295 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
295 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
San Andres V- A "new" Solidarity
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By Cecilia Rodriguez
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National Center for Democracy, Liberty and Justice
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"We seek a new peace, not one of hunger, misery, submission,
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and humiliation, but one of dignity and justice..and we are
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willing to give up our lives in order to find it"
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Comandante David
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Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional
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July 24, 1995
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CHRONOLOGY
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THE GOVERNMENT on the subject of reduction of military
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tensions--REJECTS EZLN proposal to move troops to positions
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held before the February 9th assault in order that the EZLN
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would return to the position held before January 1, 1994.
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It PROPOSES a plan for "routes" occupied by both armed
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forces, a plan similar to the one used to end the Salvadoran
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conflict. The EZLN would occupy areas within government
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troop lines. This proposal was referred to as "the plan for
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reservations".
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THE EZLN RESPONDS-- Immediately it counterproposes a
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route to Guadalupe Tepeyac, the site of the historic
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"Aguascalientes", but the government instantly rejects it.
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Upon its return to the July 6th negotiations it proposes a
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route from Ocosingo to San Quintin as a "trial" effort.
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THE GOVERNMENT-- Again rejects the counteroffer
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claiming it is "extemporaneous" and WITHDRAWS its route
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proposal. It accuses the EZLN of using the proposal for
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"propaganda" purposes. NO proposal remains on the table.
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THE GOVERNMENT on the subject of the timeline for the
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peace talks-Through Jorge Del Valle the government suggests
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"profound and intense" negotiations by holding 20 days of
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discussions for each theme on the agenda. According to
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simple calculations this would consume 4 years and 11
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months, while the EZLN's proposal can have a potential
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duration of 3 years and 1 month.
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THE GOVERNMENT COMPLAINS--The EZLN is not serious about
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the peace negotiations and is utilizing delay tactics. It
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threatens to "move ahead to resolve the economic problems of
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the area without the EZLN".
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THE GOVERNMENT DECLARES in the words of Marco Antonio
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Bernal, the coordinator of the government peace delegation,
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"Why yes, we believe that the Zapatistas are liars who do
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not want peace, but to buy time in order to continue to lie
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and hide behind the mask and the mountains. WE also believe
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they are insolent and foul-mouthed and other things after
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what occurred this morning".
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Comandante Tacho responds--"Your face is that of a good
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person, but your heart is filled with hypocrisy." The
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possibilities of substantive agreements were distant in this
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5th encounter between the Mexican Government and the
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Zapatista Army of National Liberacion.
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II-TWO
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The 900 military policemen who surround the site of the
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pace talks have, over time, acquired accouterments. Now
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they sport white braids hung from their right shoulder,
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spotless white shoelaces on shiny black boots and white
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gloves. They march into formation each time they post guard.
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With eyes shifting under low-brimmed helmets, they observe
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as civilian participants, campesinos, and the residents of
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San Andres conduct their business in the small, cluttered
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plaza. In addition to their spiffier appearance, the
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military has also deployed a new look-out post on a building
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catty-corner to the site of the peace talks, radio towers,
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and sundry undercover agents who seem to do little more than
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look like agents and pull on the antennas of their cellular
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phones.
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There is clear evidence of the hardening of the
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government line everywhere. Like a cauldron sitting on
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glowing coals, Mexico simmers with the growing resistance of
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its people. Weakened by its corruption and internal purges,
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the government is cautious before a growing national and
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international civilian movement which only gains in strength
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each time the government opts for armed force. Yet its
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strategy of low-intensity warfare against the Zapatistas
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creeps forward much as its troops do in the Lacandon jungle.
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In addition to the recent deportation of three priests
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in Chiapas, the publication of a recent book by Carlos Tello
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Diaz (a great grandson of Porfirio Diaz) is an expansion of
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the government's effort to publicly discredit the EZLN.
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Based largely on government intelligence reports, the book
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clearly attempts to legitimize the official government line.
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According to the book the EZLN is nothing more than a
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"rabid " handful of old-line leftists who use indigenous
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people to forward a socialist agenda, the CCRI holds no real
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power and bishop Samuel Ruiz and his church are a central
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spoke of the Zapatista movement. Tello's book received
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front page treatment in may national publications as well as
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a significant splash in the electronic media. It was
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conveniently made public days before the peace talks.
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The cauldron simmers in Mexico. The Zapatistas promote
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a mobilization of peaceful civilian movements, the
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organization of international solidarity efforts. They wage
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a battle of ideas and words, of innovative proposals, of
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calls to conscience and of an integral effort to fined a
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peaceful solution. The government meanwhile continues to use
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intimidation, starvation by occupation, selective
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assassination, illegal detention and the blatant
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manipulation of propaganda.
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It will soon be 19 months since the Zapatistas burst
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into the public eye. The initial outpouring of romanticism,
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spontaneity and curiosity has ended. The difficult and
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important task of building a peaceful national liberation
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movement and maintaining the viability of a peaceful
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transition remains. In addition to that the Zapatistas face
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the formidable task of advancing history in Latin America.
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The Zapatistas and their supporters struggle to overcome the
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cannibalistic habits of the left and the clear failures of
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socialist theory. They struggle to integrate the grassroots
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as no other group in history has done. After spending ten
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years educating, training, and building communities; the
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Zapatistas are intent on avoiding the mistakes of other
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armed struggles. At great military and political expense,
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they have held off the war in the hopes that national and
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international consciousness would develop and that moderate
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and progressive forces could forge a unity capable of
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harvesting the kind of social change as yet unknown to
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history.
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To that end, the Zapatista's latest innovation is the
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national and international plebiscite. Mexico has had only
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one other plebiscite in one hundred years of its history.
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This one however has been requested by an armed and
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clandestine group; it is the first in world history. It is
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being organized by a non-governmental organization and
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promoted by the Democratic National Convention, a civic
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group that is a brainchild of the EZLN. In addition to the
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difficulties that arise naturally with such a novel task,
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the Plebiscite confronts the challenge of a lack of
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resources, and the establishment of working relationships
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among such disparate groups. Yet the civilian movement has
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undertaken the task with such enthusiasm that major
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ideological differences have been set aside. In its
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insistent search for a democratic practice, the EZLN offers
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the people of Mexico a moment in which to exercise it, to
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find a voice for the will of the populace, something that
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the present government of Mexico has been unable to do.
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While some may claim that the innovations of the EZLN
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have not been completely successful, no one can say that
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they have not changed Mexico and world history forever. Yet
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the change a t this moment is intangible and fragile. It is
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manifest in the tiny steps which ordinary citizens take in
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an effort to re-awaken or even give birth to a new kind of
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democracy, a representative democracy whose base is civic
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involvement. It struggles to survive in a cynical world
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more prepared for despair than possibility. It challenges
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all previously held concepts about how change takes place.
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The Zapatistas depart from traditional leftist theory,
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precisely in what the government refuses to acknowledge---
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their indigenous base. This is a clear departure from
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traditional "guerrilla" theory, as is their open and frank
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dialogue with the populace as well as their willingness to
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allow others to take the lead, and to engage in debilitating
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peace talks with a group of negotiators who appear to be
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deaf. The Zapatistas do not negotiate from a machista
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position of force--they use reason and the moral authority
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that comes from the sacrifice of their lives to continue to
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persuade people to seek a change in Mexico.
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From the Mexicans and the Zapatistas we learn that the
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ideals contained in the words "democracy, liberty and
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justice" are expensive and difficult to achieve. They cost
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lives, health egos and sacrifice. They require imagination,
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flexibility, integrity, and the ability to take enormous
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risks. "The plebiscite" said Comandante David "is very
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important. It is a form by which to dialogue on a national
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level, by which to break the silence and change the
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attitudes of the government and of the powerful. It is a way
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in which to give voice to the smallest ones, the voice of
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the faceless, nameless ones without history, and a method of
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work of those who want a just and dignified peace."
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In the witless style of Chicken Little, the government
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delegation commented that "the results of the plebiscite
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would not be an obstacle" for the peace negotiations." It
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then promptly concluded the 5th encounter arguing that the
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EZLN was only buying time for the plebiscite. The EZLN
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proposed the 6th peace talks be hold on August 20th. The
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government prefers September 5th.
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III- THREE
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The civilians who post guard in the peace cordon at San
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Andres Sacam'chen must stand for four hours each shift.
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When they are lucky, the clouds crawl slowly down the green
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mountains and the sun peeps out occasionally from behind
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them. Then, the hours drift by in a silent dance of aching
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feet. Most of the time though the rain pours and the
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civilians carefully hold out the front of their ponchos, in
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order to made a small circle of dry land at their feet. Or
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the sun glares down mercilessly, and they shift their hats
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in order to keep it from their eyes. Unable to hear or see
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anything, they carefully study the enclosed building where
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the Zapatistas and the government delegation are meeting.
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Otherwise, one can sleep, read, converse with old
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friends, wander from one end of the plaza to the other and
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watch the children play. The unifying task is waiting. The
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civilians stand at attention when the door suddenly opens ..
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They clutter together at strategic points in order to catch
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a glimpse of the unfolding events.
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These are either brief narratives of agendas and the
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always-moving communiqus of the Zapatistas. Long days
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filled with waiting, and even longer damp nights filled with
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silence and the unbearable desire to sit or gaze at
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something new. The hundreds of people committed to the
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vision of the Zapatistas at San Andres Sacam'chen however,
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do not complain. They are proud and anxious to stand, happy
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to give up the subsistence routine of their lives in order
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to come to San Andres and wait, regardless of the hunger and
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exhaustion. This is their grain of sand after all, to stand
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through inclement weather, and use their bodies to protect
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the Zapatistas.
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And in the silent waiting of these indigenous
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communities lays the most powerful lesson of all, more
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powerful than all the weaponry assembled against the
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Zapatistas, more powerful than the hundreds of television
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hours now being used to discredit them. Resistance is the
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ability to fight with whatever one has, in whatever way
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possible. Resistance is collective. The campesinos together
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meld in a long chain of humanity, indistinguishable one from
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the other.
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It will require significant financial, moral and
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physical support in order for the national democracy
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movement that the Zapatistas have helped to birth, to
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succeed. Like everything else in its wake, its success will
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require a "new solidarity". This solidarity can not be based
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on a pedestal upon which we place a people struggling to
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find a new way of doing things, and which we abandon when we
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learn, that they are people just like us. It cannot be a
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solidarity filled with rhetoric about "imperialism", "the
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masses" or cluttered with perfectionism that will never
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exist in the very human process of social change.
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This new solidarity must take risks-- it must organize
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in base communities. It must develop "unprecedented
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proposals"--it must collaborate in ways it has not done
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before and avoid becoming an expensive parasite which
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absorbs all the resources and fails to accomplish its goals.
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It must combine the financial donations which allow a people
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to survive and struggle, with the political tenacity and
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vision to complement the fierce determination of the Mexican
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people. it must leave behind the armchair psychosis of the
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left which glorifies armed struggle as the superior method
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by which to resolve political conflict. It must leave behind
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its self-righteous absorption with its own agenda, and be
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willing to learn, to wait, and to engage.
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Only then will this new solidarity be a fitting
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companion to the new peace so eloquently expressed by
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Comandante David. together they will overcome the
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exhaustion of a world embittered by the failures of all
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previous economic theory. Hand in hand, they will stand at
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the threshold of a new international order based on
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democracy, liberty and justice.
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NUTS AND BOLTS
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Given the critical nature of the struggle for a new
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peace in Mexico, you can personally do the following almost
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immediately;
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1. Send a substantial contribution to the Mexican
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Commission for the National Plebiscite. The commission must
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raise $100,000 in order to make the plebiscite happen.
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Contributions should be sent to the Banco Inverlat SA
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(branch #038), account # 910695-2, in the name of Esperanza
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Ayar Macias.
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2. Support the humanitarian aid caravan being organized
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by Pastors for Peace due to arrive in Chiapas on August
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27th. For more information, please call Pastors for Peace
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at (612) 378-0062 or <p4p@igc.apc.org> for specific
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information. The campesinos have been severely impacted by
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the militarization of southern Mexico. Unless there is a
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significant increase in humanitarian aid, the widespread
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hunger and illness which already grips the area will
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intensify. Will we allow hunger to be the only compensation
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for a people who dared to stand for their dignity?
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3. Participate in the International Plebiscite by
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personally filling out a ballot. Take a bunch to your
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union, school, health club, church. Talk to people and
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explain the importance of their participation. The
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International Commission of the CND has authorized three
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stages for the International Plebiscite to correspond with
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national events. Participation in the International
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Plebiscite is open to all peoples of the world. Please plan
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other events and gather as many ballots as possible.
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JULY 31 - Deadline for the completion of the first stage.
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AUGUST 20 - Completion of the second stage to coincide with
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the National Plebiscite.
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SEPTEMBER 13 - Completion of the third stage to coincide
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with the completion of the National Student Plebiscite.
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4. Participate in the peace camps located in many of
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the villages which have been militarized. your presence and
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hard work in these communities are an enormous moral
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support, and a deterrent to continued military harassment
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and intimidation.
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For more information about "new" solidarity contact the
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Center for Democracy, Liberty and Justice at (915) 532-8382
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or email at <moonlight@igc.apc.org>.
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