|
kicked off the Caucasians from Moscow. They think these people
|
|
are all criminals because they have dark skin they think a
|
|
lower culture than Russia, so they are not people who work, but
|
|
only criminals.
|
|
|
|
If the people can vote, they will vote for the person like
|
|
Yeltsin, but not he. It is a very strange situation in our
|
|
country. The people don't like this, they don't like this, but
|
|
they always make the same mistakes. They wait for new leader to
|
|
come and hope he will solve all problems, but it only becomes
|
|
worse.
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
**
|
|
|
|
|