111 lines
6.3 KiB
Plaintext
111 lines
6.3 KiB
Plaintext
THE MONROE DOCTRINE:
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The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's
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seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823:
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. . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made
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through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power
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and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the
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United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation
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the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the
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northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been
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made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain,
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which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United
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States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting
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the great value which they have invariably attached to the
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friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the
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best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to
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which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by
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which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for
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asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of
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the United States are involved, that the American continents, by
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the free and independent condition which they have assumed and
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maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for
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future colonization by any European powers. . .
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It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great
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effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the
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condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared
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to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely
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be remarked that the results have been so far very different from
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what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe,
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with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive
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our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators.
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The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most
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friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men
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on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers
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in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part,
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nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our
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rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries
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or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this
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hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by
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causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial
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observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially
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different in this respect from that of America. This difference
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proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments;
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and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss
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of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their
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most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled
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felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore,
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to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United
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States and those powers to declare that we should consider any
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attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of
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this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the
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existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have
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not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments
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who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose
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independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles,
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acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of
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oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny,
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by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation
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of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war
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between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality
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at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered,
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and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur
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which, in the judgement of the competent authorities of this
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Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of
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the United States indispensable to their security.
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The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still
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unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced
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than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on
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any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by
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force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such
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interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question
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in which all independent powers whose governments differ from
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theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none
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of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to
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Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have
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so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains
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the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of
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any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the
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legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations
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with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and
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manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every
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power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those
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continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.
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It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their
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political system to any portion of either continent without
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endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that
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our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of
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their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we
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should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.
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If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and
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those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must
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be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true
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policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves,
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in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .
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Prepared by Gerald Murphy (The Cleveland Free-Net - aa300)
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Distributed by the Cybercasting Services Division of the
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National Public Telecomputing Network (NPTN).
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Permission is hereby granted to download, reprint, and/or otherwise
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redistribute this file, provided appropriate point of origin
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credit is given to the preparer(s) and the National Public
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Vš�R¥�T
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