122 lines
5.4 KiB
Plaintext
122 lines
5.4 KiB
Plaintext
14 Digit Hacking
|
|
|
|
|
|
Well boys and girls, it would seem my predictions of increased
|
|
telco security has come true. In 1986 I predicted that within 2
|
|
years all of the telcos would move to the 14 digit format. This
|
|
because of their inability to protect their systems from us -
|
|
phreaks. Take Heart!! We're not dead yet.
|
|
|
|
Those of you who have read my book, The Phreaker's Handbook or
|
|
Phreak's Long Distance Phone Thieves have a handle on what's
|
|
up. This is the news on increased telcom security as of Oct 1987.
|
|
|
|
Allnet
|
|
|
|
Allnet is going hog wild with their new software analysis
|
|
package. They've cut the maximum amount of time you can stay on a
|
|
code down to three days. It depends on when you whack it. They do
|
|
not run the software on Fri, Sat, or Sun. So if you whack the
|
|
code on Friday, it will stay good until Monday around 1 P.M.
|
|
Pacific Standard Time. If you bang them during the week, you'll
|
|
lose the code in less than 24 hours.
|
|
|
|
Mci
|
|
|
|
If your first love was the 5 digit Mci Node, say bye bye. They
|
|
are slowly dismantling the local dialup network and keeping the
|
|
950-0222 nodes which incidentally are 14 digit At&t 0+ format.
|
|
In the last year my return rates have dropped from 5 per hundred
|
|
to 1 per 300. Rather pathetic. And that was multinode, multi
|
|
destination hacking. Incidentally, another one of my innovations
|
|
that came about in May of 1986 when they installed the first
|
|
version of the monitoring software.
|
|
|
|
Sprint
|
|
|
|
You can start kissing off those 9 digit codes. Sprint's new FON
|
|
system is totally 14 digits and can only be accessed thru an 800
|
|
number. For which there is a 55 cent surcharge most of which goes
|
|
to At&t. Sprint is going to let Ma Bell provide their security
|
|
for them. They say they aren't going to issue the 9 digit codes
|
|
anymore. They aren't killing all the codes at once though. We
|
|
still have time to play with Sprint. I think they're going to
|
|
kick back and see what they results of the FON project. If for no
|
|
reason other than the expense of 55cents just for the privilege
|
|
of placing a call, I recommend everyone discontinue their Sprint
|
|
accounts and go to another company. Incidentally, the "increased
|
|
quality" of the new fiber optic network can't be that great when
|
|
you consider that you have to connect and downconnect to your
|
|
destination on the hold copper wire networks owned by your local
|
|
telco. Hardly worth 55 cents.
|
|
|
|
Metrophone
|
|
|
|
I know of no one who's gotten a code off of Metro in over a year.
|
|
This used to be the whore of the networks. She never said no. Now
|
|
she never says yes.
|
|
|
|
Skyline (mci)
|
|
|
|
950-1088 I've seen codes posted in remote areas for this service.
|
|
Have not heard of, or been able to bag one code in the large
|
|
metro areas. Mci appears to be killing this node and routing to
|
|
the 1022 node again 14 digits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The problem of whacking 14 digit codes is that of possibilities.
|
|
There are 14x14 possible combinations of numbers. This makes it
|
|
practically, which any predictable regularity to hack out the
|
|
code. We can resort to that old standard (created by me) of
|
|
prefix hacking. The attached file is for the entire Southern
|
|
California Area. It includes the area code and prefixes used
|
|
here. They are all valid and courtesy of Pacific and General
|
|
Telephone companies. These 6 digits will reduce the possibilities
|
|
down to 8x8. This is a pain in the ass, but it is possible.
|
|
This scenario will work with any telco that uses valid phone
|
|
numbers as part of the code. DO NOT HACK YOUR LOCAL TELCO OR AT&T
|
|
unless you're equipped to do it from a fortress phone (pay
|
|
phone). Ess will pick up your actions at you'll have a phone
|
|
truck in front of your house within 30 minutes. Trust me, I did
|
|
it, and a knew better too. Nothing came of it other than I went
|
|
in the bathroom and kicked myself in the ass for being so dumb!
|
|
|
|
I want you to think of the prefix file as a chain file. Add all
|
|
the prefixes in your local area to it, area codes too please.
|
|
In a couple of months I want to see this thing back in the
|
|
Southern California Area busting at the seams.
|
|
|
|
Ok, what do we do with those companies that use bastardized
|
|
routines for their codes. The Ustel format uses 527 for the 818
|
|
area. The new FON card uses 524 for 818. Both companies are now
|
|
owned by Sprint so we can see a similarity in the thought
|
|
processes here can't we? I'm starting a separate file with the
|
|
first six digits of the Fon Card and Another one for the Ustel.
|
|
US/Sprint is on the 9501033 node and uses the 0+ At&t format
|
|
I've your partial to 800's go for the Fon's. I personally leave
|
|
800's alone.
|
|
|
|
If you're inclined to cancel your Ustel or Sprint accounts, add
|
|
your first six digits to the list and put it back in the archive
|
|
file. This is the only way we're going to crack the bastards,
|
|
group effort at data collection.
|
|
|
|
There is one other possibility. The 14 digit code is the product
|
|
of a formula called a "hashing formula" By entering the first
|
|
10 digits of the card it will generate a 4 digit security code.
|
|
It also relates to the logical record location within the telco's
|
|
computer system. If anyone has this formula, and has no love for
|
|
the phone companies....get this sucker into circulation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Good luck guys...more updates available as the news developes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bobo T. Hacker
|
|
aka Robert Morgan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|